The design and implementation policy of the National Health Insurance Scheme in Oyo State, Nigeria by Omoruan, Augustine Idowu
i 
 
THE DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION POLICY OF THE NATIONAL HEALTH 
INSURANCE SCHEME: A STUDY OF OYO STATE. 
 
 
 
By 
 
 
 AUGUSTINE IDOWU OMORUAN 
 
 
Submitted in Accordance with the Requirements for the Degree of 
 
 
 
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 
 
 
 
In the Subject 
 
 
SOCIOLOGY 
 
 
At the 
 
 
 
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH AFRICA 
 
 
 
 
SUPERVISOR: 
PROFESSOR JIMI ADESINA 
 
 
 
NOVEMBER 2018 
  
ii 
 
DECLARATION 
 
 
 
Name:   Augustine Idowu OMORUAN 
 
 
 
 
Student Number:   55761305 
 
 
Degree:    Doctor of Philosophy (Sociology) 
 
 
THE DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION POLICY OF THE NATIONAL HEALTH 
INSURANCE SCHEME IN OYO STATE, NIGERIA 
 
 
 
 
 
I declare that the above thesis is my own work and that all the sources that I have used 
or quoted have been indicated and acknowledged by the mean of complete references. 
 
 
 
      November 2018 
 
SIGNATURE        DATE  
  
iii 
 
DEDICATION 
 
 
 
This thesis is dedicated to God Almighty the giver of life, and to the memory of my late parents, 
Pa. Emmanuel Ideho Omoruan and Mrs. Grace Omoruan. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
iv 
 
AKNOWLEDGEMENT 
 
 
My foremost gratitude goes to Almighty God for sustaining me throughout the research. To 
Him be the glory. 
 
I express my sincere appreciation to my supervisor, Professor Jimi Adesina for his comments 
and insights on the numerous drafts he had to go through. I failed severally during the writing 
stage but he did not abandon me. Therefore, I sincerely appreciate you sir. 
 
I am most grateful to the academic staff of the department of General Studies, Ladoke Akintola 
University of Technology, Ogbomoso, starting from Professors A.B Afolabi, T.F Ebijuwa and 
W. Tijani, Associate Professors, Aladeyomi, Adejumo, Osunbade, Oladiti. Drs. Adeniji, 
Olaniyan, Aborishade, Olagunju, Onipede and Olatunji. Others include Messrs Bamidele, 
Oyekola and Mrs. Phillips. Likewise, I appreciate the non-teaching staff of the department for 
their support. 
 
I acknowledge my friends and colleagues under the SARChI Chair both past and present 
including Dr. Olayinka Akanle, Dr. Kola Omomowo, Dr. Ranti Samuel, Dr. Ashley, Dr. Musa 
Chibwana, Messrs Madalitso Phiri, Bongani Nyoka, Clement Chipenda, Newman Tekwa, Tom 
Tom, Misses Marion, Kim, Ntombi and Ipeleng, for their inspiration and motivation. 
 
Thank-you also to Dr. Samuel Oloruntoba, I feel very fortunate to find such helpful and 
inspiring scholar. He always welcomed me when I needed advice or suggestions. To Dr. 
Oluyemi Stephens, thanks for the regular prayers and supports, I am very grateful. To 
Adeyinka, I am grateful for an enduring friendship.  
 
I sincerely appreciate the financial supports of LAUTECH, TETFUND and UNISA towards 
the completion of the research.   
 
My gratitude goes to the authors of books, journal articles, periodicals and other materials that 
I consulted in the research. 
 
v 
 
I appreciate my wonderful daughters, Goodness and Mercy for their patience while I was away 
for the research. To my siblings, I am very grateful for encouraging me to keep at it even though 
it would have been so much easier to give up. To my late parents whom notwithstanding the 
financial constraint were able to send my siblings and I to school. Their sacrifice sets the 
foundation on which the journey of this success was laid.  
 
Finally, yet importantly, I am very grateful to my wife, Janet Omoruan, the dearest and the 
most precious person to me in the world. It is impossible for me to account for her contributions 
to the successful completion of the research. I can say only one thing, without her support and 
sacrifice my PhD degree would never be a reality. My all-out gratitude is to my sweetheart for 
staying beside me in all situations during the programme. Stay blessed my dear! 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
vi 
 
LIST OF ABBREVIATION AND ACRONYM 
 
BOTs   Board of Trustees 
CAQDAC  Computer-Aided Qualitative Data Analysis 
CBHI   Based Health Insurance  
CBHIP  Community Based Health Insurance Programme 
CBN   Central Bank of Nigeria 
CSMBS  Civil Service Medical Benefit Scheme 
DRC   Democratic Republic of Congo 
EBPHI   Employment-Based private health insurance 
ESHI   Employer Sponsored Health Insurance 
FERMA  Federal Road Maintenance Agency 
FMF   Federal Ministry of Finance 
FRSC   Federal Road Safety Corps 
FSSHIP  Sector Social Health Insurance Programme 
GoR   Government of Rwanda 
HCHC   Hygeia Community Health Care 
HCP   Health Care Providers  
HIF   Health Insurance Fund 
HMOs   Health Maintenance Organisations 
HSR   Health Sector Reform 
IDI   In-Depth Interview 
IMF   International Monetary Fund 
IMR   Infant Mortality Ratio 
ISSHIP  Informal Sector Social Health Insurance Programme 
KII   Key Informant Interview 
vii 
 
LAUTECH  Ladoke Akintola University of Technology 
LFN   Law of the Federation of Nigeria 
LGAs   Local Government Areas 
LMICs   Low-and–Middle-Income-Countries  
LOS    Log Ordinary Least 
MHA   Mutual Health Association 
MMR   Maternal Mortality Ratio 
NCH   National Council on Health 
NCMS   New Cooperative Medical Scheme 
NHIP   National Health Insurance Policy 
NHS   National Health Service 
NHIS   National Health Insurance Scheme 
NPC   National Population Commission  
NSDC   Nigerian Security and Civil Defence Corps 
NTA   Nigerian Television Authority 
OECD   Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 
OOP   Out-of-Pocket  
PHC   Primary Health Care 
PHI   Private Health Insurance 
PPACA  Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act 
PSHI   Public Sponsored Health Insurance 
SAPs   Structural Adjustment Policies 
SES   Social-economic status 
SHI   Social Health Insurance 
SPSS   Statistical Package for Social Sciences 
viii 
 
SSS   Social Security Scheme  
TETFUND  Tertiary Education Trust Fund 
TISHIP  Tertiary Institution Social Health Insurance Programme 
UCH   University College Hospital 
UCS   Universal Coverage Scheme 
UHC   Universal Health Coverage 
UK   United Kingdom 
UNICEF  United Nation Children Education Funds 
UNISA  University of South Africa 
US   United State 
VCSHIP  Voluntary Contributors Social Health Insurance Programmes 
VGSHIP  Vulnerable Group Social Health Insurance Programme 
WHO   World Health Organisation 
WTP   Willingness to Pay 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ix 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Given the general poor state of health care and the devastating effect of user fee, the National 
Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS) was instituted as a health financing policy with the main 
purpose to ensure universal access for all Nigerians. However, since NHIS became operational 
in 2005, only members of scheme are able to access health care both in the public and in private 
sectors, representing about 3% of Nigerian population. The thesis therefore examines the 
design and implementation policy of NHIS in Oyo state, Nigeria. Key design issues conceptual 
framework guides the analysis of data. The framework identifies three health interrelated 
financing functions namely revenue collection, risk pooling and purchasing. Data was collected 
from the NHIS officials, employees of the Health Maintenance Organisations (HMOs) and  the 
Health Care Providers (HCPs) using key informant interview. In addition, in-depth interview 
and semi structure questionnaire were used to gather data from the enrolees and the non-
enrolees. Empirical findings show that NHIS is fragmented given the existence of several 
programmes. In addition, there is no risk pooling neither redistribution of funds in the scheme. 
Revenue generated through contributions from the enrolees was not sufficient to fund health 
care services received by the beneficiaries because of the small percentage of the Nigerian 
population that the scheme covers. Further findings indicate that enrolled federal civil servants 
have not commenced monthly contribution to the NHIS. They pay 10% as co-pay in every 
consultation while federal government as an employer subsidised by 90%. Majority (76.8%) 
of the respondents agreed that they were financially protected from catastrophic spending. 
However, the overall benefit package was rated moderate because of exclusion of some priority 
and essential health care needs. Although above half (57%) of the respondents concurred that 
HMOs are accessible, in the overall, (47.6%) of the respondents were not satisfied with their 
services. In the case of the HCPs, majority (61.9%) of the respondents claimed that there is no 
excessive waiting time for consultation. Furthermore, (64.3%) rated their interpersonal 
relationship with the HCPs to be good. However, more than half of the respondents (54%) 
disagreed on availability of prescribed drugs in NHIS accredited health facilities. For the non-
enrolees, findings show that most of the respondents (72.9%) were willing to enrol, but 
significant proportion (47.5%) indicated financial constraint as impediment to enrolment. 
 
x 
 
Key word: Social Policy, Structural Adjustment Policies, Health Sector Reform, Health 
Financing policy, Out-of-Pocket Payment, Social Health Insurance, National Health Insurance 
Scheme, Fragmentation, Nigeria. 
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 CHAPTER ONE 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Background to the Study 
 
Health financing policy reform has been a major concern that is gaining prominence in the 
international health policy debate. It is a mechanism of providing financial solution to the 
challenges of health care costs caused by slow economic growth rate, which in turn resulted in 
inadequate financing of health care and uneven distribution of health services. Financing policy 
reform in the health sector involves a range of financing model, such as, tax finance system, 
Social Health Insurance (SHI) and Out-of-Pocket (OOP) payments etc., with the aim of 
increasing revenue to the sector. However, in recent time, SHI is at the centre stage of global 
health policy discourse as a means of generating adequate revenue (both from taxation and 
contribution) to finance health care (Hsiao and James, 2007). Many countries in the 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) have attained universal 
coverage via SHI (Barnighausen and Sauerborn, 2002). Besides, SHI has also been introduced 
in the Low Medium Income Countries (LMICs), to replace OOP payments, which for a long 
time remained as the main source of financing health care (Hsiao and Shaw, 2007).  
 
The recent shift in the health financing debates towards SHI as a model that could offer 
households financial protection from the burden of healthcare costs became essential in the 
developing countries due to the collapse of tax-funded universal health care system and the 
devastating effects of OOP payments (Akin, et al., 1987; Mohindra, 2008). SHI has continued 
to gain recognition as one of the effective ways to protect households from financial burden of 
health care costs (World Health Organisation (WHO), 2005, 2013; Ataguba, 2016). For 
example, the WHO, a leading advocate for Universal Health Coverage (UHC), encourages the 
adoption of SHI as a cost-effective model to achieve universalisation of health care (WHO, 
2005; McIntyre, et al., 2005). The WHO defines UHC as “ensuring that all people can use the 
promotive, preventive, curative, rehabilitative and palliative health services they need, of 
sufficient quality to be effective, while also ensuring that the use of these services does not 
expose the user to financial hardship” 
(https://www.who.int/healthsystems/universal_health_coverage/en/). 
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In 2005, the World Health Assembly at its 58th congress adopted a resolution inspiring its 
member states to move towards UHC (WHO, 2005). Besides, in 2010, the WHO focused on 
prepayment initiative and risk pooling as the strategy to achieve the goal of UHC (WHO, 2010). 
Most countries in the OECD including Germany, Japan, Belgium and Costa Rica among others. 
have expanded and universalised health coverage through SHI (Carrin and James, 2004; Hsiao 
and James, 2007). Furthermore, a considerable number of countries in Africa, Asia and Latin 
America have also committed to achieving the goal of universalism of health care by engaging 
in political, legislative and technical debate on the inclusion of SHI as a financing policy in the 
attainment the universal access. For example, Ghana, Thailand and Colombia have steadily 
improved their health coverage to about 50%, 95% and 75% respectively, through the 
establishment of SHI (National Health Insurance Authority, 2010; La Forgia and Nagpal, 2012; 
Vargas-Zea, et al., 2012; Dutta and Hongoro, 2013). However, improving population coverage 
in other countries such as Nigeria and Dominican Republic among others remains a challenge, 
with about 3% and 10% coverage respectively (Barnighausen and Sauerborn, 2002; Odeyemi 
and Nixon, 2013).  
 
Historically, the principle of development underpinned the Nigerian state in the immediate 
post-independence as social services provision was seen not just as a response to social ill but 
also as a driver of productivity and social cohesion (Adesina, 2007a). The fundamental 
normative components inherent in welfare state underpins the nationalist ideology. These 
include first, that individual well-being is a collective responsibility, meaning that the 
individual is not solely responsible for taking care of himself or herself, but rather being taken 
care of is a social right. Second, a normative commitment to promote public well-being should 
consider the entire population, not just a particular group or sub-section. Third, social provision 
must represent a sense of collective responsibility. Fourth, social service practices or activities 
must be congruent with the normative orientation of promoting the benefit of the whole 
population. Finally, the “social” must be autonomous from political or economic 
consideration–in other words given that social provisions are based on “social right,” they must 
not be subordinated to economic or political considerations (Korpi and Palme, 1998; Kildal 
and Kuhnle, 2005. Adesina, 2007a). 
 
The Nigerian government provided health care services including preventive and curative care 
for her citizens through general taxation. Universalization of social services was primarily the 
responsibility of the government, health and other basic social services like education were 
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seen as issues of social welfare rather than consumable goods and therefore health expenditure 
as a percentage of federal government expenditure was on an average of 3.5% in the 1970s 
(World Development Report, 1980). Besides, social services were seen as a complement to 
economic growth (Adesina, 2007a; Obono, 2007). Furthermore, social justice and equity was 
part of the national policy framework as people had access to these services not based on ability 
to pay, but rather on needs (Adesina, 2007b). However, in the post 1980s public health 
expenditure and other social services plummeted due to dwindling economic growth rate, cut 
in social spending, political instability and the introduction of Structural Adjustment 
Programmes (SAPs) which de-emphasised spending on health and other basic social services 
(Adesina, 2007a). Because of the inadequate public spending on health care, the WHO (2005) 
noted that many sub-Saharan African countries including Nigeria spend less than the 
recommended annual limit of $34 per capita on health services. These brought about poor 
socio-economic indices such as high infant and maternal mortality rate and low life expectancy. 
For instance, in Nigeria, health expenditure from federal government allocation reduced 
drastically from an average of 3.5% in the 1970s to less than 2% between 1980-90s, resulting 
in shortage of essential drugs and other medical supplies (Federal Ministry of Health, 1988).  
 
The decline in the economic activity of the 1980s compelled Nigerian government to adopt the 
devastating neoliberal policy championed by International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World 
Bank economic recovery policy known as SAPs. The main elements of SAPs were neoliberal 
features including anti statist ideology, promotion of private sector and free market culture, 
reducing public spending on social services and opposition to publicly funded health system. 
Ideologically, neoliberalism embodies individualism and the primacy of the market with the 
notion of commodification of social services. Thus, public sector user charges policy was 
introduced to improve social funding and substitute poor budgetary provision to the health 
sector due to the following premises: first, it would generate and improve the quality of health 
services. Second, the policy would prevent unnecessary health services utilisation and 
adherence to referral systems. Third, health care provider would be more responsive to patients 
and provide quality care when patients make OOP payments for services. Lastly, user fees 
policy would stimulate fairness among the people (Akin, et al., 1987; McIntyre, et al., 2005; 
Adesina, 2007b). Furthermore, privatisation and liberalisation took the central stage of the 
economy, and thus affected the social services provision. For example, health care was subject 
to market forces and treated as a normal commodity rather than one based on equity, fairness 
and social justice. The country witnessed astronomical growth rate of private hospitals charging 
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exorbitant fees for health services. The results of SAPs were however devastating as many 
studies revealed that social indicators such as education, health care and life expectancy 
drastically declined rather than improve. The effect of SAPs was also notable by de-
industrialisation and neglect of the nationalist development objectives (Adesina, 2007b; 
Obono, 2007; Shivji, 2009). 
 
Consequently, overwhelming evidence highlights that user charges or OOP payment did not 
provide enough revenue to offset the decline in public funding for health care but rather 
worsened the decline in the funding of health care (Adesina, 2007a; Obono, 2007). This is 
because direct purchase of health care was difficult for many individuals and households and 
thus did not improve the health sector funding. Subsequently, the risk pooling through 
prepayment and mutual support mechanism was considered an alternative strategy to finance 
health care (Ogunbekun, et al., 1999; National Demographic and Health Survey (NDHS), 2003; 
Bodenheimer and Grumback, 2005; Save the Children, 2008; WHO, 2010). 
 
Health insurance could be private, government or a mix of government and private financed. 
In the private health insurance, transaction requires the payment of a premium or contribution 
by an individual or private employer to an insurance organisation and a refund from the 
organisation to the provider. The government-financed health insurance is a single tax-financed 
health insurance system where the government takes sole responsibility of financing health 
care through taxation. The mixture of public and private financed model is a combination of 
tax funded and mandatory contributions from individuals, employers and employees of varying 
population groups to finance health care. SHI is a model of financing health care by both state 
and private as mentioned above. In the SHI model, members of the society are categorised and 
accommodated into different insurance plans irrespective of their socio-economic status, 
funding is provided through membership contribution and taxation to support certain income 
groups and exempt the low income and poor population group who cannot afford to make 
contributions (Carrin and James, 2004). This model has attained high level of universalisation 
of coverage both in the developed and in some developing countries. 
 
Over the past decades, the developed countries such as Germany, Canada, UK and Japan 
among others have instituted social insurance programs namely accident, retirement, disability, 
unemployment and medical care (Bodenheimer and Grumbach, 2005; Macgregor, 2014). 
These countries have demonstrated largely state involvement in the management of health care 
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in the form of statutory health insurance, financed by tax revenue or a mixture of tax and 
contributory system with little support from private insurance thereby providing universal 
coverage for their populations. For example, Germany finances health care through a merger 
of social insurance and public financing model such that no distinction existed between 
employed individuals who contributed to their health insurance scheme and unemployed 
people whose contributions are made by the government. The German government ensures that 
there is no disparity in accessing health care by making sure funds is available in the sick funds 
to take care of the poor and the sick. Ninety per cent of the German population belongs to the 
mandatory sickness fund, 8% opts for private insurance, 2% receives medical services as 
members of the military and the allied services, and less than 0.2% has no coverage (File and 
Murray, 1995; Busse, 2004; Busse and Riesberg 2004).  
 
Furthermore, Canadian government operates a tax-financed single-payer health system and all 
Canadians receive the same health insurance irrespective of individual social economic status. 
For instance, changing, quitting or retiring from a job has nothing to do with health insurance 
system in Canada. The Canadian health care system is so unique that UHC programme has 
designed a fairer system for distributing health care services. The government does not allow 
private insurance companies to market health insurance for services covered by provincial 
health plans in order to avoid preferential treatment (Bodenheimer and Grumback, 2005; 
Busse, 2004). Furthermore, health care in the United Kingdom (UK) is largely ‘free of charge’ 
at the point of use within the context of the National Health Service (NHS). A tax-based health 
care system provides UHC to a large percentage of the population. Funding includes direct and 
indirect taxes and contributions from the insured with supplement from free market of private 
health insurance (PHI). Largely, UK has low level of health care expenditures due to the 
institution of the governmental single payer system to limit budgets and mode of 
reimbursement of health care providers (Boyle, 2011; Adeyemi and Nixon, 2013).  
 
Japan has several insurance plans with different categories like Germany’s mandatory 
employment-based social insurance for workers. First, every employer of 700 employees and 
above are required to operate self-insured health plan for their employees and their dependants 
in a plan called the society-managed insurance plans–and this covers 23.7% of Japanese 
population. Second, employers of less than 700 employees enrolled in a single national health 
insurance program for small businesses operated by the national government and it covers 
37.9% of the population. The third category of health insurance called citizens health insurance 
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plan covers self-employed and retirees, which made up of about 39.8% of the population. 
Another type, which is the fourth category, exists for government employees or civil servant 
and it covers 7.4% of the population. The fifth and final category of health insurance plan in 
Japan covers the physically challenged and institutional services. This category protects 1.2% 
of the population and it is financed by tax system and newly earmarked income tax. The entire 
health insurance plans in Japan are mandated to provide comprehensive benefits such as 
payment for hospital services, medications, maternity and dental care (Ikegami and Campbell, 
2004; Ikegami, 2009; Jones, 2009).   
 
Many developing countries are also driving towards the policy of universal coverage with 
substantial progress made. For instance, the Ghanaian NHIS is funded by a 2.5% National 
Health Insurance tax on selected goods and services, a 2.5% Social Security and National 
Insurance Trust fund from the government workers, premium from the informal sector workers 
and government budget allocations. However, some categories of people are relieved of paying 
premium in Ghana health insurance policy, these include children who are less than 18 years 
with at least one parent paying contribution; or covered by exception, as well as pregnant 
women, pensioners, aged and the indigents who could not afford the premiums.  
 
The Ghanaian NHIS essentially combined SHI for formal sector employees and Community 
Based Health Insurance (CBHI) scheme for the informal sector to meet the policy goal of UHC 
with almost half of the population covered (Ghana NHIS, 2010; Dalaba, et al., 2012; Debpuur, 
et al., 2015). Similarly, the GoR began a dramatic reform of its health care system in1999, and 
by the year 2000, the country was committed to universal coverage using CBHIP called 
Mutuelles de sante as the main component of the national strategic plan to attain UHC (Rwanda 
Ministry of Health, 2010). While other SHI programmes such as the Military Medical Scheme 
and La Rwandaise d'Assurance Maladie were available, they only cover insignificant 
proportion of Rwanda population. However, to ensure universal coverage, several laws were 
promulgated including the Rwanda CBHI Policy in 2010 that made provisions for Rwandan 
residents to enrol in health insurance plan that provides quality care (Rwanda Ministry of 
Health, 2010). The CBHI scheme took the central stage of Rwanda strategic health plan in 
achieving universal coverage because it covers majority (90%) of the population while other 
health plans cover 5.4% of the population. The laudable achievement of high universal 
coverage in Rwanda through community insurance scheme was contingent on a number of 
funding such as 45% revenue from other sources such as tax revenue, external funding, other 
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insurance plans etc. and 55% revenue from contributions (Rwanda MoH, 2010; Nyandekwe, 
et al., 2014). 
 
Furthermore, in mapping a path towards universal coverage in Thailand, the Thai government 
merged a wide range of health insurance plans to three that covers the entire population. The 
three health insurance plans include (1) Civil Service Medical Benefit Scheme (CSMBS) that 
covers government employees as well as retirees and their dependants. (2) Social Security 
Scheme (SSS) for private sector employees excluding dependants. (3) Universal Coverage 
Scheme (UCS for population not covered by CSMBS and SSS. The CSMBS is financed by 
general taxation and it covers 9% of the Thai population, SSS is financed by payroll deduction 
– tripartite contribution of 1.5% of salary from government, employer and employee and it 
covers 16% of the population. Moreover, the UCS is financed by general tax and it covers 75% 
of the population (Dutta and Hongoro, 2013). However, not much has been achieved in terms 
of universal coverage in Nigeria despite the fact that several health insurance programmes are 
in place such as formal sector, informal sector, voluntary individual, vulnerable group social 
insurance programmes etc. According to NHIS, only 3% of the population has been covered 
and benefited from the programmes (NHIS, 2011). 
 
It is widely acknowledged that many developing countries have implemented different forms 
of SHI programmes, attaining different levels of coverage depending on the pace and stage of 
implementations. For example, Ghana, Rwanda, Thailand, Colombia and China have made 
significant progress towards achieving universal coverage. On the other hand, Nigeria, 
Dominican Republic and India among others have not achieved much in terms of population 
coverage. Achieving universal coverage has been very challenging in most developing 
countries especially with the way their health financing policy is organised and implemented. 
Therefore, this study investigates the institutional design and implementation policy of NHIS 
in Oyo State, Nigeria. 
 
1.2 Statement of Problem 
SHI has been at the forefront of health financing policy discourse in global south in recent 
times as many countries are at different stages of implementation. The stage and pace of 
implementation varies because of many factors such as legislative, political, economic etc. 
However, in Nigeria for example, the idea to introduce National Health Insurance (NHI) dates 
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back to 1962 when the central government was providing health care for all at no direct cost to 
individuals and households because health care and other social services were financed by 
general taxation. Therefore, the idea was halted because there was no reason for health 
insurance at the time, health services was readily available at government clinics and hospitals 
across the country. In this respect, the nationalist ideology was premised on a symbiotic 
relationship between social services and economic development. Therefore, government was 
investing heavily in social services including education and health to enhance human capacity, 
and thus increase economic growth and development. However, the idea re-emerged in 1984 
due to the decreasing public expenditure on social services and declining state of health care 
delivery in the country. This prompted the National Council on Health (NCH) to commission 
a study on the feasibility of NHI in Nigeria. In 1988, however, NCH constituted a committee 
on the viability of the proposed NHI. The report of the committee was submitted to the Federal 
Ministry of Health and encouraged the government to start the NHIS in 1992 with a 
recommended template (www.oauife.edu.ng/.../NATIONAL-HEALTH-INSURAQNCE-
SCHEME-IN-NIGERIA). The NCH endorsed rebranding of the scheme to accommodate 
private sector participation (NHIS, 2006). This idea brought about the introduction of Health 
Maintenance Organisation (HMOs) as financial manager of the scheme. Thereafter, the NHIS 
was finally unveiled in May 1999 by the military decree 35 (Awosika, 2005; NHIS, 2006). 
 
In 2005, a segment of the programme for the formal sector was unveiled with the presidential 
directive given to NHIS to ensure no less than 30% of Nigerians are covered by the year 2015 
and 70% by 2020. Furthermore, in 2016, President Mohammadu Buhari reiterated government 
commitment to ensure all Nigerians have access to health care, and thus mandated the scheme 
to ensure efficiency and protection from political patronage (This Day News, 2014; Health 
Reporters, 2016). After its institution in 1999, NHIS was set to achieve the following 
objectives: (1) “to ensure every Nigerian has access to good healthcare services” (NHIS Act, 
2004: 5). (2) “Protect families from the financial hardship of huge medical bills” (NHIS Act, 
2004: 5). (3) “Limit the rise in the cost of healthcare services” (NHIS Act, 2004: 5). (4) “Ensure 
equitable distribution of healthcare costs among different income groups” (NHIS Act, 2004: 
5). (5) “Maintain high standard of healthcare delivery services within the scheme” (NHIS Act, 
2004: 5). (6) “Ensure efficiency in healthcare services” (NHIS Act, 2004: 5). (7) “Improve and 
harness private sector participation in the provision of healthcare services” (NHIS Act, 2004: 
5). (8) “Ensure adequate distribution of health facilities within the Federation” (NHIS Act, 
2004: 5). (9) “Ensure equitable patronage of all levels of healthcare” (NHIS Act, 2004: 5). (10) 
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“Ensure the availability of funds to the health sector for improved services” (NHIS Act, 2004: 
5). 
To achieve the aforementioned objectives, NHIS operates in the form of SHI scheme to cover 
the Nigerian population. The scheme operates three main programmes to ensure the realisation 
of its objectives. These include the Formal Sector Social Health Insurance Programme 
(FSSHIP), Informal Sector Social Health Insurance Programme (ISSHIP) and Vulnerable 
Group Social Health Insurance Programme (VGSHIP). The establishment of the scheme is to 
expedite fair financing of healthcare costs through pooling of funds and prudent use of 
resources to provide financial risk protection for people through prepayment mechanisms 
before falling ill (NHIS, 2012).  
 
Despite political and technical commitments to the scheme, NHIS has been lagging since its 
inception concerning the realisation of its set objectives and overall goal of universal access to 
health care. Only members of the scheme are able to access health care services in both the 
public and private sectors. Although studies have shown that federal government employees, 
employees of the private organisations, voluntary individuals etc. have joined the scheme, there 
is no accurate record of the total number of people covered in the scheme. It is estimated that 
about 5million Nigerians including 75% public employees and 25% private sector employees 
were insured (NHIS, 2011; Osuchukwu, et al., 2013; Health Reporters, 2016). Thus, achieving 
NHIS goal has been very challenging owing to the low patronage. 
 
There are several studies on the impact of NHIS on health care in Nigeria. For example, a 
substantial amount of research has identified challenges facing NHIS in Nigeria (e.g. Nnabuchi, 
2009; Oyendibe, et al., 2012; Onoka, et al., 2013; Odeyemi and Nixon 2013; Odeyemi, 2013; 
Ilesanmi and Ige, 2013). In addition, research has shown that NHIS provides reliefs from cost 
burden incurred through OOP payment (e.g., NHIS, 2012; Onyedibe, et al., 2012; Odeyemi, 
2013). All these studies have broadened our understanding on the impact of NHIS on the 
Nigerian health care. However, there have been contradictions between NHIS stated objectives 
and actual implementation. The gap between the objectives and outcomes have shown policy 
fragmentation and loss of cohesion among programmes and players in the scheme, which in 
turn resulted in weak implementation of NHIS. It is therefore important to assess the 
institutional design and implementation policy of NHIS and its effects in achieving equitable 
and efficient financial and health benefits and the overall goal of universal coverage in Nigeria. 
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1.3 Research Objectives 
 
The broad objective of this thesis is to assess the design and implementation policy of NHIS in 
Oyo State Nigeria, while the specific objectives are to: 
 
1. Examine the structure and functions of NHIS in Oyo state. 
 
2. Examine the mechanisms adopted by NHIS to meet universal coverage objectives in 
Oyo state. 
 
3. Identify challenges inhibiting the achievement of the set objectives in Oyo state. 
 
4. Assess the extent of equity in terms of financial contribution and health benefits    
among enrolees in Oyo state. 
 
5. Determine the extent of availability and accessibility of services of the HMOs and 
health providers in the NHIS in Oyo state. 
 
6. Examine the knowledge, attitudes and perceptions of non-enrolees about the scheme 
Oyo state.  
 
 
1.4 Research Questions 
 
The research study provides answers to some questions on NHIS’ design and implementation. 
These include: 
 
1. What is the structure and functions of NHIS in Oyo state? 
 
2.  What are the mechanisms adopted by NHIS to meet universal coverage objectives in 
Oyo state?  
 
3. What are the challenges inhibiting the achievement of the set objectives in Oyo state? 
 
4.  What is the extent of equity in terms of financial contribution and health benefits among 
enrolees in Oyo state? 
 
5. What is the extent of availability and accessibility of services of the HMOs and health 
providers in Oyo state? 
 
6. What is the knowledge, attitudes and perceptions of non-enrolees about the NHIS in 
Oyo state? 
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1.5 Significance of the study 
Design and implementation is very crucial in the redistributive process of any social policy in 
order to achieve a democratic and egalitarian objective. This is because realising promised 
outcomes in a poorly designed and implemented policy will be elusive. The debate about social 
health insurance is pertinent not only for the development towards the achievement of universal 
coverage in Nigeria but also for the development of universal coverage as an essential global 
health idea. Thus, this thesis provides an empirical analysis of the design and implementation 
policy employed by NHIS to meet the target objective of universal access. The thesis also 
provides information on financing and benefits of NHIS programmes, knowledge, attitudes and 
perceptions of the public about the scheme. Knowledge about the design and implementation 
of the scheme will be useful not only in policy making of the Nigerian government for the 
improvement of NHIS but also for other countries who are experiencing similar challenges of 
scaling up population coverage. Given the presidential mandate to provide coverage for no less 
than 30% of Nigerians by 2015, and the current administration efforts to ensure efficiency and 
the achievement of universal coverage, this thesis highlights the strategies required for scaling-
up the NHIS and the achievement of universal coverage in Nigeria. The thesis emphasises the 
principle of redistributive health care as a mechanism for the achievement of universal access, 
and seek to advance knowledge in health financing policy literature. 
 
Furthermore, the outcome of this research will be useful in establishing appropriate institutions 
to support and pave way for the achievement of universal health coverage in Nigeria. Policy 
formulation on the proper way of achieving health insurance coverage, implementing policy 
and accompanying programmes for a viable NHIS will positively contribute not only to 
solvingthe burden of households health expenditures, but also improve human capital, labour 
productivity, social cohesion and economic growth. 
 
The scope of the study includes the three main urban areas of the state namely Ibadan, Oyo and 
Ogbomoso. In addition, three local government areas (LGAs) namely Iseyin, Surulere and 
Ibadan southeast were selected. Specifically in Ibadan, the following unit of study were 
selected: NHIS enrolees from public and private enterprises, NHIS officials, HMOs’ 
employees and NHIS accredited health providers. In Oyo, NHIS enrolees were selected from 
public and private institutions. Similarly, in Ogbomoso, NHIS enrolees were selected from 
public and private institutions. 
12 
 
1.6 Thesis Structure 
 
The thesis is presented in nine chapters. The current chapter presents background information 
to the thesis, outlines statement of problem, research questions and objectives. The chapter also 
points out that the thesis has the potential to add to knowledge on health financing policy 
literature. It also discusses the scope and delimitation of study. 
 
Chapter 2 examines the historical development of NHIS in Nigeria. It also assesses the law 
and policies of the Federal Republic of Nigeria as it relates to the establishment of NHIS. In 
addition, the chapter discusses the operational guidelines of the scheme in relation to 
programmes, standards and accreditations, records and information, offences penalties and 
legal proceedings. 
 
Chapter 3 reviews existing literature on health care reform. Specifically, we review the 
literature on the following themes, namely health sector reform, structural adjustment policies, 
risk sharing model, national health insurance policy, health financing policies in Nigeria and 
NHI in Nigeria. The chapter underscores health sector reform as a global health policy agenda 
with emphasis on overhauling of health system to bring about efficiency and equity putting 
into consideration values and culture that underpins various reforms in every country. For the 
developing countries; however, health sector reform implies dismantling the public health care 
system by reducing public spending on health, liberalising the health sector and expanding 
private participation. This idea resulted in structural adjustment policies with neo-liberal 
orthodoxy such as introduction of user fees in public health care system and risk sharing model 
as a viable alternative because of the failure of user fee to generate funding as proposed by the 
international financial institutions. The chapter appraises the trajectory of health financing in 
Nigeria putting into consideration tax funded health care system in the immediate post-
independence, user fee or out-of-pocket payment initiated by the structural adjustment policy 
of the 1980s and the introduction of social health insurance as an alternative health care 
financing model in Nigeria. The chapter also presents a conceptual framework for the study. 
  
Chapter 4 discusses research methodology used in this study, such as the description of the 
research design, study area, study population, sampling techniques, research instruments, pilot 
study, reliability and validity of the instruments, methods of data collection and data analysis, 
and research ethics. Specifically for the research instrument, key informant interview was used 
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to gather information from NHIS officials, employees of the HMOs, Health Care Providers 
(HCPs). In-depth interview and semi-structured questionnaires were used to elicit information 
from enrolees and non-enrolees. 
 
Chapter 5 discusses the institutional framework of NHIS in relation to the set objective of 
universal access. Using the three interrelated health financing functions of the conceptual 
framework namely revenue collection, risk pooling and purchasing/provision, the chapter 
presents results of the key informant interview with the stakeholders namely NHIS officials, 
HMOs’ employees and HCPs. 
 
Chapter 6 presents the socio-demographic characteristics of the respondents. These include 
gender, age, marital status, education, religion, income, occupation and ethnicity. It analyses 
respondents’ method of financial contribution, financial protection against catastrophic 
spending and heath care package.  
 
Chapter 7 explores the quality of services of the HMOs and HCPs. Specifically, the analysis 
covers respondents’ views on accessibility to HMOs, services of the HMOs and overall 
satisfaction with the HMOs. In addition, on HCPs, the analysis covers respondents’ views on 
waiting time, availability of drugs, interpersonal relationship and overall rating of the services. 
 
Chapter 8 explores knowledge, attitudes and perceptions of the enrolees about the NHIS. The 
analysis covers knowledge about NHIS, sources of knowledge, description of NHIS, 
willingness to enrol and the influence of social economic status such as education and income 
on willingness to enrol. 
 
Chapter 9 concludes the chapters. It combines findings from the research and makes valuable 
suggestions for policy formulation. 
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 CHAPTER TWO 
 
HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONAL HEALTH INSURANCE SCHEME 
IN NIGERIA 
 
2.1  Introduction 
Chapter 2 presents the historical account of the emergence of NHIS in Nigeria. It traces the 
historical trajectory of the evolution of NHIS. It also assesses the law and policies of the Federal 
Republic of Nigeria as it relates to the establishment of NHIS. In addition, the chapter discusses 
the operational guidelines of the scheme in relation to programmes, standards and 
accreditations, records and information, penalties for offences under the NHIS Act and legal 
proceedings. 
 
2.2  Evolution of National Health Insurance Scheme in Nigeria 
The first bill for the establishment of a national health insurance in Nigeria dates back to 1962 
when the former federal minister of health Dr. Majekodunmi presented a bill to the National 
Parliament in Lagos for its establishment. The national health insurance was presented to the 
parliament at the time health care was tax financed and Nigerians health care needs were readily 
met without charges by government health facilities. Therefore, people did not see any reason 
to reform the health care system, and thus the bill was abandoned because it did not receive 
much support in the parliament. The idea re-emerged in the 1980s due to limited government 
resources to continue the provision of ‘free’ health care delivery for all. This prompted the 
National Council on Health led by the former minister of health Admiral Patrick Koshoni to 
commission a study headed by Prof. Diejomaohon on the idea to establish national health 
insurance in 1984.The reports of the study found national health insurance feasible and 
practicable in Nigeria (Awosika, 2005). 
 
In 1989, the former Minister of Health, Prof. Olikoye Ransome-Kuti commissioned a 
committee chaired by Dr. Emma Umez-Eronini on the feasibility of a national health insurance 
in Nigeria. The committee came up with the possibility of establishing of a national health 
insurance, and thus, recommended the template for the establishment of the NHIS. However, 
the formal launching of the scheme was delayed due to lack of political will by the successive 
government and inter-professional rivalry among the stakeholders. In 1995, the National Health 
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Insurance Submit reiterated the need to begin the national health insurance (NHIS, 2006; 2015). 
The enabling law instituting NHIS as a social security system was promulgated in 1999 under 
Decree 35 (now Act). However, intermittent activities were carried out from 1999 to 2004. 
Nevertheless, the launching of the formal sector programme took place in 2005 with the official 
opening by the former president, Chief Olusegun Obasanjo (Awosika, 2005; NHIS, 2015; 
(www.oauife.edu.ng/.../NATIONAL-HEALTH-INSURAQNCE-SCHEME-IN-NIGERIA). 
 
2.3  National Health Insurance Scheme Act Cap 42 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 
2004 
The former Head of State General Abdulsalami Alhaji Abubakar signed the National Health 
Insurance Scheme into law on May 10, 1999 under Decree 35 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 
(LFN); presently it is called Act Cap 42 LFN, 2004. The Act is divided into 9 parts and 49 
sections. Part I Section I states that:  
 
“There is hereby established a scheme to be known as the National Health Insurance Scheme 
(in this Act referred to as "the Scheme") for the purpose of providing health insurance which 
shall entitle insured persons and their dependants the benefit of prescribed good quality and 
cost effective health services as set out in this Act” (NHIS Act, 2004: 3). 
 
Section 2 focuses on the establishment of the NHIS as a body corporate to provide quality and 
affordable health care for Nigerians. It also discusses the establishment of the scheme’s 
governing council to include the chair, a representative from the Ministry of Finance, Health 
and office of the Establishment and Management Services etc. This part also highlights terms 
of appointment of members of the governing council including tenure of office and conditions 
for appointment and removal of any members.  
Part II highlights the objectives, functions and the powers of the scheme. The objectives of the 
scheme include: 
a) “Ensure that every Nigerian has access to good health care services” (NHIS Act, 2004: 
5). 
b) “Protect families from the financial hardship of huge medical bills” (NHIS Act, 2004: 
5). 
c) “Limit the rise in the cost of health care services” (NHIS Act, 2004: 5). 
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d) “Ensure equitable distribution of health care costs among different income groups” 
(NHIS Act, 2004: 5). 
e) “Maintain high standard of health care delivery services within the Scheme” (NHIS 
Act, 2004: 5). 
f) “Ensure efficiency in health care services” (NHIS Act, 2004: 5). 
g) “Improve and harness private sector participation in the provision of health care     
services” (NHIS Act, 2004: 5). 
h) “Ensure adequate distribution of health facilities within the Federation” (NHIS Act, 
2004: 5). 
i) “Ensure equitable patronage of all levels of health care” (NHIS Act, 2004: 5). 
j) ”Ensure the availability of funds to the health sector for improved services” (NHIS Act, 
2004: 5). 
  
The functions and responsibilities of the scheme include: 
a) “Registering health maintenance organisations and health care providers under the    
Scheme” (NHIS Act, 2004: 5). 
b)  “Issuing appropriate guidelines to maintain the viability of the Scheme” (NHIS Act, 
2004: 5). 
c)   “Approving format of contracts proposed by the health maintenance organisations for      
all health care providers” (NHIS Act, 2004: 5). 
d)   “Determining, after negotiation, capitation and other payments due to health care 
providers, by the health maintenance organisations” (NHIS Act, 2004: 5).  
e)  “Advising the relevant bodies on inter-relationship of the Scheme with other social      
security services” (NHIS Act, 2004: 5).  
f)   “The research and statistics of matters relating to the Scheme” (NHIS Act, 2004: 6).  
g)   “Advising on the continuous improvement of quality of services provided under the 
Scheme through guidelines issued by the Standard Committee established under 
section 45 of this Decree” (NHIS Act, 2004: 6).  
h)  “Determining the remuneration and allowances of all staff of the Scheme” (NHIS Act, 
2004: 6).  
i)  “Exchanging information and data with the National Health Management Information 
System, Nigerian Social Insurance Trust Fund, the Federal Office of Statistics, the 
Central Bank of Nigeria, banks and other financial institutions, the Federal Inland 
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Revenue Service, the State Internal Revenue Services and other relevant bodies” (NHIS 
Act, 2004: 6).  
j)   “Doing such other things as are necessary or expedient for achieving the objectives of 
the Scheme under this Decree” (NHIS Act, 2004: 5).  
  
Section 7 of the provision inter alia empowers the council to manage day-to-day activities of 
the scheme such as to determine its overall policies including the financial and operational 
procedures and effective implementation of policies. 
 
Part III of the Act discuses appointment of staff members of the scheme including the 
appointment of the Executive Secretary by the President of the country on the recommendation 
of the Minister of Health. In addition, the functions and conditions of service of the Executive 
Secretary were highlighted. This part also explains the responsibility of the council for the 
appointment of directors and other employees at the scheme. The conditions of service for all 
employees at the scheme include among others entitlement to pension and gratuity as stated in 
the pension Act were discussed in Section 10.   
 
Part IV highlights provisions for the management and maintenance of the scheme under the 
council. These include money received from the HMOs, federal, states and local governments, 
private organisations and donors among others (Section 11(2)). This Section also highlights 
the use of the accrue fund for cost of the administration, payment of allowances to members of 
the council, payment of salaries to the employees and maintenance of property among others 
(Section 11(3)).  Section 14 explains, “The council shall keep proper account of the scheme 
and appoint an auditor to audit the account in line with the guidelines supplied by the Auditor 
General of the Federation” (NHIS Act, 2004: 9). Section 15 explains the scheme’s exemption 
from tax. 
 
Part V discusses contributions into the scheme, health care providers’ registration and payment 
mechanisms, and registration of public and private HMOs. Section 16 explains that “an 
employer who has a minimum number of employees not specified may pay contributions to 
the scheme as may be determine from time to time” (NHIS Act, 2004: 11). Section 18 details 
payment mechanism namely capitation and fee-for-service for accredited providers with the 
approved benefits package. Section 19 highlights the conditions for the accreditation of HMOs; 
these include that the HMOs must be financially viable before and after registration, have 
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account in at least a bank approved by the council and insured with insurance company 
approved by the same council among others. Section 20 emphasises the functions of the HMOs 
including collection of contributions from the enrolees, payment of providers and ensure that 
the providers give qualitative care by establishing quality assurance system. 
 
Part VI of the Act emphasises the establishment of zonal health insurance offices in the country 
and their functions. Section 21 states that “the council shall divide the country into such number 
of zones as it may, from time to time, determine, and establish in each one, a Zonal Health 
Insurance Office” (NHIS Act, 2004: 11). Section 21 also explains the responsibilities of the 
zonal offices including general administration of the scheme, maintaining a register of health 
care providers and planning for a success of the scheme’s implementation among others. 
Section 23 provides financial provisions relating to the zonal offices. These include grant from 
the scheme, government and donors. The section also explains that the zonal offices shall use 
the money at their disposal to run the zones such as payment of salaries and training of 
members. Section 24 mandates the zones to prepare annual report at the end of each financial 
year and submit such reports to the council with the audited account.  
 
Part VII is on arbitration and it has two sections. Section 26 states that there shall be States 
Health Insurance and Federal Capital Territory Arbitration Board with the responsibility to 
arbitrate between aggrieved parties. Section 27 identifies members of the arbitration board to 
include:  
 
1) A legal practitioner as the chairperson. 
2)  A representative of the Nigerian Medical Association in the states and the 
federal capital territory. 
3)  A representative of the Nigerian Employer Consultative Association in the 
states and the federal capital territory. 
4)  A representative of the Nigerian Labour Congress in the states and the federal 
capital territory.  
5)  Two persons to represent the public. 
 
Part VIII states various offences, penalties and legal proceedings. Section 28 identifies offences 
and penalties such as (1) anyone who fails to pay into the account of the organisation within a 
given period commits an offence and is liable to a fine of 100,000 naira or 500 per centum of 
the amount of the contribution involved together with the accrue interest or imprisonment. (2) 
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Employer who deducts contribution from the employees ‘wages and refuses to remit the 
contribution within the specified period is liable to 200,000 naira or per centum of the amount 
contributed including the accrue interest or imprisonment. Section 29-38 identifies various 
offences and their penalties within the scheme. 
 
Part IX of the Act outlines miscellaneous in Section 39 and 40. Section 39 states that 
contribution to the scheme shall be inalienable. In other words, contributions to the scheme 
remains with the scheme and cannot be taken away by any means. Section 40 of the provision 
states that contribution to the scheme by an employer or employee forms part of the tax-
deductible expenses. Section 41-49 discusses aspects of the provision including insurance 
indemnity for health care providers, transfer of liability in the case of merger or acquisition, 
contributions from members of the armed forces and the police and guidelines for contributions 
among others. 
 
The Act empowers NHIS to develop operational guidelines that explain various programmes 
and the process for implementation. Some provisions of the Act that guide the development of 
the operational guidelines include Part III section 6(b), 6(g) and 7(f). The provisions state that:  
 
 “The scheme shall be responsible for issuing appropriate guidelines to maintain the 
viability of the scheme” (NHIS Act, 2004: 5). 
 
 “The scheme shall be responsible for advising on the continuous improvement of 
quality of services provided under the scheme through guidelines issued by the 
Standard Committee established under section 45 of this Act” (NHIS Act, 2004: 6). 
 
 “The scheme shall be responsible for set guidelines for effective co-operation with other 
organisations to promote the objectives of the scheme” (NHIS Act, 2004: 6). 
 
The scheme developed the first operational guidelines in 2006 and reviewed it in 2012. The 
operational guidelines are a policy document that sets out the operations of the scheme. It is 
divided into four sections: section one (programmes); section two (standards and 
accreditation); section three (records and information); and section four (offences, penalties 
and legal proceedings). 
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Section one of the operational guidelines discusses a range of programmes of the scheme that 
covers different segments of the Nigerian population and it is broadly categorised into three. 
The first one is the FSSHIP that is designed to cover: (1) employees in the public sector such 
as Federal, States and the Local Governments; (2) workers in the organised private sectors (3) 
Armed forces, Police and other allied forces; and (4) individual voluntary contributors. Second, 
ISSHIP is classified into two: CBHIP that takes care of the informal sector workers such as 
artisans and the rural populace; and TISHIP is designed for students in the higher institutions, 
such as Colleges of Education, Polytechnics and Universities. (3) The VGSHIP covers 
vulnerable groups such as the physically challenged, inmates, children under five, pregnant 
women, refugees and internally displaced persons. Section 2 discusses standards and 
requirements for accreditation of HMOs, health care facilities, mutual health association, civil 
society organisation, banks etc. Section 3 provides necessary flow of information among the 
stakeholders for proper implementation of the scheme. Section 4 emphasises offences, 
penalties and legal proceedings to ensure compliance with the provisions of the scheme (NHIS, 
2006, 2012).  
 
2.3.1  Formal Sector Social Health Insurance Programme 
 FSSHIP is a social security system designed to cover: (a) employees in the public sector such 
as Federal, States and the Local Governments; workers in the organised private sectors; (b) 
Armed Forces, Police and other allied services and (c) voluntary contributors’ programme. 
However, different rules apply to different categories of the programmes concerning 
contributions and benefits. 
 
(A)  Public Sector and Organised Private Sector Employees 
The Public Sector includes Federal States and Local Governments employees while organised 
private sector comprises of private organisations employing ten or more persons. Contribution 
into the formal sector programmes varies. For the civil servants, the employer contributes 
3.25% and the employee contributes 1.75% signifying 5% of the employee’s consolidated 
salary. For other tiers of government and the private sector, the employer contributes 10% and 
the employee contributes 5% amounting to 15% of the employee’s basic salary (NHIS, 2012). 
Health care of the insured in this programme is paid for from the pooled funds to cover the 
employee, a spouse and four biological children below 18 years of age. However, coverage 
extends to more dependants based on additional payments by principal beneficiary. The 
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Operational Guidelines stipulates a 90-day waiting/processing period before an enrolee can 
access health services under the scheme. Benefits package is the same for all formal sector 
programmes. This include out-patient care and in-patient care; prescribed drugs; 
pharmaceutical care; diagnostic tests; maternity care including ante-natal, delivery and post-
natal care of four pregnancies ending in live births; consultation with specialist; eye 
examination and care excluding contact lenses; dental care with the exception of those 
contained in the exclusion list. Other benefits include annual medical check-up (NHIS, 2006; 
2012). 
 
(B)  Members of the Armed forces, Police and allied services 
For members of the Armed forces, Police and other allied services including customs, prisons, 
federal road safety corps (FRSC), immigration services etc., contribution equals to 5% of the 
participant’s consolidated salary paid by the federal government to cover the principal 
beneficiary, spouse and four biological children below 18 years of age. In addition, no waiting 
period is required for this group. Health care benefit is the same for the formal sector 
programme as mentioned above (NHIS, 2012). 
 
(C)  Voluntary Contributors Social Health Insurance Programme 
The VCSHIP covers interested individuals, families and organisations with less than 10 
employees, foreigners and Nigerians in diaspora etc. who are not covered by any other form of 
SHI programmes. Participants in the programme are required to pay contribution of 15,000 
naira (US$ 81.9) per person once per annual or on instalment, though subject to periodic 
review. The benefits package includes some of the benefits in the formal sector programmes 
(NHIS, 2012). 
 
2.3.2  Informal Sector Social Health Insurance Programme 
The ISSHIP is a voluntary social insurance system for people in the informal economy such as 
employees of companies with less than 10 workers, artisans, rural dwellers, voluntary 
individual interested in the programme and others not included in the formal sector programme 
(NHIS, 2012). The informal Sector SHI is classified into two types: the Community Based 
Insurance Social Insurance Programme and the Students of Tertiary Institution Programme. 
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(A) Community Based Health Insurance Programme 
The CBHIP is sub-divided into two: urban self-employed individuals and rural community 
dwellers programmes. The former pools resources and health risk of members usually 
occupational-based groups and provides protection for members against mutually determined 
health risks. It is designed for economically cohesive groups not less than 1000 members band 
together to form a Mutual Health Association (MHA). Financial contribution per member to a 
MHA is flat rate and paid in cash monthly or seasonally in advance in order to receive health 
benefit, albeit subject to review and vary from one MHA to another based on their health needs. 
The benefits package includes primary and secondary care that reflects prophylactic and 
therapeutic components of health care delivery. Participants in the programme are subject to a 
60-day processing/waiting period before accessing benefit. A number of CBHIP management 
models exist to facilitate operations in the communities; these include Board of Trustees (BOT) 
as programme managers, BOT as programme managers with technical facilitators. A BOT 
comprises a representative from each of the groups that form the MHA. In the first model, BOT 
functions as a board and programme managers performing daily activities such as collection of 
contributions from members, making payment to providers and engaging stakeholders for the 
smooth running of the MHA. Second model: the BOT engages NHIS accredited facilitators to 
provide technical support while the board maintains ownership and management of the MHA. 
Third model: The technical facilitators are responsible for the management of the MHA 
including collection of contributions and payment of providers with support from the BOT in 
recruiting and monitoring members of the MHA.  
 
The rural community dwellers programme shares some features with the urban self-employed 
individual programme such as forming a MHA of at least 1000 members managed by a BOT. 
Contribution is flat rate per individual or household members and can be paid monthly or 
seasonally, and it is subject to review; benefits package includes primary and secondary care. 
Moreover, the three CBHIP management models described earlier could be applied in the rural 
dwellers programme. However, distinctions exist such as that membership is not restricted to 
occupational-based groups as in the case of urban self-employed individual programme. 
Membership comes from different occupations, though in the same community. This creates 
room for more participants in the programme. 
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(C)   Tertiary Institutions Social Health Insurance 
The TISHIP is a social health system whereby health care needs of students in the tertiary 
institutions is paid for from a pool of fund from students’ contributions in the tertiary 
institutions such as Universities, Colleges of Education, Polytechnics, Colleges of Agriculture, 
Mono-technics, Schools of Nursing and Midwifery and Health Technology among others. 
Students pay contributions annually on registration for every academic session. The present 
contribution rate is a community rated amount of 2000 naira ($US 10.9) per student and is 
subject to periodic review by the scheme. Benefits package includes primary and secondary 
care. 
 
2.3.3  Vulnerable Group Social Insurance Programme. 
The VGSHIP provides health care services to persons who because of disability cannot engage 
in any productive activity. Such people include the physically challenged, inmates, pregnant 
women, children under five, victims of human trafficking and people who are internally 
displaced etc. These groups have the same benefit package with the public-sector programme; 
save for children blow five years of age programme that covers major causes of morbidity and 
mortality such as malaria, diarrhoea, pneumonia, measles, and inadequate immunisation among 
others. Government, development partners and civil organisations are responsible for the 
funding of vulnerable group programme, and assigned the management of this group to 
accredited HMOs. 
 
2.4 Standard and Accreditation 
Section two of the operational guidelines discusses standards and requirements for 
accreditation of various stakeholders in the NHIS: HMOs, MHAs, health care facilities, BOT, 
insurance companies, etc. (A) HMOs are private or public incorporated companies registered 
by the NHIS to supervise the provision of health care services to enrolees by accredited health 
care facilities. They play a crucial role in the implementation of NHIS programme. Any group 
of individuals or organisation seeking registration as HMO is required among others to:  
 
1. “Register with the Corporate Affairs Commission” (NHIS, 2012: 72).  
2. “Have a minimum paid-up share capital requirement of HMOs” (NHIS, 2012: 72).  
3. “Provide evidence of indemnity insurance cover with NHIS-accredited insurance 
company” (NHIS, 2012: 72).  
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4. “Maintain an operational account with an NHIS-accredited bank and undertake not to 
engage in any business other than the business of health care management” (NHIS, 
2012: 74).   
 
HMOs responsibilities include among others collection of contributions from enrolees; 
contracting with providers for delivery of health services; payment of providers and continuous 
sensitisation of enrolees. For accountability and transparency, HMOs are required to provide 
access to their bank account information, and rendering their annual reports and audited 
account to NHIS. Any HMO wishing to terminate its contract with NHIS shall give three 
months’ notice and fulfil other requirements. Presently, there are 76 national and states 
accredited HMOs in Nigeria working with accredited health care providers (HCPs) across the 
country. HMOs serve as intermediary between NHIS and HCPs; as well as interface between 
the HCPs and enrolees. They also make payments to HCPs for the services rendered to enrolees 
using: (1) capitation – regular payment in advance for treatment of insured members; 2) fee-
for-service – direct payment for services based on referral of insured members to secondary or 
tertiary facilities (NHIS, 2012). 
 
 
(B).  MHAs are voluntary organisations providing health insurance services to their 
members. Members of this association help in managing the health plan of the association, 
determining the health package and negotiate with the providers. NHIS requires any 
associations seeking registration/accreditation, as MHA to inter alia register with the Corporate 
Affairs Commission; pay stipulated registration and accreditation fees; maintain current 
account with the NHIS, have a constitution/bye-laws. After the registration of a MHA, the 
following among others guides the association. (1) “Accreditation shall be renewable every 
two years” (NHIS, 2012:96). (2) “No person shall have claim on assets or rights of the 
association” (NHIS, 2012:96).  (3) “NHIS may cancel accreditation of any MHA if the 
accreditation is based on fraudulent activities or unable to maintain the financial conditions 
stipulated by the scheme” (NHIS, 2012:96). (4) MHA is required under law not to have in its 
board any person of unsound mind because of ill health or is guilty of serious misconduct or 
convicted of any offence involving dishonesty. Exit of MHA from the contract requires three-
month notice, payment of outstanding claims to providers and continue with its obligation 
within the three-month notice (NHIS, 2012). 
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(C).    MHA elects BOT to manage the association. BOT members comprise of the chair, 
secretary, financial secretary, treasurer, public relations officer clerk and two others. Rules and 
regulations guiding BOTs include among others: members shall be resident of the community, 
elected in a democratic manner and operate in line with the constitution/byelaw developed by 
the association. Their functions include collecting contributions from members, conduct 
mobilisation and sensitization of community members on MHA, pay contribution collected to 
technical facilitators – in the case technical facilitators managed model, or pay providers – in 
the case of BOT managed model. BOTs members are entitled to remuneration as determined 
by the MHA. They are also required to audit the association account annually and submit the 
audited account to NHIS no later than six months after the association accounting year (NHIS, 
2012). 
 
(D).     NHIS classifies health care facilities into primary, secondary and tertiary care. There 
are 11, 574 NHIS accredited primary, secondary and tertiary care in Nigeria. In Oyo state, there 
are 318 accredited health care facilities, these include primary health care facilities such as 
health care centres, nursing and maternity homes; secondary facilities including general 
hospitals, specialist hospitals, pharmacies, laboratories, dental clinics etc.; and tertiary facilities 
namely teaching hospitals and specialist hospitals. Health care facilities and providers seeking 
NHIS accreditation are required inter alia to register with Corporate Affairs Commission, 
possess relevant academic qualifications, possess indemnity cover, and pay required 
accreditation fees. After registration, the following among others guides health care facilities 
and providers: accreditation is renewable every three years and based on availability of skilled 
personnel, availability of information technology infrastructure, well-organised and proper 
management structures and compliance with the arbitration board etc. Any provider or health 
facility wishing to terminate its contract(s) with NHIS shall give a three-month notice, attend 
to NHIS enrolees within the three months and publish in the dailies its intention to exit. 
 
(E). An Insurance Company seeking NHIS accreditation is required among others to “have 
a minimum paid-up share capital as determined by the National Insurance Commission” 
(NHIS, 2012:105), register with Corporate Affairs Commission, provides audited account of 
the company in the last three years, pay accreditation fee as determined by the NHIS. Moreover, 
accreditation is renewable every two years, subject to NHIS approval. In addition to settling of 
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outstanding claims with NHIS, health providers and HMOs, a period of three months is 
required for the termination of contract with the NHIS (NHIS, 2012). 
 
2.5 Records and information 
Section 3 highlights the necessary information and records required to ensure proper 
implementation of the NHIS programmes. For instance, the scheme requires every HMO to 
provide the following information:  
 
 Information of itself for accreditation including name, address, phone 
numbers/email, insurance company, bankers etc. 
 
 Bio data of new enrolees such as enrolee’s NHIS registration number, name, 
address, date of birth, next of kin, phone number etc.  
 
 Contributions from enrolees and employers on monthly basis, payments to health 
facilities or providers, annual audited financial reports and quality assurance report 
of health facilities etc.  
 
Moreover, health providers are also required to: (1) supply necessary information to NHIS for 
accreditation such as name, address, registration number, certificate of practice, indemnity 
cover etc. (2) Report on a monthly basis to NHIS on information about the enrolees including 
NHIS registration number of patient, name of patient, complaints, treatments, etc. NHIS is 
required to supply stakeholders the list of accredited health facilities; list of accredited HMOs; 
list of medicine price; list of accredited bank and insurance companies etc. 
 
2.6 Offences, Penalties and Legal Proceedings 
Section 4 emphasises offences, penalties and legal proceedings guiding stakeholders to ensure 
conformity with the provisions of the NHIS operational guidelines. The Act provides a list of 
offences and penalties that would apply to defaulting stakeholders after the necessary legal 
proceedings (NHIS, 2012). The following examples are some of the offences and penalties:  
 
(A). In the case of HMOs, any HMO that refuses to remit capitation, fee-for-service or other 
claims to providers after receiving the money from the NHIS within the given period as 
indicated in the policy document shall face the following penalties:  
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 Suspension for not less than three months.  
 
 A fine of not less than 500,000 thousand naira (US$ 3, 225).  
 
 Prosecution under the relevant laws that guide financial transactions.  
 
 Delist repeated offenders from NHIS accredited HMOs list.  
 
(B).   HCP who discriminates and refuses to treat any enrolees and their covered dependants 
after receiving payment from the HMO on behalf of such enrolees shall face the following 
penalties: (1) warning; (2) a fine of not less than 100, 000 thousand naira (US$ 645); (3) 
suspension not less than three months; and (4) delisting of repeated offenders. 
 
(C).   NHIS beneficiary/enrolee who intentionally engages in multiple registrations shall face 
the following penalties: (1) warning, (2) prosecution, (3) deleting the excess registration and 
(4) notify the employer.  
 
(D).   NHIS accredited bank that fails to submit annual statements of the scheme within the 
stipulated time shall face the following penalties: (1) warning, (2) suspension and (3) delisting.  
 
(E).    Insurance company that fails to enter and comply with the NHIS agreement shall be 
delisted from NHIS accredited list of insurance. 
 
2.7  Conclusion 
 
This chapter explored the historical development of NHIS in Nigeria. It examined NHIS Act 
as it related to the development of the scheme. It also assessed the operational guidelines of the 
scheme in relation to the programmes – standards and accreditations; records and information; 
offences, penalties and legal proceedings. Thus, the NHIS Act and the operational guidelines 
set out the implementation of NHIS in Nigeria. 
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                                                          CHAPTER THREE 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
3.1  Introduction  
Chapter 3 evaluates bodies of literature on Health Sector Reform (HSR). Specifically, the 
chapter analyses health-financing aspect of the reforms. The areas covered under the literature 
include: 
1. Health Sector Reform 
2. Structural Adjustment Policies 
3. Risk Sharing Model 
4. National Health Insurance Policy 
5. Health Financing Policies in Nigeria 
6. National Health Insurance Scheme in Nigeria 
 
3.2  Health Sector Reform 
In the existing literature, discrete conceptual terminologies, such as health system reform 
(Hurst, 2010), health sector reform (Berman and Bossert, 2000), and health reform (WHO, 
2000; World Bank, 1987) have been used to refer to the same thing, hence the concepts are 
used interchangeably in this thesis. While fundamental changes aimed at improving the health 
care system is central to HSR, there is no common definition of the term. Scholars deploy 
different definitions based on their understanding and purpose for the reform. Berman and 
Bossert define HSR as “sustained, purposeful and fundamental change” – “sustained” in the 
sense that it is not a "one shot" temporary effort that will not have enduring impacts. 
“Purposeful” in the sense of emerging from a rational, planned and evidence-based process; 
and “fundamental” in the sense of addressing significant, strategic dimensions of health 
systems” (Berman and Bossert 2000: 2). For koivusalo and Ollila, HSR has been described “as 
the process of improving the performance of existing system and of assuring efficient and 
equitable response to future changes” (koivusalo and Ollila, 1997: 137). It has also been 
perceived as an essential change in institutional procedures and policy to improve the function 
of the health services, which in turn would improve health condition of the people (WHO, 
2004, 2005). Furthermore, the World Bank describes HSR in four dimensions to address the 
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problem of national health systems in the Low Medium Income Countries (LMICs). These 
include (a) charging users of publicly provided health services, especially for the types of 
curative care that benefit solely individual and their families; (b) encourage risk-coverage 
programmes; (c) strengthening non-governmental provision of health services and (d) 
decentralising the public health system. World Bank further notes that health care reform 
embodies a shift in health care financing from the government to the beneficiary, and in making 
decision from central planning authority to local authority for even accessibility (World Bank, 
1987, 1989).   
 
 For better performance of HSR, Robert and colleagues note that it is fundamental for health 
sector reformer to diagnose the causes of health sector problems by exploring five control 
knobs of the sector. The “control knobs” “must be significant causal determinants of health 
system performance” (Robert et al, 2002: 32), and could be adjusted to bring changes in the 
functioning of health system. The five “control knobs” include (1) financing, the available 
resources for health care and it could be tax, insurance premium and direct payment by patients. 
(2) Payment, the method of reimbursing health care providers including capitation, budgets 
and fees for service. (3) Organisation, this includes organisation of health care providers in 
terms of their functions, roles etc. in health care markets. (4) Regulation, the use of force by 
regulatory body to enforce stakeholders in the health sector such as health providers and 
insurance companies to comply with rules of the sector. (5) Behaviour, this refers to the 
attitudes and responses of people and providers of health care, which in turn influence the 
functioning and outcome of reform of the health care system (Robert et al, 2002). The “control 
knobs” distinguishes reform in a two-way dimension with ‘big R’ reform signifying strategic 
and fundamental reform that established change in two or more “control knobs”, including 
financing, regulation, payment etc. which in turn affect the overall health system performance 
in a positive way. On the other hand, ‘small r’ reform connotes limited, partial and incremental 
change that focuses on single “control knobs” which subsequently brings poor performance of 
the health system. For example, ‘small r’ reform include the introduction of user charges in 
public hospitals or granting of autonomy to the public clinics and hospitals (Berman and 
Bossert, 2000: 13).  In contrast, Hurst describes HSR as complete overhaul of health system to 
bring about efficiency and equity putting into consideration values and culture that underpins 
various reforms in every country. In the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD), health reform has brought about extensions of health insurance to 
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different groups of the population over many years and result in the achievement of universal 
health insurance in most OECD countries (Hurst, 2010). Hurst (2010) further posits that reform 
in the health sector focuses on how to meet the main objectives of health policy including 
efficiency and equity. They provide a framework for the necessary reform and implementation 
in the health sector. Thus, the design and implementation of HSR could be in circular process 
of improvement as shown in Figure 1 below: 
 
 
Figure 3.1: The process of health sector reform, design and implementation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Nutley and Smith, (1998). Excerpted from Hurst, (2010). 
 
The first step is the assessment of the health system by authorized agencies to reveal 
inadequacies in its performance. The second step involves designing and proposing structural 
reforms aimed at confronting the identified inadequacies in the sector. The third step involves 
the introduction of rules and regulation and other policy measures that would pave the way for 
reforms. The fourth step involves the implementation of reforms through financing and 
delivery of health services. There is interdependence between successive steps of reforms – all 
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steps must work together in a sequential pattern to ensure a viable reform.  Therefore, reform 
in the health sector is continuous, that is, changing expectations of consumers, changes in 
technology and other components of the health system precipitate further reforms. This 
framework could be optimised if stakeholders demonstrate adequate commitment (Hurst, 
2010). 
 
While the notion of HSR is prominent in the global arena, it varies in both scale and scope from 
one country or organisation to the other. For instance, in the OECD countries, reforming health 
system has mainly focused on equity of access with microeconomic efficiency to curtail the 
continued rise in health care costs due to technological advancements in medicine, which 
subsequently increase the ageing population (OECD, 2012; Hurst, 2010). On the other hand, 
this concept became increasingly prominent in the LMIC in the 1980s and mainly concentrated 
on dismantling the public health care system by reducing public spending on health, liberalising 
the health sector and expanding private participation (Shiviji, 2009; Adesina, 2007b; Obono, 
2007). Additionally, Gilson and Mills explain that reform in the health sector of LMICs include 
among others: one, strategy to increase the financing of health system. Two, provision of funds 
for the promotion of primary health care services. Three, devolution of public health sector to 
ensure even distribution and accessibility among the people. Four, liberalising the health sector 
to encourage private participation (Gilson and Mills, 1995a). Thus, these changes in health 
system were in line with World Bank development report “Investing in Health” as strategies in 
the LMICs to address fundament gaps in health care system including insufficient spending on 
cost – effective health programme; poor quality and inequitable distribution of health benefits 
(World Bank, 1987, 1993). 
 
3.3 Structural Adjustment Policies and Health Sector Reform  
Structural Adjustment Policies was an initiative of the international financial institutions led 
by the Word Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) on macroeconomic policies for the 
LMICs. The policies imposed on developing countries by these international institutions 
initiated a series of economic crises and limited resources, which in turn led to a drastic cut in 
social spending and preference for private sector economy activity than the public control of 
productive forces. The World Bank had been a major player in the international health policy 
since 1980s, not only as a policy adviser, but also as a lender and donor with strong support for 
neoliberalism (Mohindra, 2008; Heidhues and Obare, 2011). The neoclassical/neoliberal 
ideology in which structural adjustment policies was heavily rooted criticized democratic 
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welfare state model of developing countries where public funds are used for social services 
including education and health in order to maintain social justice, but encourages liberalisation, 
minimal government interference and free market forces (Cassels, 1995; Ortiz, 2007; Obono, 
2007; Adesina, 2008). The World Bank SAPs initiative was in the form of designing macro-
economic stabilisation policies, such as, fiscal control (e.g., government expenditures); 
institution (e.g., decentralisation), liberalization (e.g., privatisation) and deregulation (e.g., 
price control) (Berman, 1995; Slim and Katia, 2011). 
 
The SAPs was introduced by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to rectify the 
macroeconomic instability over the short term by restricting public expenditures and 
constraining demand for social services (IMF, 2004). Moreover, World Bank emphasised that 
“once the economy is stabilised, policy could then be implemented in the medium to long time 
measures for stimulating economic growth through liberalization, privatisation and 
deregulation” (World Bank, 1987:121). This initiative was made a precondition for structural 
adjustment loans and mechanism to bail developing countries out of the economic crises. 
Furthermore, most countries that experienced SAPs in the 1980s and 1990s initiated health 
sector reform that led to divestment of public investment and spending on public provisioning 
of health services but provide incentive for private participation because of the adjustment 
programme of stabilization and liberalisation. Consequently, divestment of public investment 
led to the financial crisis in the public sector, which in turn resulted in inadequate public health 
infrastructures, poor quality of health services and dwindling capacities on the part of 
government to provide ‘free’ health care (Obono, 2007; Mohindra, 2008; Slim and Katia, 
2011). 
 
Widespread debates abound on the impact of SAPs on social services in the LMICs. The 
exponents of SAPs argue that the cuts in social spending would not necessarily be detrimental, 
but rather improves social services through a more efficient use of resources (World Bank, 
1983; De Ferranti, 1985). On the contrary, critics reveal that SAPs were not meant to revamp 
the social services in the developing countries; instead, it was harmful to social services notably 
education and health. Social indicator such as education, medical care, health, rate of literacy 
and life expectancy declined drastically (Gu and Tang, 1995; Obono, 2007; Atieno and Shem, 
2007; Adesina, 2007b; Adesina 2008; Wang, et al., 2012). For instance, Adesina notes that 
social policy in a neoliberal regime “had deleterious effects on livelihood, economy and the 
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social fabric of the society” (Adesina, 2007b: 11) with the reversal of ‘social right’ and social 
citizenship. Adesina further maintains that SAPs was a fundamental reorganisation of the state 
with the development of an economic ideology that brought about severe cuts in social services, 
private participation in social services provisioning and market-centric policy framework. 
Furthermore, Gu and Tang (1995) assert that structural and economic changes imposed by 
marketization and privatisation had negative and detrimental impact on China health sector by 
dismantling the solidaristic mechanism of financing healthcare prior to the macro-economic 
reforms package. They emphasised that China had a robust rural cooperative medical scheme, 
a form of CBHI that covered 90% of the rural population before the economic reforms of the 
early 1980s. Subsequently, the abolishment of the rural CBHI during the reform had 
detrimental effect on China health care, for example, the percentage of rural population covered 
by health insurance dropped from 92.6% in 1976 to 6.1% in 1990. 
 
The three proposed policies by World Bank to address the problems of health system in the 
developing countries include charging users of publicly provided health services; 
decentralizing the public health system and strengthening private provision of health services. 
These three policies are considered as a package that is closely related and mutually reinforcing 
(World Bank, 1987). The World Bank asserts that charging fee in the government facilities 
would not be enough in raising revenue unless competitive incentives such as private sector 
participation and decentralisation government sector are in place to support government in 
health care financing (World Bank, 1987, 1993). In summary, SAPs was heavily rooted in 
neoclassical/neoliberal ideology championed by the World Bank and IMF restraining state-led 
provisioning of social services in the developing countries and encouraging private 
participation in the provision and financing health care services with minimal government 
interference. 
 
3.3.1 Charging Users of Public Health Facilities 
Financing reform is central to HSR debates because of scarcity of resources available for public 
provisioning of health care services in most countries mainly due to destabilised economy, 
increase in the costs of health care and increasing aging population (Ikegami and Campbell, 
2004; Ikegami, 2009; OECD, 2015), resulting in the reform of health care financing. Although 
reform in financing health care system is a global agenda, its priority varies from one country 
to another owing to social, political and economic differences. User fee a form of co-payment 
for health care is not prominent in the developed countries (OECD, 2012); instead, insurance 
34 
 
is given considerable attention as a financing model. For example, in Germany, UK and the 
United State (US) among others health care provision is largely financed through either tax or 
social insurance.  In the US, employment-based private insurance and the Public Sponsored 
Health Insurance (SPHI) programmes such as Medicare designed for the elderly and Medicaid 
created for the poor were the main source of financing health care (Bodenheimer and 
Grumbach, 2005). However, Germany and the UK  largely finance their health care either 
through social insurance, tax or the combination of both (Hurst, 2010; Bodenheimer and 
Grumbach, 2005).  
 
Conversely, user fee became the main source of funding health care in the developing countries 
in the 1980s because of severe reduction in public spending (Adesina, 2007a, b). The economic 
crisis forced many countries to face the quandary on how to provide adequate health care 
services for their citizens in the face of dwindling revenue. Subsequently, the proposed user 
fee by the Word Bank was imposed. World Bank pushed governments to introduced user fee 
(cost recovery) at the point of service delivery on the basis that it would increase revenue, 
create greater rationalisation of services and improve equity. It thus noted that “as the 
contributions of households (especially the better-off) increase, there would be more money in 
the system and states would be able to recover significant proportion of their health costs 
through user fees” (World Bank, 1987: 26). The World Bank further maintained that “this 
approach would reduce government responsibility for paying for the kinds of health services 
that provides few benefits to society as a whole… more government resources would then be 
available to pay for services that provide many benefits to the whole society” (World Bank, 
1987: 26). Thus, public funds could be used for “public goods” such as immunisation, waste 
disposal and in some cases for maternal and childcare (World Bank, 1987).   
 
The developing countries launched cost recovery programmes in the 1980s based on the 
following World Bank assumptions firstly, that introducing user fees would not stop people 
from using health care when it is needed because health care is inevitable. Secondly, user fees 
would be offsets by improvements in quality. Thirdly, exception policies for the poor would 
be effective and finally, people were willing to pay (World Bank, 1987, 1989, 1993; De farranti, 
1985). However, studies (e.g., Ogunbekun, et al., 1999; Asenso-Okyer, et al., 1998; Berman 
and Bossert, 2000; Sahn, et al., 2003; McIntyre, et al., 2006; Mohindra, 2008) have explored 
the impact of user fees in relation to Word Bank assumptions. A study on the demand for health 
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care found that users of health care were sensitive to price, and as a result, utilisation of health 
care declined drastically in rural Uganda as many people could not afford the costs (Sahn et al, 
2003). Moreover, Berman and Bosset (2000) note that former communist states including 
former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe suffered negative consequences of user fees as they 
opened their economies to market forces. 
 
In relation to the assumption that user fee would compensate by improvement in quality, studies 
have shown that quality was compromised for financial gain (e.g. McIntyre et al., 2006; 
Mohindra, 2008). A longitudinal study conducted by Haddad and Fournier revealed that 
utilization rate declined to 40% and 18 - 32% of this decrease is caused by costs in Zaire. They 
expressed that“ regular supply of drugs and the improvement in the technical quality of the 
services – technical qualification of the staff, allocation of microscopes, and renovation of the 
infrastructures – was not enough to compensate for the additional financial barriers created by 
the increased cost of services” (Haddad and Fournier,1995: 744). On the exemption policy for 
the poor, studies reveal many difficulties related to exemption such as lack of financial 
capacity, poor political will, non-poor users being exempted and weak administrative capacity 
(McIntyre et al., 2005; Haddad and Fournier, 1995; Gilson and Mills, 1995). Similarly, 
researches have shown that many people made concessions such as selling off assets, removing 
children from schools, borrowing from relatives, reducing food consumption to be able to pay 
for medical bills, and a significant proportion of households’ expenditures spent to offset 
medical expenses (Ogunbekun, et al., 1999; Asenso-Okyer, et al., 1998; Sahn, et al., 2003; 
McIntyre, et al., 2005).  In summary, despite the claim that user fee (cost recovery) would bring 
about efficiency and equity in health care, studies have shown that user fee did not increase 
revenue and equity as stipulated by the Word Bank. Instead, it deprived many households 
access to health care services as people were sensitive to costs and these drastically reduced 
their access to health care. 
 
3.3.2 Decentralisation of Public Facilities 
Decentralisation of government health services implies granting financial and managerial 
autonomy to local units of the system, giving local units greater responsibilities for planning 
and budgeting, collection of user charges, and determining how collected funds and transfers 
from the central government will be spent (World Bank, 1987, 1989). The main objectives of 
decentralisation were to improve planning and management of health services, increase 
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accountability, create effective and efficient organisation of services, encourage community 
participation and minimise administrative costs (Gilson and Mill, 1995b). Decentralisation is 
viewed as a part of the policy reform agenda of international agencies not only to increase 
revenue available in the health sector, but also to increase access to health care in the 
community.  Although decentralisation is purported to help increase access to health care and 
revenue, this programme had generated quite a debate in most developing countries (Mohindra, 
2008). Some studies reveal this concept as complex and problematic (e.g., McPake, 1996; 
Larbi, 1998; Therkildsen, 2000). For example, in Ghana, the multiplicity of institutions 
involved in decentralisation such as the Ministry of Finance, the Comptroller and Accountant 
General, the Office of the Head of Civil Service, and the Public Services Commission were 
reluctant to liberalise control over human and financial resources, which in turn affected 
decentralisation negatively (McPake, 1996; Larbi, 1998).  
 
McPake (1996), in an attempt to locate decentralisation policy of health reform in sub-Saharan 
Africa in a wider context, notes that the Gambia Medical Service Act of 1998 provides the 
medical framework, which established the Hospital Management Board. However, there are 
stringent restrictions of the board that affected its statutory role, which include financial and 
administrative management of public hospital in its jurisdiction. Similarly, in Ghana, there was 
no clear devolution of power between the Ministry of Finance and Hospital Management Board 
and this had implication on the logic of the use of competitive mechanism and decentralised 
management to improve efficiency. Decentralisation was considered to improve efficiency of 
resources and ensure inclusiveness in the communities. However, administrative and political 
constraints were found to impede decentralisation in Tanzania (Therkildsen, 2000). ‘Leakage’ 
of public resources meant for social provisioning was also noted in Uganda (khemani 2001). 
Additionally, decentralisation in China was biased in favour of economic viable region like the 
urban areas at the detriment of the rural settings (Gu and Tan, 1995). Decentralisation suffered 
many setbacks in the developing countries such as non-participatory policy process, 
misappropriation of funds meant for sub-national levels, political constraints, lack of planning 
for implementation and poor autonomy to the hospitals (Larbi, 1998; Therkildsen, 2000; 
Mohindra, 2008). 
 
Nevertheless, decentralisation had resulted in the creation of many health district councils and 
devolution of public services to the districts or sub-national regions in the developing countries, 
and thus bringing services closer to the people (Mohindra, 2008). For instance, the Ghanaian 
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health districts increased from 65 to 110 in 1996 (Larbi, 1998). In Uganda, the district 
governments are empowered by the central government through devolution of power and thus 
responsible for social services provision such as health care. The districts are autonomous 
hence; they have their own budgets, recruit staff, health plans etc. though with strong support 
from the central government. However, despite devolution of power to the local council to 
enhance rural dwellers access to health care, geographical barriers, poor quality, failure to 
adequately stock drugs and long waiting time among others remain hindrances in the rural 
settings (Kassam, Collins, Liowa, and Rasoola, 2015; Uganda Ministry of Health, 2000). 
 
Furthermore, Nigeria was recognised as one of the few countries in the developing countries 
to have significantly decentralised both financial resources and service delivery within its three 
tiers of government (Federal, State and Local) (Khemani, 2001, 2005). For instance, the 
National Health Policy was overhauled in the 1980s, assigning responsibility of Primary Health 
Care (PHC) delivery to the local government. In addition to the statutory allocations from the 
federal government, local governments have internally generated revenue to carry out their 
statutory responsibilities. Moreover, the federal and state governments provide logistical 
assistance to the local governments, primarily for the implementation of national programmes 
such as immunization, control of HIV/AIDS and malaria, and procurement of drugs and other 
essential equipment (Khemani, 2005). However, local governments have been financially 
constrained, and this has implication for their statutory responsibility in terms service delivery 
and payment of workers’ salaries. Khemani argues, “as several developing countries are 
beginning to decentralise responsibility for local public services to local institutions, actual 
empirical evidence on local government accountability for services delivery is lagging” 
(Khemani, 2005: 286). In sum, despite the fact that several developing countries had 
decentralised their health care system, the issue of partial decentralisation where fiscal 
responsibility and authority were not fully transferred to the sub-national levels remains a 
challenge. In addition, sustainability of the sub-regions in terms of their generating capacity is 
also a concern.  
 
3.3.3 Strengthening Private Provision of Health Services 
Expanding private participation and reducing the state role in the provision of health care is 
another component of HSR instituted by the Bretton Woods Institutions, with the conviction 
that competition will bring about improvement and efficiency in the health care provision. The 
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World Bank argued that using private resources effectively helps mobilise resources from 
family, communities and voluntary groups and allow government resources to be directed to 
costs effective programmes including immunisation, malaria vector control and HIV/AIDS 
control that produce many benefits but for which individuals are reluctant to pay (World Bank, 
1987, De Ferranti, 1985). The advocate of this approach further argues, “Almost nowhere are 
government clinics and hospitals the only source of care. At least, they often compete with 
private care providers including private for-profit, non-profit providers (religious missions) and 
traditional providers in the provision of health care, during which governments regulate the 
activities of the private providers and at times contracts with the private providers for certain 
‘public goods’ or projects such as immunisations and vector control” (World Bank, 1993). 
 
Literature has revealed the importance and the growing role of private sector in the provision 
of health care services (e.g., Ejughemre, 2014; Adeyemi and Nixon, 2013; Bodenheimer and 
Grumbach, 2005; Makinen, et al. 2000; Ogunbekun, Ogunbekun and Orobaton, 1999; Gilson 
and Mill, 1995; World Bank, 1993). For instance, a comparative analysis conducted by 
Makinen et al., (2000) on health services utilisation patterns in African, Asian and Latin 
American countries finds that although the better-off disproportionately use private health care 
providers, 56%, 60% and 58% of people in Paraguay, Guatemala and South Africa respectively 
sought health care through private providers. The activities of private drugs outlets have also 
been studied. Kassama et al (2015) observe that the proliferation of private outlets – drug 
vendors without formal training is on the increase in the developing countries with high 
patronage. Reasons given for using their services include proximity, access to cheaper drugs, 
adequate supply of drugs, opportunity to purchase drugs on credit and friendly service   
 
A number of strategies have been adopted to encourage private participation, these include 
contracting their services, training of health professionals, integration into planning process 
and subsidising non-governmental organisations (NGOs) (Mohindra, 2008; Kassam, et al., 
2015). For instance, the involvement of private sector in the distribution of Artemisinin 
Combination Therapies (anti-malaria drugs) has increased accessibility rate in most 
communities in Uganda (Kassam et al., 2015). As in other developing countries, private health 
care providers including medicine vendors remain the closest providers of health care to most 
communities in Uganda as they outnumbered the public providers (Kassam et al., 2015; 
Ejughemre, 2014). The mission hospitals have also been playing significant role in the 
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provision of health services in most African countries and at times designated as district 
hospitals with financial support from the states (Mclntyre and Mutyambizi, 2005).  
 
The states have been responsible for addressing problems involving private for-profit providers 
through regulations. Nevertheless, studies have shown poor quality of services, unethical 
practices and high cost of care in the private-for-profit services (Kassam, et al., 2015; 
Mohindra, 2008; Mclntyre and Mutyambizi, 2005). For instance, proliferation of untrained 
private health care providers providing incorrect treatment was noted in rural communities in 
Uganda (Kassam, et al., 2015). In addition, they tend to charge higher fee than public health 
facilities in order to meet their financial obligations (Mclntyre and Mutyambizi, 2005). Despite 
the private sector contributions to health care provision, quality and cost control remains a 
heated debate given inadequate state regulation and monitoring of this sector in developing 
countries. After the initial licensing, the safety and quality of care provided by the private 
providers remain unmonitored and unregulated. Drug vendors and traditional medicine 
providers have free reign largely in the rural areas (kassam, et al., 2015). 
 
3.4 Risk Sharing Model 
As the user fee or cost recovery did not live up to the promise such as generating additional 
resources and increasing access to health care as claimed by the international financial 
institutions, but in most respect created a host of other problems, risk sharing approach was 
considered as alternative financing model. Cost sharing through prepayment is therefore 
considered to cover a large proportion of the population at modest cost and equitably with 
emphasis on social health insurance (World bank, 1987, 1993). Health insurance has a long 
history with the developed countries notably Germany, Japan, UK etc. On the other hand, this 
financing model is gaining recognition in the developing countries in recent decades (Hsiao 
and Shaw, 2007). Thus, prepayment models including individual private health insurance, 
employment-based health insurance, community health insurance scheme and social health 
insurance scheme are discussed below.  
 
3.4.1 Individual Private Health Insurance 
Individual private health insurance is a prepayment model, which has been in existence for 
centuries to replace direct purchase of health services. It is a pre-payment plan to protect 
individual from uncertain financial health care costs. Individual health insurance plan often 
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requires two transactions, that is, a premium or contribution payment from the individual to an 
insurance organisation and a reimbursement from the insurance plan to the health care provider. 
However, it is a purely market driven health insurance model based on fundamental principle 
of neoliberalism that individual should pursue their health care based on the notion that 
individuals must be free to define and pursue their own goals with minimal interference from 
the government. With individual private health insurance, people purchase health insurance 
and receive health care in the private institutions without state intervention (Mclntyre and 
Mutyambizi, 2005; Bodenheimer and Grumbach, 2005). Historically, individual private health 
insurance dates back to 1850 as a provisional support income for people with disability 
including death benefits to assist individual with burial costs. This model was very lucrative 
especially for insurance companies up to the Second World War (WW2) (Wagner, 2012).  
 
In the capitalist economy like the US, where social policies are less generous and less 
egalitarian, values such as individualism and free market culture remained dominant. 
Individual private health insurance was developed by commercial private insurance companies 
to provide health care for people who could afford contributions or premiums (Bodenheimer 
and Grumbach, 2005). The advocates of this model argue that first individual private health 
insurance frees employers of the obligation to provide health insurance for their employees. 
Secondly, it gives people a stable source of health insurance irrespective of their employment 
status. Thirdly, small business owners are exempted from the expenses of insuring their 
employees. Lastly, it saves people from massive tax increases in order to insure the uninsured 
as in the case of government-financed health insurance (David and Schoen, 2003; Wagner, 
2012). In addition, individual private insurance plays either or both supplementary or 
complementary roles to fill the gap in the public health care services. In the US for example, 
41 million beneficiaries of the Public Sponsored Health Insurance programmes in 2003 had 
supplementary private insurance (Wagner, 2012; Marion, 2014). In Germany between 1975 
and 2002, the number of people having individual private health insurance rose “from 4.2 
million to 7.7 million, representing 6.9% and 9.3% of the population respectively” (Busse and 
Riesberg 2004: 77). 
 
However, this model has been criticized on high cost of health insurance premium. The 
skyrocketing cost of individual private health insurance has prevented many people from being 
insured in this model. Secondly, this model is characterised by limited coverage because it 
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covers small proportion of the population (the affluent) and has contributed to considerable 
inequalities within the overall health system. For example, in the US, the model provides health 
insurance for only about 3% of the population in 2002 and 16.2% in 2016 (Bodenheimer and 
Grumbach, 2005, New York Time, 2016). Similarly, Sapakankunti notes that individual private 
insurance is specifically for the high-income class who can afford the premiums. The 
population coverage of this model was only 1.6% in 1992 and 2.0% in 1995 of the total 
population of Thailand and the increasing trend is not high (Sapakankunti, 2012). Thirdly, 
contribution is risk-related and there is no redistribution among members within or between 
groups. Prepayment level often determines one access to health benefits (Mclntyre, et al., 2005; 
Bodenheimer and Grumbach, 2005; Ataguba and McIntyre, 2012). In sum, individual private 
health insurance is certainly based on the principle of individualism and libertarianism whereby 
health care is seen as individual responsibility rather than the responsibility of society requiring 
social solidarity. Thus, this model is elitist because it provides health services for an 
insignificant proportion of the population (the better off) while the larger proportion of the 
population is left out of the model.  
 
3.4.2 Employment-Based Private Health Insurance 
 
Employment-Based private health insurance (EBPHI) is based on shared contribution in that 
employers and employees share the costs of health care while employers usually pay larger 
part of the premiums that purchase health insurance for their employees. Historically, this 
model dates back to the nineteenth – century in Germany where artisans’ guilds mutual benefit 
funds and miner’s unity funds were established to provide sickness, disability and funeral 
benefits to their members. Additionally, industrial workers also organised voluntary mutual aid 
societies like the artisans to provide similar benefits for their members; however, they only 
reached a small population and did not protect the members’ needs sufficiently (Sigerist, 1999). 
Moreover, the German government that imposed duties on the employers to protect their 
workers in the wake of 19th century Industrial Revolution later passed three legislations. These 
include (1) employer’s liability for compensation in case of accidents, (2) railroad companies 
were liable for accident of their workers and were compelled by law to compensate injured 
employees and (3) ship-owners were required to provide sustenance and medical care to ailing 
sailors (Sigerist, 1999). Prior to1883 Bismarkian statutory health insurance, diverse relief funds 
were available at different regions for different groups of workers in Germany, which were 
accessed by members. A number of voluntary relief funds were available on solidarity-based 
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support system whereby members have access according to needs rather than according to 
contributions to the funds. However, the rapid growth in employment – based health insurance 
was spurred during the WW2 when price control policy prevented wage increase but allowed 
the growth of fringe benefits. However, due to shortage of workers, employers began to offer 
health insurance to their employees as incentive. Besides, after the war, unions built on this 
trend and negotiated with their employers for health benefits for their members. The resultant 
effect of this negotiation was a dramatic growth in employment-based private insurance in 
Europe, the U.S and many other countries (Barnighausen and Sauerborn, 2002; Bodenheimer 
and Grumbach, 2005).  
 
Primarily, EBPHI was premised on community rating approach with social solidarity – within 
each group people who become ill receive health benefits irrespective of their contributions. 
Funds are redistributed among different groups from the healthy to the sick, as a subsidy to pay 
the costs of health care of those unable to pay (Barnighausen and Sauerborn, 2002). However, 
this health insurance model attracted commercial insurance companies to health care and thus 
changed its dynamics entirely to market driven financing health system. The solidaristic and 
redistributive principle of this model therefore was weakened by experience rating approach 
where income is less redistributive from the healthy to the sick or from the better off to the 
poor.  
 
In an evaluation of EBPHI, the US and South Africa share related institutions that supported 
this model not only because of the neoliberal policies and capitalist institutions that have 
largely reshaped their health care systems from community rating to experience rating, but also 
as a result of explicitly polarised health care system along socioeconomic line. In the U.S. for 
example, Bodenheimer and Grumbach (2005: 7) explain that experience rating is entrenched 
in the US insurance market. “Within each group, those who become ill are subsidised by those 
who remain well, but among different groups, healthier groups (e.g. bank managers) do not 
subsidise high-risk groups (e.g. mine workers)”. They note that in a laissez-faire competitive 
private health insurance that features predominantly in the US, community rating cannot 
survive, given that healthy people have no economic incentive to subsidise another group of 
sick people. However, this model received political support in the US in that employers are 
given incentives such as tax credit to cover employees voluntarily and medical savings account 
to support employees’ expenses (Bodenheimer and Grumbach, 2005). While employment-
based private insurance was envisioned to expand health insurance coverage to the uninsured 
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Americans, the number of uninsured Americans remains high largely due to the rising cost of 
health insurance premium. The tax credit failed to reduce the numbers of uninsured workers. 
On the other hand, medical savings account divided the population into low and high-risk pool 
thereby the low risk people fails to subsidize high-risk people. Therefore, the incentives created 
by government within employment-based private insurance had little impact on the nation’s 
health care cost (Schroeder, 2001; Bodenheimer and Grumbach, 2005; Walden, 2012). 
 
In South Africa, Mclntyre, et al. (2005), Ataguba and McIntyre (2012) note that EBPHI is 
referred to as ‘medical scheme’ and membership depends on income and employment status: 
the non-formally employed and the poor are less likely to be scheme members. Moreover, 
‘medical scheme’ has been severely criticised on the following reasons firstly it covers only a 
very small proportion of the population – about 16% of South Africans, and accounts for over 
43% of the total health care financing. It also contributed to considerable inequities within the 
health system whereby the better off (usually small group) accesses private health care services 
while majority of the population depends on under-sourced public health services. Second, the 
proliferation of medical schemes has resulted in the fragmentation of the insured population 
into different risk pools, which has raised questions about redistributive mechanism and 
sustainability. Third, it has resulted in high costs of medical scheme in terms of private hospital 
admissions, administration and medicines. Finally, the use of limited tax resources estimated 
at US$1 billion to subsidize medical scheme which only benefited a small proportion of the 
population has shown the weakness of employment based insurance to engender social justice 
and equitable distribution of health care in South Africa  (Mclntyre, et al. 2000; Mclntyre and 
Doherty, 2004; Ataguba and McIntyre, 2012; Ataguba, 2016).  
 
Although South African Government has introduced legislative and regulatory framework to 
address the challenges with employment-based insurance in terms of contributions, benefits 
package and tax benefits, the population served entirely by the medical scheme coverage 
remained small and skewed in favour of the richest groups (Ataguba 2016; Ataguba and 
McIntyre 2012). In summary, the fundamental principle of social justice and solidarity in which 
employment-based insurance was traditionally established (whereby people benefit from the 
scheme according to need rather than exclusively on contributions) has been taken over by the 
neoliberal policies of individualism and market-based competition. This model is only 
available to insignificant proportion (employees of the formal sector) of the population, and 
thus, contributions and benefits are inequitably distributed. 
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3.4.3 Community-Based Health Insurance 
 CBHI is a prepayment model that is commonly practiced by the population groups 
characterised by community self-help, social justice and solidarity. There are calls from the 
international agencies for the establishment of CBHI in developing countries, as it provides 
insurance coverage to people with limited coverage like those who are not engage in formal 
sector employment.  CBHI is considered as a promising model not only to increase access and 
generate revenue for health services, but also to reduce out-of-pocket spending through pooling 
of risk and resources (De Allegri, et al. 2006; Basaza, et al., 2008). Bennett (2004: 147) 
described CBHI “as any scheme managed and operated by an organisation, other than 
government or private for-profit company that provides risk pooling to cover all or part of the 
costs of health care services”. For Jakab and Krishnan it is viewed as “populations with low 
income obtaining their subsistence from the informal sector (urban/rural) and/or socially 
excluded groups (due to cultural factors, physical or mental disability, other chronic illness) 
and often not able to take advantage of government and/or market-based health care financing 
arrangement” (Jakab and Krishnan, 2016: 4). Besides, Musau described it as “any not-for- 
profit insurance scheme that is aimed primarily at the informal sector and formed on the basis 
of an ethic of mutual aid and the collective pooling of health risk, and in which the members 
participate in its management” (Masau, 1999: 5).  
 
CBHI is currently in the spotlight and widely promoted by the international agencies such as 
the World Bank and World Health Organisation as a financing option mainly for the people in 
the informal sector and the rural populace, and as a viable mechanism to achieve universal 
coverage (World Bank, 1989, 1993; WHO, 2005; 2012). CBHI is currently gaining attention 
in the developing countries as governments in these countries are increasingly recognising its 
role as part of a national financing strategy for health care. Many of CBHI schemes are 
developed in the sub-Saharan Africa and Asian countries. For example, Nkoranza in Ghana, 
SEWA in India, Health Card Scheme in Thailand and Ikosi-Isheri Mutual Health Insurance in 
Nigeria among others (Jakab and Krishnan, 2016; Centre for Public Policy Alternative, 2014; 
Bennett, 2004). Primarily, this model was to ensure the community (such as low-income 
earners who are socially excluded from other forms of insurance) is actively involved in 
mobilising, pooling and allocating resources for health care that reflects the principles of social 
solidarity (Jakab and Krishnan, 2016). However, CBHI schemes vary remarkably in terms of 
structures, funding, benefits package, composition, membership and objectives. For instance, 
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CBHI schemes are grouped into four categories: (1) some schemes were initiated by private-
for-profit providers like Nkoranzi in Ghana and Bwamanda hospital pre-payment scheme in 
the DRC. (2) SEWA scheme in India was developed from micro-credit schemes and later added 
health insurance for its members’ protection. (3) The traditional mutual health scheme such as 
the Gonosasthya Kendra in Bangladesh and Mutuelle de Sante, Rwanda. (4) Community 
financing supported by governments/social insurance/ NGOs such as Hygeia Community 
Health Care programme in Kwara State Nigeria and Community Health Fund in Tanzania 
(Jakab and Krishnan, 2016; Gustafsson-Wright, and Schellekens, 2013; Bennett, 2004). 
 
Literature has shown the importance of CBHI scheme to health care financing (e.g., Bennett, 
2004; Wang, et al., 2012; Gustafsson-Wright, and Schellekens, 2013; Ogben, 2014; Odeyemi, 
2014; Jakab and Krishnan, 2016). For example, Jakab and Krishnan, in a literature review argue 
that CBHI schemes provide coverage to several people who cannot afford the costs of health 
care. They note, “Gonosasthya Kendra in Bangladesh is effective in reaching the poor. 80% of 
the people classified as destitute in the area are covered by the scheme, 46% of the poor, 20% 
of the middle class and 10% of the rich amounting to 27.5% total subscription rate” (Jakab and 
Krishnan: 2016: 26). Similarly, the Thailand Health Card Scheme shows significant supports 
for members with lower income group than non-members. This demonstrates a pro – poor 
targeting of the health card scheme in Thailand (Jakab and Krishnan, 2016).  
 
 Health Insurance Fund (HIF) initiated by a Dutch foundation in collaboration with the Kwara 
State government in Nigeria, has increased access of rural population to health care in Kwara 
State. In a quasi-experimental study conducted by the Amsterdam Institute of International 
Development on the impact of Hygeia Community Health Care (HCHC) among households in 
Nigeria in 2013 reveals that about 23,000 individuals or about 30% of the population had 
enrolled in the scheme. It was also revealed that the use of health care had increased on average 
by 20.5% for the treatment group (the insured) and HCHC has decreased out-of-pocket health 
care expenditures. “On average, these expenditures have declined by about 1,030 Naira per 
person per year, representing a 52% reduction in health expenditures when including the cost 
of the insurance premium” (Gustafsson-Wright, and Schellekens, 2013:11). Moreover, 
Polonsky, et al.’s (2009) survey of 506 households reveals that CBHI scheme for rural 
population in Armenia had a successful implementation by providing equitable health care to 
the vulnerable people including the poor, women and elderly.  
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However, a number of challenges of CBHI have been identified because of different 
ideological concepts upon which the foundations, objectives, structures and benefit packages 
of various CBHI schemes are based. Bennett (2004) argues that conflicting objectives and 
interests exist between government-financed (such as Community Health Fund in Tanzania) 
and individual CBHI schemes (such as SEWA in India). While government subsidised scheme 
is largely concerned with the equity, sustainability remains the dominant objective of individual 
schemes because without being in operation no other objectives would be achieved. Thus, the 
mechanisms of sustainability of individual scheme may conflict with equity with respect to 
wider health care system. Bennett (2004: 149) notes, “Exclusion of high-risk individuals from 
scheme membership will affect most vulnerable members of the population, increasing 
premium levels will most likely reduce the level of effective protection provided against 
financial risk”. Bennett further argues that in principle the role of CBHI is to complement other 
forms of health care financing; however, in practice, there is minimal complementary role of 
CBHI schemes with other forms of the health care system. In addition, multiple risk pools exit 
in the developing countries operating in parallel with the social security schemes (Bennett, 
2004).  
 
Furthermore, Jakab and Krishnan in a comprehensive review of literature analyse CBHI on 
three themes: resource mobilisation capacity, social inclusion and financial protection. On 
resource mobilisation, they note that community-financing method had the strength to mobilise 
resources for health care. However, presence of disparity in relation to resource mobilisation 
capacity remains a challenge. On one hand, some schemes generate substantial revenue; on the 
other hand, others generate insignificant amount of revenue. For example, the SEWA scheme 
in India generates adequate revenues through membership fees to cover all expenses including 
salaries, drugs and overhead costs. Whereas, in RAHA scheme membership contributions 
covered between 10 to 20% of the operating costs (Jakab and Krishnan, 2016). Similarly, in an 
evaluation of nine mutual health organisations contribution to financing health care in West 
and Central Africa, Atim (1998) asserts that community health financing members account for 
less than 2.5% of hospital revenues in Senegal, though they made up of 30% of the admission. 
The contributions of members only cover a small fraction of what they spent on care. The major 
factor undermining revenue generating capacity of this model is the predominantly poor 
contributing population – the poor simply cross-subsidising the health care costs of other poor 
members(Jakab and Krishnan, 2016; Bennett, 2004).Thus, Atim (1998) concludes that 
community health organisations had inadequate contributions to finance health care. 
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On social inclusion, Jakab and Krishnan assert that although community or mutual health 
schemes are designed to provide financial protection for majority of the population who would 
otherwise not have financial protection, the poorest of the poor are often excluded from the 
schemes. They note further that social exclusion is applicable to all the categories of CBHI 
schemes. In the government support schemes in Thailand, Burundi and Nigeria, the lowest 
income group often dropouts of the scheme or face affordability problems. For instance, the 
government Health Card Scheme in Thailand specifically designed for the near poor and 
middle-income groups whereas the poorest of the poor were excluded from the scheme. 
Similarly, in the Health Card scheme in Burundi, social economic status and membership were 
positively correlated. Only 25% of households were to be part of the scheme while many 
households could not afford the contributions required for joining the scheme. In the provider-
based community insurance (such as Nkoranzi) in Ghana, financial reason was the major 
hindrance for not being part of the scheme. Similar findings also reported in the mutual health 
fund in the Bangladesh – reasons for not being part of the scheme include inability to pay 
contributions, co-payments associated with the scheme etc. (Jutting, 2003; Jakab and Krishnan, 
2016).  
 
The registered CBHI schemes are either receiving subsidies from the government or donor 
agencies to subsidise their membership contributions. However, these subsidies are used as 
incentives for the scheme to register more members and generate more revenues. In Tanzania, 
for example, schemes with more members are likely to secure larger share of subsidies from 
the government or donors, whereas scheme with less members receives less subsidy. Funds 
from government or donors are used as ‘matching grants’ to support the amount of revenue 
generated by individual scheme. Although this serves as an incentive, it raises the question of 
equity among schemes because small schemes indicate poor revenue generation capacity, 
insolvency and poor managerial ability (Mclntyre, et al. 2005).  
 
Regarding financial protection, literature reveals that CBHI schemes are effective in providing 
protection for members against ‘catastrophic’ health care costs (e.g., Arhin, 1994; Atim, 1998; 
Gumber and Kulkarni, 2000; Gustafsson-Wright, and Schellekens, 2013; Jakab and Krishnan, 
2016). However, financial protection is restricted to members. For example, Gumber and 
Kulkarni, express that although SEWA scheme provides financial protection to members, the 
costs of seeking health care on household budget remained higher among members (Gumber 
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and Kulkarni, 2000). Moreover, Carrin, Waelkens, and Criel (2005) also note that the size of 
CBHI determines its risk pool. Given the voluntary nature of CBHI scheme, many people may 
not be willing to be part of the scheme, though other factors such geographical location, 
economic status, social cohesion and education are crucial. To sum up the debates about CBHI, 
its performance as a financing model is relatively fair, by ensuring its members are protected 
from huge and uncertain medical bills and have increased access to health care services. 
However, the problem of social exclusion whereby the poorest of the poor who could not afford 
the minimum contribution are excluded is a serious concern. Revenue generating capacity of 
the CBHI is also a challenge, although subsidized by the government and donors, risk-pooling 
remains limited. Similarly, the effectiveness of government targeting strategies (e.g. through 
subsidy) to promote equity by ensuring the poor have access to basic services remains 
controversial.   
 
3.4.4 Social Health Insurance 
SHI as an insurance model has distinctive characteristics. The first one is that SHI is based on 
compulsion – under this model every salaried employee must enrol and pay the specified 
premium, which often is a percentage of income. However, government may pay premiums (as 
subsidies either as a part or as 100%) on behalf of vulnerable groups of the population such as 
the poor, children and elderly. Two, it operates on eligibility – people are only entitled to the 
benefits only when the required contributions are made. Three, contributions to the scheme and 
benefits to the enrolees are presented in the rules and regulation establishing the contract 
between enrolees and the social insurance companies. In this model, the benefits for the 
enrolees are specified in the benefits package (Hsiao and Shaw, 2007). Historically, social 
health insurance was first introduced in Germany in the 19th century (Barnighausen and 
Sauerborn, 2002). Prior to this period, a number of small, informal, voluntary and CBHI 
schemes existed. Various relief funds such as craftsmen’s guilds mutual funds, miners’ funds, 
factory relief funds for employees; journeymen funds and community relief funds for the 
people unable to support themselves or did not belong to any relief funds were available and 
operated on the principle of community self-help, social justice and social solidarity 
(Barnighausen and Sauerborn, 2002; Carin and James, 2004). 
 
German health care system operates the principle of gradualism in the establishment of SHI. 
In the pre-Bismarkian statutory health insurance, laws were made based on the tenets of social 
solidarity and mutual support. However, in an attempt to move from mutual support schemes 
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to SHI a number of steps were taken by the German government. These include (1) Laws 
guiding the establishment of voluntary health insurance scheme moved from general rules to 
specific rules, that is, having well-established rules guiding the development and operation of 
the scheme. (2) It was compulsory for people to joint any insurance fund within the ambit of 
the regulatory body. For instance, Barnighausen and Sauerborn, (2002: 1562) assert, “In 1854, 
local governments were allowed to pressure all uninsured into creating insurance funds for 
mutual support”. (3) Compulsory membership spreads to the entire German territory for one 
skilled group: miners. Subsequently, the miners were mandated to join one of the several 
miners’ regional funds (Barnighausen and Sauerborn, 2002; Sigerist, 1999).  
 
The three incremental phases in the development of German health insurance system paved the 
way for the introduction of SHI in 1883 for a larger number of skilled workers. The incremental 
approach adopted in Germany led to the achievement of universal coverage. It was estimated, 
that the health insurance law of 1883 brought coverage among worker from 5% to 10% of the 
population. Subsequently, the coverage grew from 11% in 1885 to 37% in 1910 and by 1930 
and 1950, population coverage reached 50% and 70% respectively (Carrin and James: 2004: 
6).  In 1981 other professional groups such as the artists, publicists were covered and by 2000, 
88% of the German population was covered in the SHI. Universality of coverage with SHI was 
not 100% in Germany, remaining 12% are largely covered under the private health insurance, 
above certain income ceiling one can opt out of the SHI for other health insurance (European 
Observatory of Health Systems, 2000; Barnighausen and Sauerborn, 2002; Busse and Riesberg 
2004). 
 
Similarly, many high and middle-income countries following an incremental approach similar 
to Germany have achieved high insurance coverage with social health insurance model. In the 
United Kingdom, for example, the National Insurance Act was established 1911. Subsequently, 
several health insurance funds including trade union and employers’ funds, mutual health funds 
and commercial health insurers became prominent and about half of the population was 
covered. Nevertheless, the insurance arrangement was highly complex with contribution 
flowing between related voluntary funds and the insured in the commercial insurance. The 
insured could only receive benefit in relation to the amount they had contributed (Bodenheimer 
and Grumbach 2005). However, in 1942, Sir William Beveridge published the agreement on 
social insurance. The Beveridge report recommended that British’s social insurance and public 
assistance programmes such as retirement, disability and unemployment benefits, be financed 
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in a uniform manner (Scott and Marshall, 2005). However, in 1948, the National Health Service 
was established chiefly financed through general taxation to ensure the British population is 
covered (Sigerist, 1999; Scott and Marshall, 2005; Bodenheimer and Grumbach 2005).  
 
Japan, like Germany – builds on pre-existing small, voluntary mutual funds until mandatory 
employment-based social insurance was established for selected groups of workers in 1922. 
However, in the 1930s Japanese government promoted the expansion of community health 
insurance nationwide. Five years after, 12 models of community health insurance were 
established at the national level and this paved the way for 1938 National Citizens Health 
Insurance Law founded on the principles of community financing (Carrin and James, 2004). 
The law was designed to meet the needs of farmers, self-employed in the rural communities, 
small companies and the poor. Subsequently, both the compulsory employment-based 
insurance for selected workers and the National Citizens Health Insurance Coverage covered 
60% of the Japanese population in 1945. After the WW2, coverage was expanded to 90% of 
the population, and subsequently in 1958 law establishing compulsory insurance for all 
Japanese was adopted with full implementation in 1961 (Carrin and James, 2004; Ikegami and 
Campbell, 2004; Kobayashi, 2009). 
 
By adopting Bismarkian model in Korea, the same systematic approach was used for the 
extension of SHI across distinct population groups. Korea had the first voluntary health 
insurance fund in 1965 and by 1977; there were 11 voluntary health insurance funds in the 
country. Similarly, in 1977, it became mandatory for employers of 500 employees to provide 
health insurance for their workers  and their dependants. Sequentially, coverage was extended 
to companies with 300, 100 and 16 employees by 1983. Between 1979 and 1980, government 
officials, military service men, private school teachers, and their dependants were compulsorily 
insured. Finally, between 1988 and 1989 universal compulsory coverage was achieved through 
schemes covering rural and urban self-employed respectively, 26 years since the enactment of 
the 1963 Health Insurance Act (Carrin and James, 2004; Hust, 2010). 
 
Based on the antecedents and success narratives of SHI in the developed countries such as 
Germany and Japan, the WHO encourages developing countries to establish social health 
insurance as a financing option with the promise of technical support as part of the resolution 
of the World Health Assembly in 2005 (World Health Assembly Resolution, 2005). WHO 
described SHI as a strategy for mobilising “more resources for health, pooling risk, providing 
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more equitable access” (WHO, 2005: 5), and delivering better services. According to Hsaio 
and Shaw (2007), the World Bank and other agencies, endorsed SHI for developing countries 
has a policy instrument to facilitate four desirable of health sector reform due to inadequate 
revenue to finance health care for all. The first one is that through SHI, government funds 
would be used to subsidise costs of health care for the poor instead of providing universal 
health care for all. Second, government funds would be used to provide public services 
including immunisation, child and maternal care etc. Third, there would be a separation 
between the demand and supply side of health care provision thereby outsourcing the supply 
side to separate entities in order to improve efficiency and quality of care. Finally, SHI would 
ensure people access to health care by using non-governmental organisations and private 
providers through means of contracting (Hasio and Shaw, 2007). 
 
Many LMICs have adopted SHI as well, either with incremental approach – building on the 
existing community health funds or transformational approach – changing or replacement of 
the existing structure to SHI (Barnighausen and Sauerborn, 2002). While some have made 
substantial progress in terms of population coverage, others face the problem of extending 
coverage to the preponderance of the population. Costa Rica, China and Thailand have made a 
giant stride in reference to population coverage. For instance, Costa Rica developed SHI 
through the Costa Rican Social Security Fund established in 1941. The process of the set goal 
of universality was incremental. Initially, membership to the social security fund was targeted 
at the urban population as well as the workers in the coffee producing zones of Valle Central, 
but benefit from the social security fund was restricted to the insured workers with the 
exclusion of their family members. However, due to the pressure from workers and other social 
movements, mandatory family coverage was established in 1956 for spouses and their children 
below the age of 12. In addition, in 1961 legislation was made to extend coverage to all the 
population including self-employed and indigent. By 1990, 29 years after the legislation for 
universal coverage 85% of the population was covered in the SHI (Carrin and James, 2004).  
 
Similarly, Thailand and China have had previous insurance schemes of different forms, scope, 
and impacts that are being incorporated into SHI. They build on various existing funds, at some 
stages, some funds were merged and changes were made. For instance, at the time of schemes 
integration in China in 2009, more than 200 million people were not covered in any insurance. 
However, in 2011, about 95% of Chinese were covered in different insurance some kind of 
coverage, and by 2013, the coverage had reached 99% of the population under the NCMS. 
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Overall, 93% of Chinese population had some form of insurance. In Thailand, a number of 
schemes including Medical Welfare Scheme, Health Card Scheme, Civil Servant Medical 
Benefits Scheme and Social Security Scheme were instrumental in the SHI development and 
the achievement of 99% of the population coverage in 2002 (Dutta and Hongoro, 2013; 
Talampas, 2014). Moreover, in the sub-Sahara Africa, Ghana and Rwanda used the 
combination of pre-existing voluntary funds and SHI model to expand population coverage. In 
Ghana, the combination of SHI for the formal sector employees and CBHI for the informal 
sector were used to expand coverage to about half of the population (NHIS Ghana, 2010; 
Dalaba et al., 2012). Similarly, The Rwanda government expanded population coverage to 90% 
of the population with SHI, through compulsory insurance in the exiting insurance funds 
(Rwanda MoH, 2010; Nyandekwe et al., 2014). However, population coverage remains a 
challenge in most developing countries that have established SHI including Nigeria, 
Cameroon, Kenya, Vietnam and the Dominican Republic among others (Barnighausen and 
Sauerborn, 2002; Adeyemi and Nixon, 2013; Muiya and Kamau, 2013). 
 
As discussed above, many developing countries are facing serious challenges in scaling up 
population coverage, which is the main target of SHI. Studies have identified impediments to 
expanding population coverage through SHI (Barnighausen and Sauerborn, 2002; Carrin and 
James, 2004; Mclntyre, et al. 2005; Hurst, 2010). Barnighausen and Sauerborn based their 
argument on three dimensions first they argued that though many developing countries have 
established SHI, the replication of German’s 19th century SHI is impracticable because of 
different principles and rationales underlying insurance schemes. They emphasise that different 
fundamental principles underpin traditional risk sharing in Africa. For example, some are 
founded on mutual benefits whereby people expect to receive from an insurance scheme as 
they contributed to the scheme. On the other hand, others are based on conditional mutual 
benefits –where members only receive benefits if they fall victim of the event they insured 
against. However, the pre-Bismarkian social insurance was originated on comprehensive 
instead of provision mutual benefits as its core principle whereby mutual self-help, social 
solidarity were developed, and these formed the fundamental principles for the evolution of 
mandatory health insurance funds in Germany. 
 
Second, Barnighausen and Sauerborn argue that in Africa, community-based health schemes 
are largely introduced by external agencies that are alien to African society and thus lack the 
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dynamics and operation of an internal social movement which are essential for scheme 
performance. They maintain that labour union plays essential role in fast tracking insurance 
scheme, “non- movement-based schemes do not pose a threat to government and thus fail to 
prompt government to take over the schemes” (Barnighausen and Sauerborn, 2002: 1562). 
However, over time non-movement-based schemes need to incorporate elements of group 
action as these would not only enhance their performance, but also encourage government 
involvement in the expansion of social protection to the majority of the population. Third, SHI 
schemes were established in many countries particularly in the developing context on voluntary 
basis. Voluntary social health insurance sired adverse selection in that many low risk 
individuals are likely not to join the SHI. They observe however, that countries with successful 
SHI based their SHI on compulsion, such as in Germany, Japan and Korea among others.  
 
On the other hand, in many developing contexts the establishment of compulsory insurance 
might not be considered politically feasible and enforceable for administrative and economic 
reasons. As a result, many have established SHI to some segments of the population 
(Barnighausen and Sauerborn, 2002). In the same way, Nicholas et al. (2015) maintained that 
most developing countries that targeted a limited group and provided health services for them 
first (usually the formal sector employees) with the plan to reach out to the informal sector 
workers usually the largest proportion of the population often end up with (1) a large proportion 
of the population uncovered. (2) Fragmented system and higher administrative costs. (3) The 
richest households often benefit disproportionately. Nicholas and colleagues further note that 
countries adopting this incremental approach, a reversal of Bismarkian model, are making very 
slow progress towards universal insurance coverage (Nicholas et al. 2015). However, they 
argue for full population coverage from the outset, noting that countries such as Thailand, 
China and Brazil have adopted full population coverage and they are making progress and 
moving rapidly to higher levels of insurance coverage. 
 
For Hasio and Shaw, a country’s level of economic structure and development influences how 
many people could be covered and scaling up of SHI towards universality of health. While 
developing countries such as Nigeria, Kenya and Ghana have large informal sector 
employment, which hinders mandatory pay roll tax deduction and collection of premiums, the 
structural features of the developed economy tend to contribute to the enabling environment 
for SHI such as the case of Germany and Japan. However, they note that large informal sector 
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economy, high prevalence of poverty, low per capita income, high dependency ratio etc. 
represent immense challenges to the scaling up of SHI in sub-Sahara Africa context (Hasio and 
Shaw, 2007). Moreover, Mclntyre, et al. (2005) explain that in contrast to the Germany 
incremental approach (from small, informal, voluntary and solidarity schemes which pave the 
way for larger, formal and compulsory schemes); many developing countries planned to 
achieve national health insurance coverage with limited targeted group (e.g., formal sector) 
being the first step. The authors based their argument on two points: one, introduction of SHI 
has divided the people into parts. The insured who have access to a number of good health 
services and the uninsured who regularly encountered poor public health services and high cost 
of private health care. Two, in many instances, the civil servants are usually the first group of 
employees to be covered under the SHI. Although they represent the largest group of formal 
sector employees in the African context, the limited public funds often used to subsidise 
mandatory health insurance for them. In that case, very limited government funds may likely 
be available to provide health care for majority of the population who depends on publicity-
funded services (Mclntyre, et al., 2005). 
 
Furthermore, Mclntyre and colleagues posit that fragmentation of a number of voluntary 
insurance schemes in the sub-Saharan African with a wide range of contributions and benefit 
packages pose a challenge to the mandatory health insurance with a common health package 
and contributions. They note, for example, the resistance from the exiting community-based 
health insurance schemes in Ghana over restructuring of their contributions and benefits 
package in order to incorporate them into the national social health insurance schemes. 
However, they argue for a health insurance with common contribution and benefits package 
from the onset rather than fragmented health insurance with different contributions and 
packages, which could be a hindrance to the attainment of universal coverage in developing 
nations (Mclntyre, et al. 2005). In summary, SHI has been used to expand coverage to the 
greater part of the population mainly in the high and middle-income countries. In the countries 
with high universality of coverage, SHI was based on the principle of incremental approach of 
the exiting small, informal and voluntary insurance schemes to large, more formal and 
compulsory schemes. In Germany as in other countries with universal SHI, legislation 
incrementally formalised, expanded and made health insurance compulsory. However, SHI 
largely remains voluntary in many LMICs  
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3.5 National Health Insurance Policy 
National Health Insurance Policy (NHIP) is a government programme that guarantees health 
insurance coverage for all residents of a nation. The NHIP objectives is to ensure everyone is 
covered for basic health care services, promote costs containment, ensure cost effective 
provider reimbursement and financial accessibility of health care for all. NHIP is generally 
financed by a replacement of out-of-pocket payment with one or a mixture of other forms of 
prepayment model including tax-financed (i.e., single-payer system or Beveridge model) and 
SHI (multiple-payer system or Bismarck model). Under the tax-financed system, everyone is 
entitled to health care without having to make direct contribution into the insurance fund. 
Contributions into insurance fund are from taxes. For instance, countries like Canada, UK, 
Finland and Sweden have tax-financed, single-payer health care system (Ortiz, 2007; Carrin, 
2002). 
Historically, for example, the Canadian tax-financed health insurance started in 1947 when the 
publicly financed universal hospital insurance was first introduced in Saskatchewan province. 
In 1957, exactly 10 years after, the Canadian government adopted the Hospital Insurance Act, 
which was implemented completely in 1961. Moreover, in 1966, the same government ratified 
universal medical insurance for the entire population which was in used in 1971 (Bodenheimer 
and Grumbach, 2005). Thus universal national health care system in Canada started out in a 
single province (Saskatchewan) and later spread from there to the entire nation.  Similarly in 
the UK, the Beveridgeian proposed model of unified single-financed health care system 
brought about the development of a National Health Service in 1948 (Scott and Marshall, 
2005). Like other Nordic countries, Finnish health care system offers comprehensive universal 
coverage of health care funded through general taxation and relied largely on public health care 
(Hurst, 2010). 
 
Advocates of single-payer tax-funded NHIP based their arguments on (1) universality, that is, 
every individual in the country is covered in the same plan because of being a resident. (2) 
Solidarity and trust: everyone is insured on the same conditions irrespective of socioeconomic 
status. (3) Efficiency: all citizens are insured in the same national pool of fund thereby making 
risk pooling more efficient and lower health expenditures. (4) Health insurance is separated 
from employment status: whether an individual is employed or not, he/she is covered under the 
nation health programme (Ortiz, 2007; MacGregor, 2014). However, critics of this model argue 
that first, tax-financed, single-payer health care system has too much power on people’s health 
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choice by restricting them to type treatments and health care providers they can access, which 
in turn results in rationing of care and excessive waiting time in most of the publicly funded 
health care facilities. Second, it functions on taxes, and thus depends on the amount of taxes 
that can be collected. In the case of insufficient funds, there is possibility of increasing tax levy 
on the taxpayers to support the dependent population (Bodenheimer and Grumbach, 2005). 
 
On the other hand, social health insurance functions on multiple-payer system such that 
mandatory contributions are made from employers, employees, self-employed, enterprises and 
government into decentralised social health insurance funds. The starting point for contribution 
into the insurance funds is certain percentage of a formal worker’s salary, whereas self-
employed pay contribution either by estimated income or flat rate. However, government pays 
contribution or subsidizes insurance membership of vulnerable population groups such as the 
elderly, disabled, low-income informal sector workers and the poor who may not be able to 
afford contributions. Achieving universal health insurance by SHI varies among countries. It 
may be faster in some countries but slow in others, putting into consideration economic, 
political and social and cultural factors (Carrin and James, 2004). This model is largely found 
in Western Europe including Germany, Austria, Belgium, Netherland and Switzerland among 
others. Similarly, many countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America have also adopted this 
model. Although many countries (especially in the OECD) have attained universalization of 
health insurance with SHI, at different pace, attaining this target remains difficult in many 
developing countries.  
 
Exponents of this model hold the view that firstly, given the high cost of medical care; 
governments alone would not be able to provide health care for all. Therefore, mandatory 
contributions from employers and employees are seen as the only way to raise fund to finance 
health care. In the developing countries, for example, the World Bank and WHO champion and 
recommend SHI for the achievement of universal health care. In 2005, the World Health 
Assembly passed a resolution thereby mandating its member states to adopt and sustain SHI 
because firstly it is a strategy for more resource mobilisation for health care, risk pooling, 
delivery of better quality care and provision of equitable access to health care for the poor 
(WHO, 2005).  Secondly, SHI reduces moral hazard – co-payment and pre-payment ratio often 
reduces moral hazard (i.e., excess demand for health care) because when people share costs of 
health care, they tend to use it wisely and thus helps to ensure better financial accessibility for 
all. Thirdly, SHI makes public resources available for the provision of health services for the 
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targeted population (i.e., the poor) who cannot afford to pay premiums rather than public 
financing and provisioning of universal health care for all. Finally, SHI encourages private 
participation by outsourcing private facilities and providers to improve the insured access to 
health care services (WHO, 2005; Hsiao and Shaw, 2007; Word Bank, 2009; McGregor, 2014). 
 
However, literature has shown that many developing countries adopting SHI strategy to finance 
NHIP face series of challenges. One, poorly targeted public resources thereby the public 
services are inefficiently and ineffectively managed to provide public services to the target 
population. Often times, public facilities operate under bureaucratic rules, as a result, they 
suffer delay of funds because funds do not reach health facilities on a timely basis, which in 
turn result in low productivity and shortage of drugs and supplies. Two, public funds often 
spent disproportionately for the rich as against the poor that are targeted. For example, public 
resources are chiefly located to public hospitals in the urban areas such as secondary and 
tertiary hospitals that are mostly used by the affluent urban residents. Three, SHI do not 
operates the logic of risk pooling mechanism, which is the basis for health financing policy 
towards universal health insurance in most developing countries. For example, coverage of 
target group (i.e., the formal employees) is a demonstration that certain population groups are 
administratively easier to manage than the other population groups. This often results in 
exclusion of the majority: the informal sector workers, rural dwellers and the poor (Mclntyre 
et al., 2005; Hasio and Shaw, 2007; La Forgia, and Nagpal, 2012). 
 
Achieving universal health insurance is the aim of any national insurance programme with 
technical support from international agencies notably the WHO and United Nations. UHC has 
been acknowledged as the most crucial goal of every health system (WHO, 2014; Nicholson 
et al, 2015; Abiiro and De Allegri, 2015). Historically, the General Assembly of the UN in 
1948 approved and declared the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. In the declaration, 
Article 25 states inter alia, “everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health 
and wellbeing of himself and his family including medical care…” (United Nations, 1948: 5). 
In addition, the Alma-Ata Declaration of 1978 states among others that it is the responsibility 
of governments to provide health care delivery for their people which could be fulfilled 
primarily by provision of PHC services to achieve the set goal of universal health care…” 
(Alma-Ata Declaration, 1978). In 2012, the United Nation General Assembly reiterated that all 
its member states should pursue the transition of their health systems toward universal coverage 
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(United Nations, 2012). Furthermore, in 2014, the global conference on UHC called for the 
universal coverage of every health system for inclusive and sustainable growth (Bristol, 2014).  
 
It was being debated in the UN assembly that universal coverage would be the potential goal 
for post 2015 global development agenda to ensure people have access to health services 
without facing financial hardship paying for the services (Global Health Strategies, 2015). In 
the light of the several international calls and declarations, several countries committed to 
achieving the goal largely dependent on one or a mixture of tax-funded and SHI (Gustafsson-
Wright and Schellekens, 2013; Hasio and Shaw, 2007). To achieve the set target of universal 
coverage, WHO (2010) suggests that governments should take into account three policy 
questions (1) who in the population is covered? (2) Which services are covered? (3) What level 
of financial protection do people have when accessing services? Similarly, Nicholas and 
colleagues note that although no country has reached a utopian state of universal coverage, 
universal coverage could be measured along population coverage, service coverage and 
financial protection (Nicholas et al., 2015). On population coverage, for instance, literature has 
shown that most countries in Western Europe uses SHI to expand their population coverage, 
though transition period vary from one country to the other, high insurance coverage was 
attained within the transition period. In Germany, 88% of the German population was covered 
by SHI, notwithstanding that above certain income cap the insured can opt out of SHI for 
private health insurance. In Austria, 96% of the population was achieved using SHI. Similarly, 
99% of the Japanese population had been covered under the SHI model (Barnighausen and 
Sauerborn, 2002; Carrin and James, 2004). However, single tax-funded health care has been 
used to attain universal insurance coverage in Demark, Sweden, Finland, UK, and Portugal 
among others (McGregor, 2014; Bodenheimer and Grumbach, 2005).  
 
Furthermore, to achieve universal health insurance coverage in the US, Employer Sponsored 
Health Insurance (ESHI) and Public Sponsored Health Insurance (PSHI) were designated to 
expand insurance coverage (Walden, 2012). Despite this harmonised programme, literature 
shows that the number of uninsured persons in the US remains high. The number of uninsured 
in the US, for example, was 25 million people in 1980 and the number increased to 43.6 million 
in 2002. Furthermore, analysis shows that uninsured persons in the U.S. were on the increase 
by 2011 with 48.6 million (15.7%). However, in 2012, the number declined to 48 million 
(15.4%). Thus, the decline in the percentage of the US uninsured in the recent time was 
attributed to Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) of the Obama administration 
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(U.S. Census Bureau as cited in Bodenheimer and Grumbach, 2005; Walden, 2012; New York 
Times, 2012).  
 
The US, under Obama administration had intention to increase health coverage to uninsured 
Americans by 2019 by making PSHI mandatory to the uninsured through federal policy and 
legislation (PPACA). PSHI has been in the form of Medicare for the elderly and Medicaid for 
the physically challenged, and workers with low-income who are 65 year and above and not 
covered in any form of health insurance (Wagner, 2012). Medicare exemplifies SHI model, for 
example, Medicare part A is accessible only to those who have paid social security taxes and 
Medicare part B is for people who paid monthly contributions albeit supported by the 
government. However, Medicaid replicates tax-funded health care system (Wagner, 2012; 
Bodenheimer and Grumbach, 2005). The PSHI is focused on increasing the number of 
Americans covered with health insurance. However, literature has argued that Obama health 
care programme is rationally attractive, but remains contentious. While the advocates assert 
that ‘Obamacare’ would increase the number of insured American to health care, critics argued 
that the programme is politically and financially unacceptable (Bodenheimer and Grumbach, 
2005; Hadley, et al., 2008; Wagner, 2012). 
In the LMICs, most countries are also taking the route of SHI in achieving universal health 
insurance coverage, though at different stages and pace of implementation. Some have reached 
high level of coverage, for example, Thailand, China, Colombia and Rwanda. Thailand 
achieves high coverage of approximately of 90% of Thai population with the configuration of 
different schemes such as Medical Welfare Scheme, Health Card Scheme, Civil Servant 
Medical Benefits Scheme and Social Security Scheme (Dutta and Hongoro, 2013; Talampas, 
2014;). Similarly, the integration of existing schemes in China such as Urban Employee-Basic 
Medical Scheme, Urban Residents-Basic Medical Scheme, NCMS and the supplementary 
schemes to cover critical diseases of rural unemployed resulted in high insurance coverage of 
the population to 93% (Liu et al., 2012; Talampas, 2014). Colombia had similar trend with 
China and Thailand in terms of integration of different schemes to achieve 70% coverage of 
the population (Hsiao and Shaw, 2007).  Coverage in Rwanda was about 90% of the population 
(Rwanda MoH, 2010; Nyandekwe et al., 2014). In contrast, many countries are struggling with 
expanding insurance coverage, for example, 10% of the population in Dominican Republic is 
covered (Barnighausen and Sauerborn, 2002). About 5% of Nigerian population is covered 
(NHIS, 2012; NMA, 2015). 
60 
 
On service coverage, studies show that countries with tax-funded health insurance demonstrate 
comprehensive health care package (Hurst, 2010; Macgregor, 2014). For example, the health 
benefits of Canadian provinces are broad including in-patient, outpatient services and 
diagnostic technologies, and as a result, it created a decent health care delivery system. Low 
income Canadians receive more health services than higher income groups, this is often in 
proportion to the higher burden of disease in lower income groups (Klatt, 2000). It is worth 
noting that Canadian health system prohibits private health insurance from services included 
in the provincial health plans to avoid preferential treatment of privately insured patients. 
Similarly, in Sweden as in other Scandinavian countries, all citizens are entitled to 
comprehensive health services mainly provided by public health facilities in such that no 
distinction exists among the people in terms class, status and income (Bodenheimer and 
Grumbach, 2005; OECD, 2012 ). On the other hand, service coverage with SHI countries 
differs among countries, most developed SHI countries offer a wide array of in-patient and 
outpatient care including the use of diagnostic technology and x-ray, whereas, services 
coverage in the developing countries seemed not to be comprehensive, many services are often 
not included in the benefits package. In Vietnam, for example, services excluded from the 
benefits package include HIV/AIDS prevention and treatment programmes, dental care and 
some pharmaceuticals among others (Talampas, 2014). Similarly, health reform in China had 
increased the equity scale on health care utilisation in both in-patient and outpatient services 
among the people than pre-reform era. However, disparity existed between people of higher 
and lower socioeconomic status in terms of the use of diagnostic technologies because the 
reform is primarily aimed at targeting basic health care services (Liu et al., 2012). The study 
conducted by Liu and colleagues reveals that socioeconomic status including education, 
income and position at work influenced outpatient care and use diagnostic technology among 
the study population in China.  
On Financial protection viewpoint, national health insurance model operates different methods 
of protecting insured financially and keeping health care expenditures low. While Countries 
with a  tax-financed system of national health insurance such as Canada and the Scandinavia, 
ensure their population are protected, with little or no cost sharing in the form of co-payments 
(a percentage of the cost of services paid out-of-pocket at the time of receiving medical care 
services) as part of reimbursement transaction to contain costs. Other methods such as global 
budgets for hospitals expenses and expenditure caps for the health providers feature 
prominently and serve as a mechanism to control costs and keep expenditures low. Hospitals 
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and providers are compelled to stay within the allocated funds, and thus expenses outside the 
global budgets or expenditure limits are not entertained by the insurance funds (Bodenheimer 
and Grumbach, 2005). In contrast, patient cost sharing features prominently in most SHI 
countries as part of reimbursement transaction. For example, patient cost sharing became 
prominent in Japan in 1997 following the increase in health care costs as a result of aging 
population and economic recession in the 1990s. Co-payments increased from 10% to 20% of 
all services; however, due to excessive burden of co-payments on patients, monthly limit of 
co-payment was capped at about $500 while the aged were exempted (Ikegami and Campbell, 
2004; Bodenheimer and Grumbach, 2005; Kobayashi, 2009). Similarly, in Korea, cost sharing 
is one of the policies widely used to control health care cost, it induces inequitable medical 
services utilisation such as ambulatory care. It does not decreased moral hazard as purported; 
instead it increases inequitable health care distribution among different income groups (Kwon, 
2003; Kim, et al., 2005). 
Furthermore, Ewelukwa, et al. (2013) in their study of health expenditures and payment 
mechanism in Nigeria, reveal that patients with lower socioeconomic status were less likely to 
adhere to recommended medications compared to patients with higher socioeconomic status. 
They further note that increase in patient out-of-pocket spending for prescribed drugs is likely 
to exacerbate health disparities between low and high-income earners. Nevertheless, literature 
has shown that cost-sharing model reduces unnecessarily use of emergency services without 
affecting appropriate use of health services if it is used in modest amounts (Selby, et al., 1996; 
Sabik and Ghandhi, 2015). However, it is designed to encourage patient to use lower-cost 
effective care such as clinic rather than to discourage use of health services. In sum, NHI is a 
state programme to ensure universal health insurance for all without financial burden. While 
countries with tax-financed single-payer system have attained universal insurance coverage, 
disparity exists among SHI countries in terms of achieving this goal. However, the developed 
SHI countries have attained high population coverage while majority of LMICs are still 
struggling in scaling up coverage. Low population coverage, minimal benefits package and 
patient cost sharing remain prominent in the LMICs.   
 
3.6 Health Financing Policy in Nigeria 
Health care financing in Nigeria is grouped into two: pre-1980 and post-1980 (Adesina, 2007a, 
b). In the pre-1980, health care was financed from general taxation that guaranteed ‘free’ 
universal access for all. Adesina (2007a: 23) assert, “Health care was readily available at public 
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hospitals and clinics at no charge”. In this regard, financial barrier to health care access was 
avoided as social spending on health was seen as social investment to enhance economic 
growth and development (Adesina, 2007a, 2009). Adesina further notes that similar to 
education, “social spending on health was part of the wider objective of defeating the triad of 
ignorant, poverty and disease” (Adesina, 2007a, 25). Moreover, the nationalist ideology was 
driven by inclusive approach to development whereby government was responsible for all 
aspects to development without external interference. The result of this was positive correlation 
between health-related indices and economic growth in the first decade of post-independence 
Nigeria (Adesina, 2009). For instance, Nigeria’s GDP grew from 3.1% in 1960 to 7.5% in 1970 
with agriculture and manufacturing largely responsible for the astronomical growth of the 
economy. Agriculture share of the GDP in 1965 and 1970 was 50.2% and 38.2% while 
manufacturing share in the same period was 5.0% and 3.4% respectively (World Bank, 1980). 
Interestingly, the total population per medical doctor declined drastically from 73,710 to 15,740 
between 1960 and 1975, infant and under-five mortality per 1,000 live births also declined 
from 50 in 1970 to 22 in 1979 (World Bank, 1980). 
 
However, the post-1980 was characterised by slow economic growth rate as a result of poor 
agricultural output, decline in international petroleum prices, balance-of-payment deficit and 
fiscal crisis coupled with the increase in government budgetary obligations (World Bank, 1980; 
1987; Helleiner, 1983), which in turn resulted in the cuts of social spending (Adesina, 2009). 
The health sector and other basic social services then began to receive less allocation from the 
federation account starting from this period. For example, public health spending as a 
percentage of the GDP between 1981 and 1989 were as follows: 2.0% in 1981; 1.6% in 1982; 
2.0% in 1983; 1.1% in 1984; 1.99% in 1985; 1.82% in 1988 and 1.50% in 1989 (Central Bank 
of Nigeria (CBN), 1983, 1990). In addition, health expending as a percentage of government 
expenditures dwindled from an average of 3.5% in the 1970s (World Bank, 1980), to less than 
2% in the 1980s. Moreover, public spending on health as a percentage of GDP hovers around 
2% in the successive years (Ogunbekun, et al., 1999; Obono, 2007).  
 
3.6.1 Financing Reforms 
 
Given the low growth rate in the economy and limited fiscal space experienced in the 1980s, 
the international financial institutions led by the World Bank and IMF introduced Structural 
Adjustment Policies as the prerequisite for structural adjustment loans for the developing 
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countries (Adesina, 2007a; Obono, 2007; Obasan 2013;). Part of the conditions for the loan 
includes minimal government intervention in their economies, private participation and 
introduction of user fees in government facilities with the assertion that there would be more 
money in the system through private participation and subsequently be used to improve quality, 
and increase access to health services (World Bank, 1987, 1993). 
 
In examining the equity impacts of user fees, literature is complicated and contentious on the 
impact of user fee in health status of individual(s) following its implementation. An advocate 
of user fees assert that “the demand for health care was “price inelastic” such that 
implementation of user fee or increasing costs would not deter people from using health care 
services” (de Ferranti 1985: 35). In contrast, critics have demonstrated in studies that demand 
for health care is “price elastic” and malleable, that is, demand for health care is easily influence 
by costs of health care utilisation especially among the poor (e.g., Asenso-Okyer, 1998; Jütting, 
2003; Akashi, et al., 2004; Jacobs and Price, 2004). In addition, studies have also indicates that 
user fees brought out a number of coping strategies that could be devastating to health care 
users over a long time period. These include self-treatment, not seeking treatment at all and 
delaying in seeking treatment (e.g., Ogunbekun et al. 1999; Sahn, et al., 2003; Mohindra, 2008). 
Similarly, Oyibo (2011) observed among government employees in Abakaliki, Nigeria that 
85% of respondents reported paying for services through OOP payment; health services were 
obtained at the expense of selling off assert, seeking financial support from relatives offset 
medical bills, spending substantial part of household budget on medical bills  etc. 
 
 As indicated earlier, government expenditure on health as a proportion of GDP declined slowly 
from 1.99% in 1980 to 1.39% in 1998 (Obono, 2007). Within the same period, health budget 
from government annual allocation was estimated at 533.6 million US dollars in 1980 and 
683.8 million US dollars in 1998 (CBN, 1985, 2002). However, the burden of paying health 
care fell disproportionately on households, for instance, of the total health expenditure in 
Nigeria between 2000 and 2006, private health expenditure accounted for 66.5% and 70.3% 
while government expenditure in the same period accounted for 33.5% and 29.7% respectively. 
Further analysis shows that in the private health expenditure, OOP payments accounted for 
92.7% and 90.4% respectively (WHO, 2009), the figures barely changed by 2012 (WHO, 
2015). Moreover, evidence reveals that the burden of OOP payments reflected in the unpleasant 
health-related indices such as Maternal Mortality Ratio (MMR) and Infant Mortality Ratio 
(IMR). For example, MMR was 1200 death per 100,000 live births in 1999 and in 2013 560 
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deaths per 100,000 live births, while IMR in the same period was 114.70 deaths per 1000 live 
births and 75.40 deaths per 1000 live births respectively (WHO, 2000; 2015). Although the 
above evidence shows a decrease in the mortality rate in Nigeria, it is very different compared 
to other sub-Saharan countries such as Ethiopia and South Africa. 
 
The abrupt changes in the Nigerian health care financing in the 1980s denied most Nigerians 
access to basic health care services. Per capita income fell from US$1600 in 1980 to US$270 
in2000, putting Nigeria among the 20 poorest countries in the world (OECD, 2012). The 
successive years brought no respite; rather the situation became more severe. Life expectancy 
at birth was fixed at 47 (WHO, 2007, 2012), HIV/AIDS, malaria and childhood diseases remain 
widespread, and the country’s health system ranked 187th out of 191 countries (WHO, 2002). 
However, the impact of SAP health initiative has generated a heated debate. The advocates 
argued that health sector reform to some extent had positive impacts in the countries where 
they were successfully implemented, but acknowledged the failure of user fee to increase 
revenue in most LMIC particularly in the sub-Saharan Africa (World Bank, 1993, 1994). On 
the other hand, critics described user fee as devastating, excruciating and a disaster, causing a 
dire plunge in virtually all health indices in the sub-Saharan countries (Mkandawire, 2007; 
Adesina, 2009). Arising from the failure of user fee to increase revenue, the World Bank, IMF 
and other international agencies resulted in rethinking a flexible alternative funding that would 
ensure financial protection of households from health care costs with more recognition of 
government role in the provision of social services notably education and health (World Bank, 
1993, 1994; WHO, 2000).  
 
The international agencies led by the World Bank and WHO recognise the potency of risk 
sharing model of social health insurance in the developing countries to stimulate four desirable 
components of health sector reform due to inadequate tax revenue to fund health care for all. 
These include one, government funds would be used to subsidise costs of health care for the 
poor instead of providing universal health care for all. Second, government funds would be 
used to provide public services including immunisation, child and maternal care etc. Third, 
there would be a separation between the demand and supply side of health care provision 
thereby outsourcing the supply side to separate entities in order to improve efficiency and 
quality of care. Finally, SHI would ensure people access to health care by using non-
governmental organisations and private providers through means of contracting (Hsiao and 
Shaw, 2007). Several developing countries including Nigeria therefore had begun to shift their 
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financing policy to SHI (WHO, 2010; Gilson and Mclntyre, 2005). In summary, the 
international agency admitted the failure of user fee or OOP to increase revenue and access to 
health care in the developing countries including Nigeria and therefore advocated for a shift to 
SHI. 
 
3.7 National Health Insurance in Nigeria 
Given the unpleasant conditions of health care delivery in Nigeria such as inability of 
government-owned health facilities to provide ‘free’ health care for all, poor condition of health 
facilities, declining of government financial allocation to health care in the face of rising costs, 
and devastating effects of user fee, NHIS was established in 1999. The law establishing NHIS 
states that: 
 
“There is hereby established a scheme to be known as the National Health Insurance 
Scheme (in this Act referred to as "the Scheme") for the purpose of providing health 
insurance which shall entitle insured persons and their dependants the benefit of 
prescribed good quality and cost-effective health services as set out in this Act” (NHIS 
Act, 2004: 3). 
   
With the aim to: 
 
“facilitate fair-financing of health care costs through pooling and judicious 
utilisation of financial resources to provide financial risk protections and cost-
burden sharing for people against high cost of health care through various 
prepayment programmes prior to their failing ill” (NHIS, 2012: 18).  
 
It is a health financing reform aimed at providing financial protection for people against huge 
financial costs through prepayment system. NHIS was officially launched in 2005 as a SHI 
programme. It functions with three broad programmes including formal sector, informal sector 
and vulnerable group. NHIS relies on contributions from employers, employees, individuals 
and government revenue as source of funding. A mixture of private and public providers who 
are reimbursed by HMOs supplies health services to the beneficiaries (NHIS, 2009, 2012).  
 
A number of contribution rates exist for different programmes in the NHIS. For instance, 
contribution to the scheme for the Formal Sector Social Insurance Programme varies, for the 
federal government employees, the employees pays 1.75% while the employer pays 3.25% 
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representing 5% of the employees’ gross salary. However, for other tiers of government and 
the private sector, the employee pays 5% while the employer pays 10% representing 15% of 
the employee’s basic salary (NHIS, 2012). Furthermore, for the Voluntary Individual Social 
Insurance Programme, interested individual pays 15,000 naira (US$ 96.7) per person annually, 
though subjected to review. Tertiary Institutions Social Insurance Programme for the students 
of higher institutions is funded by students’ contributions. The premium replaces the medical 
fees charged by various institutions. Contributions are determined actuarially and a minimum 
premium of 2,000 naira (US$10.9) is to be charged while other sources of funds may include 
government subsidies, charitable and philanthropic organisations among others (NHIS, 2012, 
2015). 
 
Under the CBHIP, contribution is flat rate per individual or members of an occupation-based 
group such as farmers. Their contributions could be paid in cash monthly or seasonally. For 
example, in Ayedun community in Ekiti State each member pays 1,200 naira (USD 6.5) per 
annum or 100 naira (US$ 0.54) monthly, in Abuja community members pay 1,500 naira (US$ 
8.1) per annum while the federal capital territory administration pays 13,500 naira (US$ 73.7) 
as subsidy for each member (Centre for Public Policy (CPP), 2014). The concern of different 
contribution rates allocated to different groups in reference to benefits, quality and access 
remains a debate. For instance, studies conducted in the southeast Nigeria reveal that 
community participation in CBHIP was low due to initial minimal payment attached to the 
programme. Low willingness to pay contributions among low-income earners was revealed as 
the main impediment to CBHIP in the area (Uzochukwu et al, 2009; Onwujekweet al, 2010). 
Moreover, because of low willingness to pay premiums, Christian Aid (2005) asserts that 
significant involvement of subsidies through government and donors, inclusion of payment 
exemptions to population in the lowest poverty quartile is essential for setting a sustainable and 
equitable programme. 
 
3.7.1 Financing and Benefits in National Health Insurance Scheme 
 
Equity is the ability without prejudice to recognise the right of everyone, and with a sense of 
justice and objectivity being its guiding principles (Bodenheimer and Grumbach, 2005). There 
are two types of equity horizontal and vertical. Horizontal equity occurs when people with 
equal needs receive similar treatments irrespective of socioeconomic status of the people. On 
the other hands, vertical equity happens when people with different ability to pay have access 
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to different health care needs based on ability to pay (Bodenheimer and Grumbach, 2005).  
Equity in financing could be progressive when payment as a percentage of income increases 
with income. In contrast, it could be regressive when payment as a share of income decreases 
as income increases, which in turn disproportionately affect lower-income earners 
(Bodenheimer and Grumbach, 2005). Odeyemi and Nixon (2013: 15) explain that the objective 
of any national health programme “is to mobilise resources for the health system, set the right 
financial incentives for providers and ensure all individuals have access to equitable health care 
services”. 
 
Studies have analysed equity in financing and benefits among the enrolees (e.g., Uzochukwu, 
et al., 2009; Polonsky, et al., 2009; Onwujekwe, et al., 2010; Wang, et al., 2012; Macha, et al., 
2012; Liu, et al., 2002; Odeyemi and Nixon, 2013; Ilesanmi and Ige, 2013; Ewelukwa, et al., 
2013). For example, in a study conducted by Liu, et al., (2002) assessing equity in the urban 
health insurance reform in China, observe that after the reform there was horizontal equity in 
accessing basic care among different income groups. The low-income earners had significant 
increase in outpatient care. However, vertical equity existed in accessing health care among the 
people; low-income earners did not have access to advanced diagnostic technology. In a similar 
study, Wang, et al., (2012) reveal that regardless of the fact that the poor had access to the 
village-level outpatient and inpatient care; the rich accessed the overall inpatient care utilisation 
disproportionately. Furthermore, in a survey of 506 rural households operating insurance 
schemes in Armenia, Polonsky, et al., (2009) observe an equitable distribution of health 
benefits among community health insurance scheme in Armenia. However, participation was 
low because of inability to pay contributions and lack of a comprehensive health package that 
includes coverage for chronic diseases like hypertension, diabetes and AIDS. 
 
Odeyemi and Nixon (2013) in a review-based comparative analysis of equity in Nigeria and 
Ghana, assert that great disparity existed in funding and accessing health care in Nigeria 
compared to Ghana. OOP payment in Ghana had fallen from 80% to 66%. In contrast, OOP 
payment remains high in Nigeria with over 90% of the population. In spite of the introduction 
of NHIS in both countries, majority of the population makes OOP payment for health care 
services (Odeyemi and Nixon, 2013). They further note that NHIS in Ghana offers uniform 
benefits across all beneficiaries while benefit package in Nigeria depends on membership 
category. Moreover, in a study of health benefits among NHIS enrolees in Enugu state Nigeria. 
Obikeze, et al., (2013) find socio-economic status such as income, gender and occupation as a 
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determinant of health care utilisation. They note in the study that the poorest group (quartile 1) 
received the highest benefits for both in-patient and outpatient care whereas the poor group 
(quartile 3) received highest delivery care. Therefore, the poorest group (quartile 1) made more 
payment for inpatient and outpatient treatment than other socioeconomic groups, while the 
poor group (quartile 3) made more payment for delivery care. However, the poorest group 
disproportionately paid for health care than other socioeconomic groups.  
 
On the other hand, in a survey conducted among rural, semi-urban and urban communities in 
Anambra and Enugu states, Onwujekwe, et al., (2010) observe that socioeconomic status such 
income, gender, education and place of residence were among other factors that determine 
people willingness to pay for CBHI. They note that less than 40% of the rural population were 
willing to pay membership contributions for themselves and their households. The amount they 
were willing to pay vary between 250 Naira (US$1.7) to 343 Naira (US$2.9). They further 
reveal that the higher the socioeconomic status, the higher the WTP amount. Further to the 
study, male with more education indicated higher WTP than female with less education. The 
log ordinary least square (LOS) shows negative relationship between paying OOP for health 
care and willingness to pay. In contrast, there was positive relationship between paying for 
health care using insurance and to WTP. In the same way, in a comparative study of NHIS 
enrolees and fee-paying patient in Ibadan, Ilesanmi and Ige (2013) observe unequal access to 
care and costs between the two groups. They reveal that 15% of NHIS patients had a diagnostic 
test while 28.5% of fee-paying patients had access to the same test. On the costs of care, the 
mean cost for the fee-paying patients was $14.2 while NHIS patient was $18.4. 
 
 
3.7.2 Quality of Health Care Services    
 
High quality care “is the care that assists healthy people to stay healthy, treats people’s acute 
illness, and allows chronically ill people to live long and fulfilling a life as possible” 
(Bodenheimer and Grumbach, 2005: 114). The type of health care an individual receives when 
he/she is ill determines his/her response to treatment. To receive quality care it necessary for 
people to have good health facilities including qualified health care providers. There is a 
likelihood for people with disadvantaged health care to suffer worse health outcomes compared 
to those with access to high quality care (Bodenheimer and Grumbach, 2005). Many people 
visit hospitals, health care providers, and other caregivers to receive magnificent quality care, 
69 
 
however, they are denied quality care due to many factors including inadequate scientific 
knowledge and incompetent health care providers (Bodenheimer and Grumbach, 2005: 114).  
According to National Committee for Quality Assurance (NCQA) (2010) “between 8% and 
24% of ambulatory patients, receive prescription drugs that are inappropriate or contraindicated 
and one-third of abnormal laboratory tests” (NCQA, 2010; 15).  
 
Researches have explored the quality of health care in health insurance. While some scholars 
(e.g., Obermann, et al., 2006; Ibiwoye and Adeleke, 2008; Agba, et al., 2010; Onyedibe, 2012) 
observe that health insurance offers poor services. For example, Obermann, et al., (2006) note 
that although SHI in Philippines has been successful in enrolment, quality and price control 
remains a major challenge. In the same way, Onyedibe, et al., (2012) in a survey of 200 
respondents in Jos Nigeria, reveals that unavailability of required services has become a 
frequent occurrence in the NHIS. Twenty-six per cent of respondents were not satisfied with 
the scheme because of the following reasons inadequate registration system, delay in receiving 
required services, defective referral system, and lack of coverage of some required services in 
the scheme. In addition, a significant relationship was found in the study between the 
percentage of enrolees and poor health indices. Similarly, Agba, et al., (2010) in a study of 
employee’ access in Cross River State, find disparity among employees’ access to NHIS. The 
federal employees had more access to the scheme than the state, local government employees 
did and self-employed. The study also reveals insufficient personnel and medical facilities as 
the potent hindrance of NHIS in the state.  
 
In contrast, scholars (e.g., Ibrahimipour, et al., 2011; Mohammed, et al., 2011, 2014; Owumi, 
et al. 2013) observe high quality with health insurance services. For example, Owumi, et al., 
(2013) in a survey of NHIS services in Oyo State found approximately 80% of the respondents 
preferred NHIS services because it reduced OOP payments. Sixty per cent of the respondents 
were thus satisfied with NHIS services. However, 40% of the respondents were dissatisfied 
with some of the services including the practices of HMOs in terms of process of authorisation 
code when referred from secondary to tertiary facility. Furthermore, Mohammed et al. (2011) 
in a study of client satisfaction with NHIS in Jos, revealed satisfaction rate (42%) among the 
respondents. Marital status, general knowledge and awareness of contribution were found to 
positively influence clients’ satisfaction. In another study by Mohammed et al. (2014) on 
providers’ perspective, they revealed that in providers’ payment mechanism domain, 95% of 
the providers prefer capitation as payment method. On benefits package domain, 97% of the 
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providers were satisfied with the package. On the administrative efficiency domain, 80% was 
recorded for both promptness and referral system while 93% for prompt arrival of funds. 
However, monitoring mechanism performed inadequately (37%). In a study of users’ 
satisfaction of NHIS services in Ibadan, Osugbade, et al., (2014) observe different areas of 
satisfaction among the respondents, 55.6% were satisfied with drugs prescriptions; 51.7% were 
satisfied with the attitude of staff and 77.8% satisfied with waiting time. 
 
O’Neil and Seifer, (1995) assert that policy develops gradually in a cyclical manner to find 
solution to problems but in the process create new problems that required new solution. Policy 
changes over time in order to proffer solution to a pressing problem such as inadequate access 
to health care and burden of health care costs, but also frequently produce a number of 
unexpected results such as gap in medical coverage, stimulating inflation in health care cost 
(Bodenheimer and Grumbach, 2005: 187). In Nigeria, the policy goal of universal insurance 
coverage within the ambit of NHIS is to the following objectives: (1) “ensure every Nigerian 
has access to good healthcare services” (NHIS Act, 2004: 5). (2) “Protect families from the 
financial hardship of huge medical bills” (NHIS Act, 2004: 5). (3) “Limit the rise in the cost of 
healthcare services” (NHIS Act, 2004: 5). (4) “Ensure equitable distribution of healthcare costs 
among different income groups” (NHIS Act, 2004: 5). (5) “Maintain high standard of 
healthcare delivery services within the scheme” (NHIS Act, 2004: 5). (6) “Ensure efficiency in 
healthcare services” (NHIS Act, 2004: 6). (7) “Improve and harness private sector participation 
in the provision of healthcare services” (NHIS Act, 2004: 6). (8) “Ensure adequate distribution 
of health facilities within the federation” (NHIS Act, 2004: 6). (9) “Ensure equitable patronage 
of all levels of healthcare” (NHIS Act, 2004: 6). (10) “Ensure the availability of funds to the 
health sector for improved services” (NHIS Act, 2004: 6). However, several constraints have 
been identified militating against the achievement of the policy goal and objectives, these are 
categorised into three parts, namely (1) financial challenge (2) institutional inadequacy (3) 
fragmentation in funding pools (Achime, 2005; Omoruan, et al., 2009; Obasan, 2013; Onoka, 
et al., 2013; Uzochukwu, et al., 2016). 
 
3.7.3 Financial Challenge 
 
Financing is a fundamental constraint to achieving UHC in the developing countries. Limited 
coverage of health policy has been attributed to scarce financial resources (Achime, 2005; 
Garrin and James, 2005; Hsiao, 2007; WHO, 2014). In Nigeria, government spending on health 
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sector has been very inadequate over the years (Ogunbekun et al, 1999; Obasan, 2013; 
Ejughemre, 2014; WHO, 2014). Evidence reveals that health sector share as a percentage of 
total budget was 4.3% in 2009 and 5.7% in 2013 (Federal Ministry of Finance (FMF), 2013; 
Obasan, 2013; Uzochukwu, 2016), this is very different from 15% of Abuja declaration in 2001 
(WHO, 2001). Moreover, within the same period, government expenditure to health as a 
percentage of GDP declined from 0.6% to 0.4% respectively (FMF, 2013, Uzochukwu, et al., 
2016). High rates of informal economy pose a challenge to NHIS in terms of coverage and 
sustainability because informal economy constitutes largest percentage of labour force in the 
developing countries, and thus results in inability for most of them to afford health care services 
(Ogben, 2014). Although there is a programme designed for the low-income group, ability and 
willingness to pay premiums by this group has been a challenge (Centre for Public Policy 
(CPP), 2014). Ogben (2014) observed in a cross-sectional survey among 287 respondents in 
rural community in Nigeria that price of health insurance was perceived to be high by some of 
the respondents basically because most of them (63.4%) earn bellow the country’s minimum 
wage of 18,000 naira (US$ 98.3) monthly. Most people in the informal economy especially 
low-income workers like the artisans face the challenge of inability to finance their health care, 
thus affects the policy goal of expanding coverage (Jutting 2003; Achime, 2005; Uzochukwu, 
2009; Owujekwe, et al., 2010). 
 
3.7.4 Institutional Capacity 
 
Institutional factor is another serious challenge facing the attainment of universal insurance 
coverage in Nigeria. In a comparative study of NHIS in the southeast Nigeria, Onoka, et al., 
(2013) observe that the federal system of government practiced in Nigeria gives other tiers of 
government such as state and local government autonomy to discuss some federal government 
policies such as NHIS whether to join or not, which in turn shapes its outcome. NHIS is a 
programme established by the central government without bidding on other federating units 
because of the system of government in Nigeria. In addition, they assert that NHIS is a federal 
government programme, established by federal law and the Act establishing the scheme does 
not compel the states and local governments to be part of the programme. Therefore, the states 
and local governments can join by volition. Secondly, indifference on the part of states policy 
makers such as the governors affects the direction the states governments take on some policies 
issues relating to federal government. The states have their own legislatures that deliberate on 
whether to join the federal government policies or not (Onoka, et al., 2013). Furthermore, 
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Odeyemi (2014) observed that political power or persuasion is critical to successful 
implementation of any reform. NHIS adoption at other tiers of government is influenced by the 
standpoint and influence of main actors like the executives and the legislators in those levels. 
However, where these actors are not in the mainstream of NHIS management, save only to 
mobilise funds into the scheme remains a challenge (Odeyemi, 2014). 
 
3.7.5 Fragmentation of Funding Pools 
 
Primarily, SHI was developed to deal with the problem of unpleasant health care utilisation 
under the OOP payment with use of a strategy “to distribute health care more in accordance 
with human need rather than exclusively based of ability to pay” (Bodenheimer and Grumbach, 
2005: 8).  Redistribution of funds among different sub-population groups such as young healthy 
group to old and unhealthy group helps in the payment of health costs of those unable to pay. 
However, this principle of redistribution is defeated when there are many pools of funds with 
weak capacity of redistribution (Bodenheimer and Grumbach, 2005). Onwujekwe and 
Uzochukwu, (2012) assert that NHIS is fragmented along different lines such as occupation, 
geographical, ability to contribute etc., which subsequently affect the operation of the scheme 
(Ezeoke, et al., 2012; Obermann, et al., 2006). 
 
Studies have shown fragmentation in funding pools has a challenge to NHIS policy goal and 
objectives (Onoka et al, 2013; Odeyemi and Nixon, 2013, Odeyemi, 2014). For example, 
Onoka et al. (2013) noted in their study that fragmentation of risk pools has subjected the low-
income and the vulnerable group to poor access to health care. Furthermore, fragmentation has 
deprived most Nigerians particularly the poor unemployed and low-income earners financial 
risk protection from huge costs of health expenditure (Eweluka et al, 2013).  Odeyemi and 
Nixon (2013) observed in CBHI that inequity in financing through a lack of integration among 
risk pools, offers limited opportunities to raise sufficient funds among the populations.  
 
3.7.6 Knowledge Attitudes and Perceptions of Community Members on NHIS 
 
Community knowledge, attitudes and perceptions play a significant role in the implementation 
and success of any social policy. Several studies have been conducted on perception and 
awareness of enrolees in reference to health insurance (e.g. De Allegri, et al., 2006; Sanusi and 
Awe, 2009; Agba, 2010; Okaro, et al., 2010; Macha, et al., 2012;  Owu, et al., 2014; Obse, et 
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al., 2015). However, little research is available on the public (non-enrolees) knowledge, 
attitudes and perceptions on social health insurance (e.g. Ogben, 2014; Jehu-Appiah, et al., 
2011). For example, Ogben (2014) in a cross-sectional survey of 287 respondents in rural 
community in Abuja Nigeria revealed that 242 (84.3%) respondents were aware of the scheme, 
out of which 152 (62.8%) enrolled into the scheme. Twenty-eight per cent of those who were 
aware did not enrol themselves or their dependants because they had no proper understanding 
on how the scheme operates. In addition, 11.2% did not see how they would benefit from the 
scheme. In another survey of 3301 household in Ghana, Jehu-Appiah et al. (2011) observe that 
many factors influenced family decision to enrol in NHI in Ghana. These include past 
experience with insurance scheme, peer pressure, health belief and integrity of the management 
of the scheme among others.  
 
Furthermore, Jehu-Appiah and colleagues note that peer pressure could negatively influenced 
enrolment because information spreads faster as people listen to one another. Therefore, 
opinions of leaders, family members and peers among others influence people’s decision to 
enrol. Perceptions is another feature that influence household decisions to voluntarily enrol and 
remain in the scheme after enrolment (Jehu-Appiah et al, 2011). Moreover, De Allegri et al. 
(2006) in a study of 393 uninsured households in a rural community in Burkina Faso observe 
that: (1) Higher education. (2) Higher socioeconomic status. (3) Familiarization with extensive 
risk sharing. (4) Wrong opinion about the competence of traditional care. (5) Close proximity 
to health facility. (6) Finally, lower level of socio-economic inequality within the community 
influence decision to enrol. In summary, the review shows that many factors including 
socioeconomic, education knowledge, attitudes influence decision to enrol and remain after 
enrolment in health insurance scheme. 
 
3.8 The Limits of existing Literature 
 
The available studies on NHIS are not mainly review-based analysis but also focus on the 
outcomes and implementation of programmes without examining the institutional design of the 
scheme, which influences the outcomes. For example, Nnabuchi (2009) study was a review-
based analysis of NHIS programmes and challenges. Omoruan, et al.’s (2009) is a general 
overview of NHIS actors’ contributions to the scheme. Mohammed, et al.’s (2014) examine 
providers’ perspective in Kaduna state on optimal resource use domain. The study however 
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based exclusively on providers’ perspective without taking into consideration other actors. 
Regarding NHIS mechanisms to meet universal coverage, CPP’s (2014) is a piloted study on 
selected community-based insurance programme in Lagos State, identifying benefits and 
challenges of the programme, but the study was restricted to Lagos state. Christian Aid’s (2014) 
is a comparative review of community-based insurance in Nigeria and Ghana. The study 
identifies similarities, differences and peculiarities in the two countries; however, it is more 
generalised and lack specificity in its approach. Gustafsson-Wright and Schellekens’ (2013) 
study examines public-private-partnership in community-based insurance model in Kwara 
state, identifying the joint role of donor and government in community-based insurance. This 
study however, highlights private participation (donor funding) in the funding of community-
based insurance model.  
 
On financing mechanism, Uzochukwu, et al.’s (2016) is a review-based analysis of various 
financing models in Nigeria. Similarly, Obasan’s (2013) is a review-based analysis of the 
challenges of health care financing in Nigeria. Onoka, et al.’s (2013) examine the constraints 
of the states in financing NHIS; however, the study was restricted to Ebonyi and Enugu states. 
Adeyemi and Nixon (2013) study indicates inequitable financing and access to NHIS services 
in Nigeria than Ghana. The study is however a view-based analysis. Ilesanmi and Ige (2013) 
study was based on NHIS enrolees and fee-paying patients in Ibadan, but the study was 
restricted to private health facilities. Although Owujekwe, et al.’s (2013) reveal gender, 
income, occupation and place of residence as the determinant factors of people’s willingness 
to pay for NHIS services, it was exclusively a quantitative study. Similarly, Obikeze, et al., 
(2013) is a quantitative study of benefits incidence among different socioeconomic group in 
Enugu state. 
 
Owumi et al. (2013a) study on the impact of NHIS on employees’ health status was restricted 
to University of Ibadan. In another study, Owumi et al.’s (2013b) investigate NHIS dispensing 
outreach programme on the users’ health status. The study was however, restricted to the 
insured in the private organisations. Ibiwoye and Adeleke’s (2008) study investigates access 
and quality of NHIS services among the insured in Lagos state. The study was purely 
quantitative and restricted to the formal sector. Other studies on NHIS services among users 
include Mohammed, et al., (2011) who assessed client satisfaction with insurance scheme in 
Zaria. Osungbade, et al., (2014) study on users’ satisfaction with NHIS services in Ibadan. Both 
studies are purely quantitative. On knowledge, attitudes and perceptions of NHIS in Nigeria, 
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most studies (e.g., Bamidele and Adebimpe, 2013; Akinwale et al. 2014; Owu et al. 2014) 
focused on enrolees. Few studies however, (e.g., Ogben, 2014; Omotowo, 2016) examine the 
non-enrolees. For example, Ogben (2014) study focused on knowledge and perceptions of rural 
community in Abuja and Omotowo et al. (2016) study was on households’ perceptions, 
willingness to pay, benefit package preferences in Enugu. 
 
From the above review, it is evident that most studies did not examine the institutional design 
of NHIS policy in Nigeria, and the available studies in this area were largely review-based 
analysis. Taking into consideration that there are contradictions between NHIS stated 
objectives and the actual implementation of programmes, there are research gaps. For example, 
the gap between NHIS objectives and outcomes have shown policy fragmentation and loss of 
cohesion among players in the scheme, and thus resulted in weak implementation of NHIS’ 
policies. Because any policy that is successfully implemented is premised on the design of such 
policy, therefore, an empirical study on the institutional design of NHIS is crucial for its 
successful implementation. In addition, limited studies are available on the knowledge, 
attitudes and perceptions of the non-enrolees in Nigeria. These gaps in the literature are 
therefore addressed in this thesis. 
 
3.9 Conceptual Framework: Key Design Issues in the Health Financing Functions 
 
Key design issues in the health financing functions conceptual framework was developed by 
Carrin and James (2004) (see Figure 2.2). The framework is built on the ideology that health-
financing performance hinges on the institutional architecture and practice of a social health-
financing model. The distinctive feature of this model is that it focuses on the fundamental part 
of health financing system, which stems from institutional design and organisational practice.     
The framework organised the broad features of health financing model such as social health 
insurance into three interrelated financing functions namely revenue collection, risk pooling 
and purchasing.  Authors of the framework highlight the relationship between the three-health-
financing functions with seven health financing performance indicators and three health-
financing objectives. Substantial improvement towards the achievement of universal coverage 
could be attained within the prevailing health financing system by taking into cognizance a 
strengthening the key design issues in the health financing. 
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Figure 3.2: Key design issues in the health financing sub-functions 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Carrin and James: 2004 
 
The authors maintain that a well-designed health financing model is a function of the three 
interrelated health financing functions:  
 
 “Revenue collection – the process by which the health system receives money from 
households, enterprises, government and other organisations like donors” (Carrin and 
James, 2004: 20).  
 
 “Pooling – the accumulation and management of revenues collected in order to spread 
risk of payment for health care among all members of the pool, so that individuals no 
longer bear their risk on an individual basis” (Carrin and James, 2004: 20).   
 
 “Purchasing – the process by which the pooled contributions are used to pay providers 
to deliver a set of specified or unspecified set of health interventions” (Carrin and 
James, 2004: 20). 
 
 The three interrelated health financing functions are measured by the seven health financing 
performance indicators namely “population coverage, method of financing, level of 
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fragmentation, composition of risk, benefit package, provider payment mechanisms and 
administrative efficiency” (Carrin and James, 2004: 20).  The functioning of the seven health 
financing performance mentioned above leads to health financing objectives such as financial 
accessibility, sufficient and sustainable resource generation and optimal use of resources 
(Carrin and James, 2004). Thus, the conceptual framework above guides this thesis. 
 
3.10 Conclusion 
This chapter provided an overview of HSR. It explained that HSR in the developing countries 
reduces state roles in social services provisioning and encourages private participation in the 
provision of social services. The chapter is divided into five sections. Section 1 demonstrates 
that HSR in the global south was premised on the neoliberal ideology of SAPs, which heavily 
criticised democratic welfare state model as the impediment to socioeconomic development of 
the region. Section 2 analyses four health reform policies in the developing countries namely 
user fee, decentralisation, competition in health care provision through private participation 
and prepayment mechanism. Section 3 appraises various health insurance models including 
individual private insurance, community-based insurance, employment-based insurance and 
social health insurance model. Section 4 evaluates national health insurance and the two 
financing models commonly used within the ambit of national health insurance to achieve 
universal coverage. Finally, section five reviews health care financing in Nigeria in the pre-
1980 and post-1980. The section also reviews the design and implementation of NHIS policy 
in Nigeria. A conceptual framework posited by Carrin and James (2004) guides the thesis. 
Chapter 4 discusses processes in data collection and analysis. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
    RESEACRH METHODOLOGY 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Chapter four presents details of the research methodology including the description of the 
research design, study population, study area, sampling techniques, research instruments, pilot 
study, reliability and validity of the instruments, methods of data collection and data analysis, 
and research ethics. 
 
4.2 Research Design 
 
A research design is the ‘blue print’ that directs the researchers as they collect, analyse and 
interpret observation (Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias, 2009: 98). According to Nachmias 
and Nachimas, (1982: 75) research design “is a logical model of proof that allows the researcher 
to draw inferences concerning causal relations among the variables under investigation”. It is 
pondering about the project or research in which a researcher want to embark on before the 
project begins in terms of how the research would be conducted and the tools required in 
conducting the research.  A research is distinguished from other forms of observation because 
of its designed and planned nature (Durrheim, 2012). In research, a number of research design 
exists these include experimental, cross-sectional, quasi-experimental designs interview etc. 
Experimental design comprises of comparative groups, that is, an experimental group and a 
control group. The two groups are alike but one is subject to the independent variable while 
the other is not. On the other hand, quasi-experimental design allows researcher to select 
randomly sample from a population but it does not require comparison groups such as the 
treatment and control group as in the case of experimental design. Moreover, cross sectional 
design is the most prominent and widely use method in the social sciences for data collection 
and analysis. It is identified with survey research where a random sample of a population 
answers a set of questions posed them. Its advantages include less expensive, best to determine 
prevalence and identifies associations in a study that could otherwise be more rigorously 
studied, possibility of studying multiple outcomes and risk factors from the data collected 
(Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias, 2009; Babbie, et al., 2012). 
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The purpose of research could be descriptive, exploratory and explanatory. In addition, 
exploratory and descriptive research are often cross sectional (Babbie, et al., 2012). There are 
different approaches to research, these include quantitative, qualitative and a combination of 
both (Durrheim, 2006: 227).  This study thus employed cross sectional research design to gain 
more insight into the design and implementation policy of NHIS in the study area. In achieving 
this, a combination of qualitative and quantitative technique was used in order to ensure that 
the weakness of one technique is compensated by the strength of the other.  
  
4.2.1 Qualitative Method 
Qualitative method in research is commonly used in the social sciences to get first-hand 
information in a study. “Qualitative research as a method of data collection and analysis derives 
from the Verstehen tradition” (Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias, 2009: 280), that scientists 
must gain an understanding of human behaviour and the subject aspect of the human 
experience. It is the appropriate method often used to study attitudes and behaviours within 
their natural settings (Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias, 2009). “Qualitative research method 
describes and interprets people’s feelings and experiences in human terms rather than through 
quantification and measurement” (Blanche, et al., 2006: 272). This method uses a broad 
methodological approach to the study of social action including (1) gaining access to research 
subjects using snowball, purposive sampling etc.; (2) qualitative method of data collection 
includes participant observation, focus group discussions among others; and (3) qualitative 
method of data analysis uses grounded theory, narrative analysis, discuss analysis etc.  
 
In qualitative method, non-probability sampling technique is often used to select a sample for 
research (Babbie, et al., 2012). This study employed snowball and purposive sampling to select 
required sample. “Snowball refers to the process of accumulation as each located subject 
suggests other subject” (Babbie et al. 2012: 235). It is a form of accidental sampling used in 
the qualitative field research to locate members of a population when it is difficult. In this case, 
the interviewee suggest another participant for the interview, and thus, the sample ‘snowball’ 
as each interviewee suggested another. In contrast, purposive sampling connotes sampling in a 
premeditated way or relies on the knowledge of the researcher about the population under 
study. The researcher therefore selects a sample from a population in a subjective manner that 
is based on personal mind-sets or experience. The likelihood that a particular subject will be 
selected for the sample is subject to the personal decision or opinion of the researcher. Thus, 
these two sampling techniques were used to select the sampling units for the interviews.  
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The qualitative methods of data collection adopted in this study involved a triangulation of in-
depth interview and key informant interview. IDI is a semi-structured individual or personal 
interview method frequently used for data gathering in the qualitative research. It is “an 
unstructured, direct, personal interview in which a single respondent probe by a highly skilled 
interviewer to uncover underlying motivations beliefs, attitude and feeling on a topic” 
(Ogunbameru, 2003: 138). The interviewer asks an interviewee questions designed to elicit 
answers pertinent to the research questions in a face-to-face situation. The way and manner the 
questions are arranged, worded and presented is the hallmark of in-depth interview questions, 
(Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias, 2009). According to Kelly (2006: 297), interview is 
“simply a conversation similar to hundreds of short and long conversations we have all the 
time, but at the same time, they are based on highly skilled performances”. On the other hand, 
KII is a semi-structured personal interview with interviewees such as professionals, community 
leaders and residents who have first-hand information or knowledge regarding a topic under 
consideration (Kelly, 2006)  
 
Quite a number of data analyses exit in qualitative research; however, this study employed 
interpretive analysis and Computer-Aided Qualitative Data Analysis (CAQDAC) – ATLAS.ti 
for the analysis. Interpretive analysis is widely used in qualitative research to provide “a 
thorough description of the characteristics, processes, transactions, and contexts that constitute 
the phenomenon being studied, expressed in language not alien to the phenomenon, as well as 
an account of the researcher’s role in constructing this description” (Blanche, et al. 2012: 321). 
In further description of interpretative analysis, Blanche and colleagues note that, 
“Interpretative analysis can be seen as a back-and-forth movement between the strange and the 
familiar, as well as between a number of other dimensions – description and interpretation, 
foreground and background, part and whole”. These processes involved in interpretive analysis 
is to make findings convincing to the people who are familiar with the phenomenon being 
studied and also make them see the phenomenon in a new perspective.  Although interpretive 
analysis does not proceed in an orderly manner, it could take the following steps: 
familiarisation and immersion, inducing themes, coding, elaboration and interpretation. 
ATLAS.ti package is one of the CAQDAC packages designed to analyse qualitative data. It is 
a code-based theory-builder aiding researcher in data analysis process (Babbie et al., 2012).  
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4.2.2 Quantitative Method 
Quantitative research method involves measuring social realities by conceptualisation and 
assigning numbers to the derived constructs for statistical analysis. It is premised on positivist 
paradigm that social realities should be collected and analysed by method of objective 
quantitative measures. Durrheim and Painter (2012) opine that social scientists preferred to 
measure social issues such as crime, inequality, religion, depression malnutrition, etc., instead 
of asking people of their views and opinions on such matters. They further note that the reason 
scientists preferred quantitative data to qualitative is the general acceptance of positivism 
paradigm. The primary features of quantitative method include objectivity of data and 
generalizability of findings. Given the large number of the sample frame for the enrolees, this 
study employed survey research to complement the qualitative approach by using questionnaire 
to elicit information from the participants. Social scientists use survey research to collect data 
from a population considered too large to observe directly using carefully constructed 
standardised questionnaires (Babbie et al. 2012). Moreover, simple random sampling is used 
to select the sample that reflects those of the larger population for the study. Simple random 
sample is the probability that each element of the sample frame have the same chance of being 
selected (Durrheim and Painter, 2012). 
 
 For analysis of data, this study used Statistical Package for Social Sciences 21. SPSS is a set 
of comprehensive statistical programmes designed for use by social scientists (Sweet and 
Grace-Martin, 2006). Using SPSS, the data were analysed into univariate, bivariate and 
multivariate analyses. Univariate analysis explores the characteristics of individual variables 
in isolation from all other variable in a data set. For example, this involves the use of descriptive 
statistics and distributions of data with tables and graphs including bar charts, pie charts, 
histogram, etc. Bivariate analysis explores the relationships between two variables in a data 
set. It shows pattern of co-variation between two variables and this could be presented in a 
tabular form, graphic and correlation coefficient. Multivariate analysis tests the simultaneous 
relationship of many variables in order to document collective effects and account for potential 
spurious factors, and this could be achieved either through linear or logistic regression (Sweet 
and Grace-Martin, 2006).     
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4.3 Study Area 
The study area is Oyo state, Nigeria (see figure 4.1). Oyo state is located in the South-West 
geopolitical zone of the country. The state was formed in 1976. However, in 1991 Osun state 
was established from of the state because of nationwide state creation exercise 
(http://logbaby.com/encyclopedia/history-of-oyo-state_9881.html). Oyo state “ now covers 27, 
249 square kilometres of land mass and it is bounded in the south by Ogun state, in the North 
by Kwara state, in the west, Oyo state is bounded partly by Ogun state and partly by Republic 
of Benin, while in the East, it is bounded by Osun State” (Adeyeye, 2006: 7).  
 
Figure 4.1 Study Area 
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The state has an estimated population of 5.5 million people (National Population Commission 
(NPC), 2009). The state is homogenous, consists of Yoruba ethnic group who speaks Yoruba 
language. However, a considerable number of people from different parts of the country lives 
and works especially in the urban areas of the state such as Ibadan, Ogbomosho and Oyo etc. 
Most people in the state practice Christianity and Islam with few people practising traditional 
religion (Adeyeye, 2006). Oyo state is a cosmopolitan state and comprises of 33 Local 
Government Areas (LGAs). The state was chosen for the study mainly because of substantial 
numbers of enrolees (158, 152 enrolees) in the state and also because of prior experience of the 
researcher on NHIS programme in the state (NHIS, as cited in Oyedibe et al, 2012; Omoruan 
et al. 2009; Omoruan, 2011).  
 
4.4 Study population 
 
A study population “is that aggregation of elements from which the sample is actually drawn” 
(Babbie et al. 2012:174). It could also be referred to as entities in which the units of study are 
selected (Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias, 2009). The study population or unit of analysis 
for this study was NHIS stakeholders namely NHIS officials, HMOs officials, HCPs, enrolees 
and non-enrolees. As described by Babbie, (2012: 84) a unit of analysis refers to objects, 
individuals, groups, organisations and the like that researchers are interested in investigating. 
From a study population a sample is drawn for the study. Studying the entire population would 
generate a lot of data that would take a lot of time to process or would be difficult to process. 
Therefore, sampling provides focus for the study and leads to a better and quality study.  
 
4.5 Sampling Techniques 
In a study of this magnitude, the use of sampling is inevitable in order to lessen the “burden” 
of data collection faced by the researcher. Sampling technique is a process of collecting a 
sample of the population being studied while a sample is a sub-set of a study population that is 
systematically drawn with the characteristics of the population in order to serve as a point of 
access to data (Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias, 2009). In addition, Durrheim and Painter 
(2006: 272) explain, “effective sampling ensures that the elements selected for a sample 
accurately resemble the parameters of the population they were selected from”. Thus, this 
follows that one major principle of sampling is its “representativeness.” In other words, a 
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sample is expected to be a true reflection of a population’s characteristic like the socio-
economic composition, among others (Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias, 2009).  
 
A sample can be selected using probability or non-probability sampling technique. Probability 
sampling simply means each sampling unit of the population has the same probability of being 
included in the sample. “It provides an efficient method for selecting a sample that should 
adequately reflect variations that exist in the population” (Babbie, et al. 2012: 202). However, 
in practice, probability samples are difficult to obtain and expensive (Durrheim and Painter, 
2012).  On the other hand, “non-probability sampling refers to any kind of sampling where the 
selection of elements is not determined by principle of randomness” (Durrheim and Painter, 
2012: 138). Although researchers could make accurate estimate of the population’s parameters 
with probability samples, a considerable number of social sciences researchers rely on non-
probability samples (Durrheim and Painter, 2012). Non-probability sampling method is 
employed for certain reasons: when it is difficult to accurately identify a sampling population 
and when a sampling frame of the population under study is not available. Thus, both 
probability and non-probability sampling techniques were employed in this survey research. 
 
Selection of the Enrolees 
 
For the selection of the enrolees, the following stages were adopted to select the sample 
members for the study: 
 
Stage one: sampling ratio was used to calculate the sample size from the sampling frame. 
According to Durrheim and Painter, (2012:139) sampling ratio is a common practice used to 
calculate sample size from a sampling frame depending on the size of the sampling frame. 
However, for a large population of approximately 150,000, 1% is required. The sampling frame 
for this study was 158,152. Sample size was calculated: 158,152 multiplied by 1 divided by 
100 (158,152×1/100) = 1581. Therefore, 1581 was the sample size for the study. 
 
Stage two: Due to unavailability of a comprehensive list of enrolees in the study area, 
purposive sampling technique was used to select three urban areas in the three senatorial 
districts of the state where NHIS enrolees are predominant namely Ibadan, Oyo and Ogbomoso.  
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Stage three: The following organisations were purposively selected in Ibadan, University of 
Ibadan, Federal Secretariat and Federal Road Maintenance Agency (FERMA) for the public 
enterprise while New Age Beverages and Rom Oil and Mills for the private enterprise. In Oyo 
town, Federal School of Survey and Federal College of Education (special). In Ogbomoso, 
Federal Government College. In addition, six NHIS accredited health facilities were 
purposively selected in order to reach individual’ enrolees who are self-employed and others 
who could not be reached in their offices. The health facilities include Ladoke Akintola 
University of Technology Teaching Hospital Ogbomoso, Bowen Teaching Hospital 
Ogbomoso, University College Hospital Ibadan (UCH), Alafia Hospital Ibadan, Baptist 
Hospital Oyo, Peakmak Hospital and Maternity Centre, Oyo. 
 
Stage four:  Due to a large number of enrolees in the academic institutions selected, the 
institutions were stratified into faculties and units. A combination of purposive and snowball 
techniques was used to identify NHIS enrolees at various faculties and units of the institutions 
because not all employees are NHIS enrolees. Similarly, purposive and snowball techniques 
were used at the Federal Government College Ogbomoso, Federal Secretariat, FERMA, New 
Age Beverages and Rom Oil and Mills. Table 3.1 below indicates the number of questionnaires 
administered in the selected organisations. However, 1402 representing 88% of the total 
questionnaires were retrieved and found usable for the analysis. 
 
Table 4.1 Selected study sites, number of questionnaires administered and retrieved 
S/N SELECTED 
STUDY SITES 
QUESTIONNAIRE 
ADMINISTERED 
QUESTIONNAIRE 
RETRIEVED 
PERCENTAGE 
1 University of 
Ibadan  
495 453 91.5 
2 Federal School of 
Survey  
110 84 76.3 
3 Federal College of 
Education 
(Special) Oyo 
164 131 79.8 
4 Federal Secretariat 250 216 86.4 
5 FERMA 48 41 85.4 
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6 Federal 
Government 
College, 
Ogbomoso 
36 31 86.1 
7 Rom Oil and Mill 85 83 97.6 
8 New Age 
Beverage 
75 68 90.6 
9 Bowen Teaching 
Hospital 
45 41 91.1 
10 LAUTECH 
Teaching Hospital 
30 28 93.3 
11 UCH 155 151 94.4 
12 ALAFIA Hospital  28 28 100.0 
13 Baptist Hospital 35 33 94.2 
14 Peakmak Hospital 25 24 96.0 
Total  1581 1402 88.6 
 
 
Selection of the Non-Enrolees 
 
To select the non-enrolees, multi-stage sampling techniques were employed. Stage one: the 
state was stratified into three senatorial districts or strata. A senatorial district is one of the 
territorial district from which a senator to a federal legislature is elected. Each senatorial district 
in Oyo state has certain number of LGAs. Oyo north senatorial district has thirteen LGAs these 
include: Saki west, Saki east, Iwajowa, Kajola, Olorunsogo, Irepo, Ogbomoso North, 
Ogbomoso south, Iseyin, Orelope, Orire, Itesiwaju and Atisbo. Oyo central senatorial district 
has eleven LGAs namely Atiba, Akinyele, Surulere, Egbeda, Afijio, Lagelu, Ogooluwa,  
Oluyole, Ona-ara, Oyo west and Oyo east. Oyo south senatorial district has nine LGAs namely 
Iddo, Ibarapa north, Ibarapa east, Ibarapa central, Ibadan south-west, Ibadan southeast, Ibadan 
north-west, Ibadan north and Ibadan North-east.  
 
Stage two: Stat-Trek’s Random Number Generator was used to randomly select one LGA from 
each senatorial district. Stat-Trek’s Random Number Generator is a computer software package 
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that generates random numbers using statistical algorithm 
(http://stattrek.com/statistics/random-number-generator.aspx). It generates a list of random 
numbers, depending on the requirement of the following: 
 
 The quantity of random numbers desired 
 The minimum and maximum values of random numbers in the table 
 Whether or not duplicate random numbers are permitted.    
 For Oyo north senatorial district, the LGAs were assigned numbers from 1 to 13 since there 
are 13 LGAs. Stat-Trek’s Random Number Generator was used to generate one LGA – Iseyin. 
For Oyo central, the LGAs were assigned numbers from 1 until the last name, and there are 11 
LGAs. Stat-Trek’s Random Number Generator was used to generate one LGA – Surulere. 
Similarly, in Oyo south, the LGAs were assigned numbers from the first to the last and Stat-
Trek’s Random Number Generator was used to generate one LGA – Ibadan south-east. 
 
Stage three: all the political wards in each LGA selected were listed, out of which half of the 
wards were randomly selected using Stat-Trek’s Random Number Generator. Political wards 
are geographic units of LGAs and consist of between 300 to 500 housing units. In Surulere 
LGA with 10 wards, 5 wards were randomly selected these include: Baya-oje, Iredaadu (i), 
Iresaadu (iii), Iresaadu (iv) and Oko (iii). In Iseyin with 11 wards, 6 wards were selected: Ado-
awaye, Akinwumi/Osogun, Faramora, Isalu (ii), Koso (i) and Koso (ii). In Ibadan southeast 
with 12 wards, 6 wards were selected namely C1, S3, S4a, S4b, S6a and S6b.  
 
Stage four: Since there is no comprehensive list of the housing unit in the selected wards, the 
researcher purposively selected 130 households across the selected wards in each LGA by a 
door to door enquiry to identify non-enrolees. The questionnaires were self-administered by 
male or female adult in the selected households while researchers assisted respondents who 
could not complete it by themselves. The total number of questionnaires administered in each 
LGA was 130 and this gave 390 questionnaires in the three selected LGAs as indicated in the 
table 3.2 below. However, 376 questionnaires representing 96% of the total sample were found 
usable for the data analysis. 
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Table 4.2 Selected LGAs and the number of questionnaires administered and retrieved 
 
S/N STUDY SITES QUESTIONNAIRE 
ADMINISTERED  
QUESTIONNAIRE 
RETRIEVED 
PERCENTAGE 
1 Surulere 130 126  96.9 
2 Iseyin 130 123 94.6 
3 Ibadan south-
east 
130 127 97.6 
TOTAL 390 376 96.4 
 
 
For the IDIs, 30 participants were selected among the enrolees; 10 participants each from the 
three selected urban areas namely Ibadan, Ogbomoso and Oyo, using purposive and snowball 
techniques. In addition, 5 participants were purposively selected among non-enrolees in each 
of the three selected LGAs making a total of 15 participants. For the KIIs, 15 participants were 
selected purposively, five each among NHIS officials, accredited HCPs and HMOs.  
 
4.6 Research Instruments and Pilot Testing 
 Research instruments consist of a wide range of instruments often used for data gathering in a 
research study, these include among others questionnaire, focus group discussion, observation, 
IDI and KII. In this study, the following instruments were used: questionnaire, IDI and KII. 
 
4.6.1 Questionnaire 
Babbies el al. (2012: 646) defines a questionnaire as “a document containing questions and 
other types of items designed to solicit information appropriate to analysis”. It is a carefully 
constructed set of questions used to gather information from a sample population after 
substantial pretesting has been done (Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachmias, 2009). There are two 
main responses formant used in the questionnaire to elicit information from the respondents. 
These include open-ended and closed-ended formant. The open-ended formant allows 
respondent to present their opinions or view in their own way without restriction from the 
researcher. On the other hand, in the closed-ended formant, respondents are restricted to a list 
of answers provided in the questionnaire (Kanjee, 2006). Questionnaire as a data collection 
instrument is appropriate in this study because of the large samples of enrolees and non-
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enrolees, and as such, “the instrument has the capacity to generate quantifiable data on large 
numbers of people representative of the wider population” (Babbie, 2012: 245). A 
questionnaire is made up of a number of separate subparts and each subpart contains a number 
of items (Kanjee, 2006). In this study, the questionnaire consists of open-ended and closed 
ended questions to allow the respondents elaborate more on some of the responses. The use of 
both open-ended and closed-ended questions increased the comprehensiveness of the study. 
Similarly, measurement scales in the questionnaire consist of dichotomous questions, multiple 
choice and scale items. There were two sets of questionnaire for this study: enrolees and non-
enrolees. The questionnaire for the enrolees was structured as follows: 
 
Section A: Socio-economic and Demographic Characteristics has nine questions – the purpose 
of the questions was to obtain demographic and socio-economic information of the participants. 
 
Section B: Equity in financial contributions and health benefits has seven questions – the aim 
was to investigate equity in terms of financial contribution and health benefit among the 
enrolees. 
 
Section C: Availability and Accessibility of services of the HMOs and HCPs has twenty-seven 
questions – the purpose was to investigate the extent to which the services of the HMOs and 
HCPs are available and accessible to the enrolees. For the non-enrolees, the questionnaire was 
structured as follows: 
 
Section A: Socio-economic and Demographic Characteristics has eight questions – the aim of 
the questions was to obtain demographic and socio-economic information of the respondents. 
 
Section B: Knowledge, Attitudes and Perceptions about NHIS has seven questions – the aim 
was to examine the level of knowledge, attitudes and perceptions of non-enrolees about the 
NHIS. 
 
Section C: Impediments to enrolment has seven questions – the aim was to study the extent to 
which different factors deter people from enrolments.  
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4.6.2 In-depth Interview 
An Interview is simply a long or short conversation for gathering information. It could be 
structured, semi-structured and unstructured (Kelly, 2012). IDI is a semi-structured individual 
interview method frequently used for data gathering in the qualitative research. It entails a 
situation whereby the interviewer allows the interviewee to speak for him/herself rather than 
providing predetermined hypothesis-based questions (Babbie et al. 2012). It has also been 
described as “a face-to-face situation in which the interviewer asks an interviewee questions 
designed to elicit answers pertinent to the research questions. The questions, wording and their 
sequence defined the structure of the interview” (Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias, 2009: 
239). Two sets of IDIs were conducted in the study. The first set for the enrolees and the second 
set for the non-enrolees. Various IDI questions were stemmed from the research objectives. 
For instance, in the case of the enrolees, questions related to NHIS health package and financial 
contributions, services provided by the HMOs and HCPs were discussed in the interviews. 
Similarly, for the non-enrolees, IDIs were conducted on issues related to their knowledge, 
attitudes and perceptions on NHIS (see appendix III). 
 
4.6.3 Key Informant Interview  
As mentioned elsewhere, KII is a semi-structured personal interview with an individual who 
has first-hand information or knowledge regarding a topic under consideration (Kelly, 2006). 
In addition, key informants are people such as government officials, professionals, community 
leaders and residents who are more knowledgeable about subject under research. They provide 
detailed and insightful information that informed decisions due to their skills and position in 
the society (Babbie, et al. 2012). KIIs were conducted among NHIS officials, HMOs and HCPs 
who are the main stakeholders in the design and implementation policy of NHIS. Different sets 
of questions were used in the interview for the stakeholders. For instance, in the case of NHIS 
officials, salient questions related to the design of NHIS policy and its implementations to meet 
the policy goal of universal health coverage were asked and discussed. On the other hand, 
questions related to the roles of other stakeholders namely HMOs and HCPs in the 
implementation of NHIS were also discussed (see appendix III). 
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4.6.4 Reliability and Validity of the Research Instruments 
The test for reliability and validity of measures of research instruments is central to research 
study. According to George and Mallery (2014: 242) “many constructs are measured in which 
a subset of relevant items is selected, administered to subjects, and scored – and then inferences 
are made about the true population values”. In order to ensure that construct indicators or 
measures best captured abstract concepts or variables, they must be reliable and valid. Although 
the two measuring device reliability and validity measures for different purposes, they are 
related. Reliability is “the degree to which an indicator or a measure is a consistent measuring 
device” (Sweet and Grace-Martin, 2006: 3). It “is the dependability of a measurement 
instrument; the extent to which an instrument yields the same results on repeated trial” 
(Durrheim and Painter, 2006: 152).  In order to measure the reliability of an instrument, 
Durrheim and Painter, (2006) posit that if the scores on a test correlate after different testing, 
it could be considered that the test is reliable.  
 
There are different ways to test whether a measure is reliable or not, these include test-retest, 
split half, internal consistency etc. (1)Test-retest method of reliability – refers to a situation 
whereby a “researcher administers the measuring instrument to the same group of persons at 
two different times and compute the correlation between the two sets of observations. Thus, 
the coefficient obtains through this means is the reliability estimate” (Frankfort-Nachmias and 
Nachmias, 2009: 171). (2) Split half method – as the name implies, is the process of obtaining 
reliability estimate by either parallel form of splitting an instrument or treating different parts 
of a measuring instrument as a separate scale. (3) Internal consistency method of measuring 
reliability though similar to split half, it does “not rely on either parallel forms or the splitting 
of tests” (Durrheim and Painter, 2006: 154). It is based on reliability estimate by the amount to 
which every element in a measure correlates with each other. Like other methods of reliability, 
internal consistency is determined mathematically to obtain the reliability estimates (Durrheim 
and Painter, 2006; Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias, 2009).  
 
Validity refers to when an indicator measures what is expected to measure. Durrheim and 
Painter (2006: 147) note that the reason for verifying measurement validity was to (1) “ensure 
that the conceptual definition of a construct corresponds with the attributes being measured; 
and (2) the operational definition corresponds to the conceptual definition”. Testing the validity 
of a measure is mostly determine by non-statistical means, though factor analysis may be 
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applied to create an instrument that measure well what researcher is attempting to measure 
(George and Mallery, 2014). Different methods of measuring validity exist, these include 
criterion, content and construct validity. According to Durrheim and Painter (2006: 147), 
“criterion-related validity – is the extent to which a measure is related to some other standard 
or criterion that is known to indicate construct accurately”. On the other hand, content validity 
relates to the extent in which a measure reflects a specific domain of content and it is 
determined by ensuring the specified area is covered when developing the construct definition. 
“Construct validity is the extent to which a measure of a construct is empirically related to 
other measures with which it is theoretically associated” (Durrheim and Painter, 2006: 151). 
To confirm the reliability and validity of the measurement scales in the study, internal 
consistency measure of reliability and content validity was employed in a pilot study conducted 
as indicated below.   
 
4.6.5 Pilot study 
Pilot study is an essential aspect of a research; it improves the genuineness of the research. 
Kelly (2012: 490) maintains that “pilot studies are conducted to identify possible problems 
with proposed research, using a small sample of respondents before the main study is 
conducted”. The purpose of the pilot study therefore was to improve the credibility and quality 
of the study. In order to improve the research instruments used in the study, a pilot study was 
conducted between 20 and 30 January 2015 in the area and among respondents not included in 
this study.  Eighty (approximately 5% of the sample size) questionnaires were purposively 
distributed among NHIS enrolees who were employees of Nigerian Television Authority 
(NTA) and Nigerian Security and Civil Defence Corps (NSCDC) in Ibadan. Twenty 
(approximately 5% of the sample size) questionnaires were purposively distributed among non-
enrolees in Ogbomoso. In addition to completing the questionnaires, participants were asked 
to comment on the following:  
 
1. If the questions were easy to understand, clear and to the point. 
2. Were the questions relevant to the topic under research? 
3. If completing the questionnaire did not take much of their time. 
 
 For the IDI, two enrolees were purposively selected in NSCDC and two non-enrolees in 
Ogbomoso. Moreover, for the KII, two NHIS officials, two HMOs officials and two HCPs who 
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were easily accessible in Ibadan volunteered to be part in the interviews. However, before the 
end of the interviews, the participants were asked to comments on the questions that is, if they 
were relevant to the topic and time spent on the interviews. 
 
4.6.5.1 Pilot study findings 
Out of the 80 questionnaires distributed among the enrolees, 62 were completed and returned 
with observations and comments. Moreover, for the non-enrolees, out of 20 questionnaires 
distributed, 16 were completed with observations. The comments and observations include: 
 
1. Re-phrasing of some question items 
2. Questions were clear and easy to understand 
3. Long questionnaire items 
4. Time consuming  
 
All the necessary comments and observations were therefore incorporated to the questionnaires 
in order to ensure content validity. In addition, to ensure internal consistency of the instruments, 
Cronbach’s Alpha correlation coefficient was used to calculate the reliability. Both 
questionnaires for the enrolees and non-enrolees had .834 and 6.50 respectively, indicating that 
the instrument had a high proportion of internal consistency based on inter-item correlation. 
For the IDI and KII, comments and observations such as rephrasing of questions and time 
adjustment were raised because most of the participants were conscious of their time.The 
researcher therefore incorporated the observations and comments into the interviews guides.  
 
4.7 Procedure for Data Collection 
A number of procedures were taken to ensure adequate data collection for the study; these 
include engagement of research assistants, time of data collection, administration of 
questionnaires, and interview of participants. 
 
4.7.1 Engagement of Research Assistants 
Three research assistants were employed and trained for data collection. One of the main 
reasons for those employed is their ability to read and write effectively in Yoruba language, 
because some of the respondents (especially non-enrolees) could not communicate effectively 
in English. The questionnaires were administered to the respondents in the various study sites 
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by the researcher with the assistance of the research assistants. The research assistants were 
also available to assist the researcher in the interviews sessions by recording and taking notes 
where applicable.  
 
4.7.2 Dates of Questionnaires Administration 
The period of fieldwork was between February 2015 and September 2015. The researcher 
ensured that questionnaires for the enrolees were first administered, then followed by 
questionnaires for the non-enrolees. Table 3.2 indicates dates questionnaires were administered 
at the selected sites. 
 
Table 4.3 Selected Sites and Dates for Questionnaire Administration 
S/N SELECTED STUDY SITES DATES FOR QUESTIONNAIRE 
ADMINISTRATION 
1 University of Ibadan  2 to 14 February, 2015 
2 Federal Secretariat, Ibadan 16 to 21 February, 2015 
3 FERMA, Ibadan 23 to 28 February, 2015 
4 Rom Oil and Mill, Ibadan 2 to 5 March, 2015 
5 New Age Beverage, Ibadan 6 to 11 March, 2015 
6 UCH, Ibadan 12 to 21 March, 2015 
7 ALAFIA Hospital, Ibadan 24 to 28 March, 2015 
8 Federal Government College, Ogbomoso 30 March to 4 April, 2015 
9 Bowen Teaching Hospital, Ogbomoso 6 to 11 April, 2015 
10 LAUTECH Teaching Hospital, Ogbomoso 13 to 17 April, 2015 
11 Federal School of Survey, Oyo 20 to 25 April, 2015 
12 Federal College of Education (Special) Oyo 27 to 30 April, 2015 
13 Baptist Hospital, Oyo 4 to 9 May, 2015 
14 Peakmak Hospital, Oyo 11 to 16 May, 2015 
15 Surulere 18 to 23 May, 2015 
16 Iseyin 25 to 30 May, 205 
17 Ibadan south-east 1 to 6 June, 2015 
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4.7.3 Administration of Questionnaire 
The researcher with the assistance of the three research assistants started the questionnaire 
administration in February 2, 2015 for the enrolees at the University of Ibadan. Subsequently, 
other sites where covered one after the other. Although there was some apathy at the initial 
stage at various study sites, this was resolved after the researcher explained the purpose of the 
research. Therefore, the respondents cooperated with the research team and everything went 
on successfully. In the process of administering the questionnaires to the enrolees, the 
researcher observed that: (1) Most of the respondents demanded to complete the questionnaires 
on their own. (2) Greater number of the respondents were met in their offices and workplace 
environment during the working hours. (3) Some asked us to wait for collection while others 
asked us to come back the following day for collection. (4) Some of the questionnaires 
administered at the hospitals were done by researchers because the respondents could not 
understand English language clearly; the research team read out the questions and responses in 
Yoruba and provided clarification where applicable. However, some of the questionnaires 
administered (those that were given out to the respondents to complete on their own) had 
incomplete information; some questions were left unanswered and some copies of the 
questionnaires could not be retrieved.  
 
For the non-enrolees, the researcher team observed some reluctance at the initial stage. 
However, after series of explanations of the purpose of the research, they agreed and cooperated 
with the research team. The research team administered most of the questionnaires, though 
some respondents insisted to complete the questionnaires on their own. The literacy level for 
this group was a bit low, and thus, the questions and responses were read out in Yoruba to the 
respondents were applicable. The research team waited and collected the questionnaires that 
were completed by the respondents, though some asked us to come back for collection. Some 
questionnaires were not completed in full, questions were left unanswered and few 
questionnaires could not be retrieved. See table 3.2 for the total number of questionnaires 
retrieved. 
 
4.7.4 In-Depth Interview 
IDIs for the study were conducted with the enrolees and non-enrolees. For the enrolees, 30 IDIs 
were conducted. The interviews shed lights on issues related to the implementation of NHIS 
programmes in the study area and were tape-recorded. In addition, the research assistants in 
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the course of the various interviews took notes. English and Yoruba were the languages used 
in the interview, depending on interviewee’s preference. Personal profile from the interviewees 
was collected and recorded on data form. The form has the following: interviewee’s consent, 
organization/LGA, designation, date of interview, time of the interview, the time the interview 
ended, language of interview, venue’s name and interviewer’s names (see Appendix III). After 
questionnaire administration was concluded on the 6 June2015, IDIs with the selected 
participants (enrolees) began the following week, that is, on the 8 June 2015. Ten IDIs were 
conducted in each urban area selected namely Ibadan, Ogbomoso and Oyo.  
 
In Ibadan, six IDIs were conducted at University of Ibadan between 8 and 9 June, 2015, in 
FERMA 4 interviews were conducted on the 10 June, 2015. The time of the interview sessions 
ranged between an hour and an hour 30 minutes. All the interviews conducted at the University 
of Ibadan and FERMA with the enrolees took place in their offices or any conducive 
environment within their work places. Moreover, in Ogbomoso, 5 IDIs were conducted in 
Federal government college Ogbomoso on the 16 June, 2015 and 5 among Federal Road Safety 
Corps officials on the 17 June, 2015. The research team uses Yoruba and English languages in 
the interviews. In Oyo, 8 IDIs were conducted in Federal College of Education between 22 and 
23 June, 2015 and 2 in School of Survey on the 24 June, 2015. Similarly, English and Yoruba 
were used as the medium of communication and the interviews were conducted in the offices 
or convenient locations chosen by the interviewees. It is worth noting that all the interviews 
conducted were successful, though some delays were observed in some cases before the 
commencement of the interview sessions. 
 
For the non-enrolees, 15 IDIs were conducted. Five IDIs were conducted in the selected wards 
in Surulere LGA, on the 29 June 2015. In Ibadan Southeast, five IDIs were also conducted in 
the selected ward on the 30 June 2015. In Iseyin, five IDIs were conducted on the 4 July 2015 
in the selected wards of the LGA. The interviews shed lights on the interviewees’ knowledge, 
attitudes and perceptions on NHIS. Yoruba and English were used in the interview. Interview 
sessions for this group (non-enrolees) took place either in their houses or in workplace 
environment. Although some challenges like delays in some cases before the commencement 
of the interviews and interference were observed; however, they were rectified and all the 
interview sessions were successful.   
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4.7.5 Key Informant Interview 
 
KIIs were conducted among NHIS officials, HMOs employees and HCPs to elicit more 
information about the design and implementation of NHIS programmes in the study area vis-
à-vis Nigeria. The main reason of these interviews was to bridge the gaps on issues that needed 
clarity on the design and implementation of various NHIS programmes. The interviewswere 
tape-recorded;the research assistants also took notes during the various interview sessions. 
English language was usedin all the interviews for this category of respondents. Personal 
profiles of all the interviewees were collected and recorded on the data form. The form has the 
following: interviewee’s consent, organization, designation, date of interview, the time the 
interview starts, time the interview ended, language of interview, venue’s name and 
interviewer’s names (see Appendix III). Fifteen KIIs were conducted. Five among NHIS 
officials, five among HMOs personnel and five among HCPs. 
 
For the NHIS officials, three KIIs were conducted in the NHIS Zonal office in Bodija Ibadan 
on the 6 July 2015, and 2 KIIs were conducted in the NHIS state office in Agodi Ibadan on the 
7 July 2015. In the case of HMOs, two KIIs were conducted with the employees of United 
Health Care International Limited, Ibadan in their offices on the 8 July 2015. Similarly, two 
KIIs were also conducted with the employees of Total Health Trust Limited in their offices on 
the 9 July 2015. One KII was conducted with the employee of Ronsberger Nigeria Limited, 
Ibadan on the 10 July 2015. 
 
Moreover, For the HCPs, two KIIs were conducted with medical doctors in their offices at 
UCH, Ibadan and one KII with a medical doctor at his office in Alafia Hospital Ibadan on the 
11, July 2015. Two KIIs were conducted in Ogbomoso, one was done with the medical director 
Ireti-olu hospital, in his office, and another KII with a medical doctor in his office at Bowen 
Teaching Hospital Ogbomoso, on the 13 July 2015. It is worth noting that the time used in the 
interview sessions ranged between an hour and an hour 30 minutes. Most of the interviewees 
in this category had knowledge about research and participated in previous research so they 
welcomed the research team and complied with the interview procedures. Therefore, the KIIs 
were successfully conducted without much disturbances or interference. 
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4.8 Data Analysis 
 
 Data analysis “is the process of ordering and organising raw data in order to extract useful 
information for making decisions” (Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias, 2009: 334). The data 
collected in this study were analysed using quantitative and qualitative methods. Blanche, 
Durrheim and Kelly (2006) note that there are two approaches to analysing data: quantitative 
and qualitative.  
 
4.8.1 Quantitative Analysis 
Quantitative data analysis involves using statistical methods to analyse data. However, before 
data analysis, Durrheim (2006: 189) explains that the preliminary stages of data analysis 
include (1) coding data – transforming raw data into meaningful numerical format; (2) entering 
data – entering numerical codes into computer in a format that can be analysed using statistical 
method; (3) cleaning data – checking the dataset for errors and then correcting these errors. 
The research team adhered to these three stages in order to ensure the data are error-free before 
analysis.  
 
The research team ensured that all the retrieved questionnaires were coded between 20 and 21 
July 2015. After that, they entered the numerical data into the computer on the 22 July 2015 
for analysis. However, in order to ensure the data was error-free, the researcher generated a full 
set of univariate analysis with frequency tables for each of the variables in the data set. Each 
variable was scrutinised to identify any error. Although some errors were discovered, for 
example, variable sex was coded 1 for male and 2 for female; however, some subjects had code 
3 for variable sex, this and other related errors were rectified. Once the researcher ensured the 
dataset is error-free, the data were then analysed using descriptive and inferential statistics.  
 
4.8.1.1 Descriptive and Inferential Analysis  
 
According to Babbie at al. (2012: 641), “descriptive statistics describe the characteristics of a 
sample or the relationship among variables in a sample, and summarizes a set of sample 
observations”. Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachamias, (2009: 588) defined descriptive statistics 
as “procedures used for describing and analyzing data that enable the researcher to summarise 
and organize data in an effective and meaningful way”. Descriptive analysis enables 
researchers to gain an initial impression of the data collected by knowing the characteristics of 
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individual variables, inform researchers of the “types of advanced statistical procedures that 
are appropriate to apply when examining associations between variables” (Sweet and Grace-
Martin, 2012: 47). IBM SPSS 21 was used to generate univariate analysis including frequency 
distributions and graphs of the characteristics of individual variables related to the research 
objectives. In addition to using univariate analysis, the researcher performed bivariate analysis 
to text the relationship, association or differences between two variables meant to achieve the 
research objectives.  
 
4.8.2 Qualitative Analysis 
 
The data collected through In-depth Interviews and Key Informant Interviews were analysed 
using interpretive analysis and ATLAS.ti package. As mentioned earlier, interpretive analysis 
is widely used in qualitative research “to provide a thorough description of the characteristics, 
processes, transactions, and contexts that constitute the phenomenon being studied” (Blanche, 
et al. 2006: 321). Blanche and colleagues note that in order to have a convincing account of the 
phenomenon being studied, the following sequence is central to analysing data using 
interpretive analysis: familiarization, inducing themes, coding data, elaboration and 
interpretation. In addition, ATLAS.ti was used to complement interpretive analysis in data 
coding.  
 
 Familiarization and Immersion: this is the first step using interpretive analysis. It 
“involves development of ideas and theories of phenomenon being studied” (Blanche, 
et al. 2006: 322). To realize this first step, after data collection, the researchers read 
through the texts (field notes) and listened to recorded interviews many times, make 
notes, draw diagrams and brainstorm with the research team on the texts in order to be 
familiar with the texts. 
 
 Inducing themes: Is the process of organizing data into themes using familiar 
expression with the phenomenon under study. In this stage, the researchers ensured that 
the texts were summarized into thematic schemes covering a broad array of issues 
related to the research objectives. However, these were later rearranged into main 
themes with several subthemes under each main theme.   
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 Coding data: This is the process of marking different sections of your data relevant to 
one or more themes. Blanche, et al. (2006) posit that different sections of the data could 
be coded into phrases, sentences and paragraphs known as textual ‘bit’ or extract that 
contains material pertaining to the themes under investigation. In addition, Blanche and 
colleagues note, “textual ‘bit’ could be labelled with more than one code if it relates to 
more than one theme” (Blanche, et al. 2006: 325). In this stage, the coding was done 
using ATLAS.ti package by clustering textual ‘bit’ or extract into meaningful pieces 
under each code heading or theme and in relation to other clusters. 
 
 Elaboration: Is the process of appraising the coded themes by carefully examining 
extract clustered together for differences. The researchers at this stage explored the 
coded themes and subthemes closely to captured nuances of texts not captured in the 
original coding and rectified were applicable for easy interpretation. 
 
 Interpretation and Checking: Is the process of putting together textual ‘bits’ or extracts 
into meaningful ideas. At this stage, the researchers put all the distinct coded themes 
together in line with the research objectives.  
 
4.9 Fieldwork Challenges  
 
There were some challenges encountered in the fieldwork. In case of the questionnaire, the 
questionnaires’ administration for the enrolees was initially faced some resistance as many of 
the respondents saw it as a time-wasting venture. As a result, they were busy with their 
businesses without recognising the presence of the research team. However, after several 
explanations by the researchers with evidence (such as student identity card and consent form) 
that the research is for academic purpose and advancement of knowledge, the respondents then 
agreed to take part in the survey. Moreover, for the non-enrolees, the challenges faced by the 
research team were similar to the challenges mentioned above. In addition, most of the 
respondents in this category expected us to pay them for participating in the survey. However, 
the research team explained further that the survey is purely for academic purpose and there 
was no money earmarked for the research. Thus, the respondents cooperated and the survey 
went on successfully. Generally, retrieving the questionnaires from those who decided to 
complete the questionnaires on their own and asked us to come back for collection was also a 
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challenge because some of them did not complete the questionnaires in time. For instance, it 
took some respondents two to three days before they could complete and return the 
questionnaires. In addition, some respondents misplaced theirs and could not return them.  
 
For the interviews, the research team also experienced a number of challenges with the 
interviewees. Permissions were obtained at various organisations before interviews were 
granted. For instance, permissions were obtained from the Medical Directors at various hospital 
before interviews were conducted. Similarly, the researchers obtained a permission from the 
Director, NHIS zonal office in Ibadan before the interviews were granted with the employees 
of the organisation. The researchers had to reschedule some of the interviews because some of 
the interviewees were not available at the time earlier scheduled. For instance, before some 
medical doctors were interviewed, the interviews were rescheduled for about two times due to 
the nature of their work. Similarly, interviewing some enrolees and non-enrolees was quite 
challenging. Initially some interviewees did not want their voice recorded, but after much 
explanation, they consented and allowed the interview sessions to proceed. 
 
4.10 Ethical Consideration 
This study went through ethical review and obtained ethical approval from the Department of 
Sociology and the Senate Research Ethics Committee of the University of South Africa. The 
research team observed the following ethical issues: informed consent, confidentiality, 
beneficence and non-maleficence, and dissemination of research in line with the ethical 
considerations. 
 
 Informed consent: Participants in the study were dully informed of the purpose of the 
study and their involvement. They were also informed that they could withdraw from 
participating in the study at any point in time, if they feel intimidated or uncomfortable, 
and the data already collected from them would be destroyed. The par ticipants were 
required to complete and sign informed consent forms. 
 
 Confidentiality: The researcher promised to protect the anonymity and confidentiality 
of the participants. As a result, the names of the participants were not used in reporting 
the findings from the interviews. Participants were adequately informed of the need 
torecord the interview through note-taking and audio recording. In addition, the 
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researchers also promised not to disclose in any way, the address of the interviewees or 
respondents. If there is a need to use the name/address of any of the participants, the 
researcher promised to seek the permission of the participant concerned before doing 
so. 
 
 Beneficence and non-maleficence: The researchers acknowledged all contributors to 
the research study and maximised the expected benefits to the participants. The 
researchers also ensured that no harm befalls participants as direct or indirect 
consequences of the research.  
 
 Dissemination of the research: The researchers promised to make the findings of the 
research available to the participants. In addition, copies of the thesis would be available 
in the University Library. 
 
 
4.11  Conclusion 
 
This chapter explained in details the research design adopted in the study. The chapter also 
discussed the reasons for adopting both qualitative and quantitative methods in the study. It 
gives details information of the study area. The chapter simultaneously explained the study 
population, sampling techniques and sample size. In addition, the process involved in pilot 
study of the research instruments were clarified. The chapter also described the quantitative 
and qualitative methods of data collection adopted. Semi structured questionnaire designed 
from the research questions was used for the quantitative data collection while in-depth 
interview and key informant interview were adopted for the qualitative data collection. The 
chapter also discussed various procedures adopted for analysing the data collected. The 
challenges encountered by the research team in the cause of this study and the ways they were 
resolved were explained. The chapter also explained in detail the research ethics regarding the 
welfare of the study participants. Chapter 5 examines the policy framework of National Health 
Insurance Scheme in Nigeria.  
 
 
 
103 
 
CHAPTER FIVE 
 
 IMPLEMENTATION OF NATIONAL HEALTH INSURANCE SCHEME IN 
NIGERIA 
 
5.1  Introduction 
Chapter 5 presents a brief background that led to the emergence of NHIS. The chapter presents 
results of the key informant interview with the stakeholders namely NHIS officials, HMOs’ 
employees and HCPs using the three interrelated health financing functions. The three 
interrelated health financing functions provide a framework for the design and implementation 
of a social health financing model in order to improve and strengthen the health system for 
optimal resource use, adequate and sustainable fund generation and financial accessibility of 
health financing for all. 
 
5.2 Health Care Financing and the Emergence of NHIS in Nigeria 
 
Health care in Nigeria in the immediate post-independence was financed from general taxation. 
Health care and education took centre stage of government social services provisioning. The 
Nigerian government provided free universal access to health care for all, as health care 
services were available at government clinics and hospitals at no costs (Adesina, 2007b). 
Financial barrier to health care access was avoided; social spending on health was seen as social 
investment to enhance economic growth and development. Furthermore, Adesina (2009: 2) 
notes, “social spending on health was part of the wider objective of defeating the triad of 
ignorant, poverty and disease”. As a result, social democratic approach drives the nationalist 
ideological commitment to development whereby development in all areas were driven by 
primarily government without external interference. The result of this was positive relationship 
between health-related indices and economic growth in the first decade of post-independence 
Nigeria (Adesina, 2009). For example, the total population per medical doctor declined 
drastically from 73,710 to 15,740 between 1960 and 1975, Infant and under-five mortality per 
1,000 live births also declined from 50 in 1970 to 22 in 1979 (World Bank, 1980).   
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However, the global economic crisis of the 1980s had its worst hit on the developing countries. 
In Nigeria for example, the post-1980 was characterised by slow economic growth rate notably 
poor agricultural performance and decline in international petroleum prices, balance-of-
payment imbalances and fiscal crisis (World Bank, 1980; 1987; Helleiner, 1983), which in turn 
resulted in the deep cuts in social expenditure (Adesina, 2009). The health sector then began to 
receive less allocation from the federation account starting from the 1980s, though with subtle 
difference in the years before SAPs. For example, public health expenditure as percentage of 
the total government budget between 1981and 1989 were as follows: 2.0% in 1981; 1.6% in 
1982; 2.0% in 1983; 1.1% in 1984; 1.99% in 1985; 1.82% in 1988 and 1.50% in 1989 (Central 
Bank of Nigeria (CBN), 1983, 1985). In addition, health expenditure as a percentage of federal 
government spending dwindled from an average of 3.5% in the 1970s (World Bank, 1980), to 
below 2% in the 1980s and 1990s (Ogunbekun, et al., 1999; Obono, 2007). Moreover, public 
spending on health as a percentage of GDP was hovering in the successive years around 2%.  
 
Given the low growth rate in the economy and limited fiscal space experienced in the early 
1980s, the international financial institutions led by the World Bank and IMF introduced SAPs 
and its neo-liberal policies as conditions to accessing bailout loans for developing countries 
including Nigeria (Obasan 2013;Adesina, 2007a; Obono, 2007). Part of the conditions includes 
among others private participation in social services provisioning, introduction of user fees in 
government facilities, minimal government intervention in the economy and provision of social 
services. With the claim that there would be more money in the system through private 
participation and thus improve quality, and increase access to health services (World Bank, 
1987, 1993). In a contrary view, Adesina (2007b: 23) notes that this erroneous assumption and 
concept of SAPs manifested in ways: “One was to assume that there was a market in health 
care services to take care of the impact that the fiscal retrenchment of the state would create. 
The second was to assume as unproblematic, resources endowment for all the citizens for 
procuring their health care needs in the new marketplace; and the third was to assume that 
public resources spent subsidizing the citizens were a waste”. Neoliberal policies therefore 
were more ideological than reality in solving poor allocation to health care and increase 
revenue to in the sector (Adesina, 2007b). 
 
The institution of user fee or cost recovery mechanisms became prominent in the 1986 as neo-
liberal policies took centre stage in the social services provisioning, for instance, free health 
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services was abolished at state owned health facilities and user fee was introduced in the state 
clinics and hospitals, private health facilities were on the increase. The consequence of lack of 
subvention to public health facilities that solely depended on government includes poor 
hospital services, arbitrary increase in the costs of medical services, drug shortages and poor 
physical structures among others (Ogunbekun, et al. 1999). Payment for health care services 
was thus shifted from the state to the individual and households. In addition, there was a shift 
from curative care to primary health care in order to reduce costs in health care spending and 
inequalities in provision of health care. The primary health care initiative held in Bamako in 
1987 was to expand primary health care in the sub-Saharan Africa countries (Ogunbekun, et 
al., 1999). However, United Nation Children Education Funds (UNICEF) (1989) posits that 
the initiative was not only to expand health care delivery but a plan for self-sustaining primary 
health care in the sub-Saharan Africa countries through charges of basic essential drugs (drug 
revolving funds) and community financing mechanisms. This act contradicts the principle of 
solidarity that exist in the community prior to SAPs whereby a network of mutual support and 
obligation exist (Adesina, 2007b). Moreover, the burden of paying health care fell 
disproportionately on households, and resulted in severe decline in the Nigerian health indices 
(UNICEF, 1989; World Bank, 1987, 1993). Sixty percent of total health expenditure was from 
private sources by 1990 of which about 90% was from OOP payments (World Bank, 1993). 
Furthermore, studies show that user fee was counterproductive to individual and households 
especially over a long period time. These include self-treatment, taking significant proportion 
of household budget, delaying or not seeking treatment at all and seeking treatment from 
informal providers etc.  (Ogunbekun, et al., 2009; Sahn, et al., 2003; Mohindra, 2008). 
  
Arising from the failure of user fee to increase revenue, the World Bank, IMF and other 
international agencies that introduced user fee then resulted in rethinking an alternative funding 
for health care which would reduce households health expenditure, increase financial 
protection and recognition of government position in social services provisioning. Unlike user 
fee model where government role in health care provision was restricted, an alternative model 
that recognises government role and support in health care provisioning was advocated (World 
Bank, 1993, 1994; WHO, 2000). The international agencies therefore recognised the potency 
of risk sharing model especially social health insurance in the developing countries to stimulate 
four desirable components of health sector reform due to inadequate tax revenue to fund health 
care for all. These include one, SHI creates room for contributions from those who can afford 
106 
 
payment while government subsidises for the poor who cannot afford premiums rather than 
providing health care for all. Two, SHI frees up public funds available to be used for public 
goods and services such as immunisation, HIV/AIDS and vector control. Three, SHI would 
ensure government subsidy is shifted from the supply side to the demand side by separating 
the responsibilities of collecting and managing SHI financing from providing health services. 
SHI would therefore encourage outsourcing of services provision to providers that are separate 
entities in order to improve efficiency and quality of care. Finally, SHI ensures people access 
to health care by using non-governmental organisations and private providers through means 
of contracting (Hsaio and Shaw, 2007). Several developing countries including Nigeria 
therefore had begun to shift their financing policy towards SHI (WHO, 2010; Gilson and 
Mclntyre, 2005).  
 
In order to investigate the performance of the scheme’s programmes, the “three-health 
financing functions: revenue collection, risk pooling and purchasing/provision of the 
conceptual framework” posited by Carrin and James (2004: 20) (see chapter 3 for details) were 
used as a guide. The three-health financing functions determine the performance of health 
financing model using seven key health financing performance indicators such as “population 
coverage, method of financing, level of fragmentation, composition of risk, benefit package, 
providers payment mechanisms and administrative efficiency” (Carrin and James, 2004: 21).  
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Table 5.1.  Social Health Insurance Programmes in Nigeria 
Name of Programme   
 
 
Contribution 
Type 
 
Enrolees 
Contribution 
 
Employer 
Contribution 
 
Government/Don
or subsidies 
 
 
Pooling  
 
 
Identification  
Criterion 
 
Formal Sector Social 
Health Insurance 
Programmes 
a. Public sector 
 Federal 
 
 States 
 LGAs. 
 
b. Organised Private 
Sector 
 
c. Armed Forces, 
Police and other 
allied Forces 
 
 
d. Voluntary 
Individual 
Contributors 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fixed premium 
Fixed premium 
Fixed premium 
 
Fixed premium 
 
 
Fixed premium 
 
 
Fixed premium 
 
 
 
 
 
1.75% 
5% 
5% 
 
5% 
 
 
1.75% 
 
 
N15,000 
 
 
 
 
 
3.25% 
10% 
10% 
 
10% 
 
 
3.25% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Not specified 
Not specified 
Not specified 
 
Not applicable  
(N/A) 
 
Not specified 
 
 
N/A 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Public sector funds  
Public sector funds 
Public sector funds 
 
Public sector funds 
 
 
Public sector funds 
 
 
Special funds 
 
 
 
 
Civil servant 
Civil servant 
Civil servant 
 
Employer of 10 or 
more employees 
 
Armed Forces and 
other allied forces 
 
Self-employed 
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Informal Sector Social 
Health Insurance 
Programmes 
a. CBHIP 
 
 
b. Tertiary 
Institutions 
 
 
 
 
No fixed 
Premium 
 
Fixed premium 
 
 
 
 
Not fixed 
 
 
N2,000 
 
 
 
N/A 
 
 
 
 
Not specified 
 
 
Not specified 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CBHI funds 
 
 
Student funds 
 
 
 
Low income/Rural 
dwellers 
 
Student 
 
Vulnerable Groups Social 
Health Insurance 
Programmes 
a. Pregnant women 
 
b. Children under 
five 
 
c. Physically 
challenged 
persons 
 
d. Prison inmates 
 
e. Refuges, 
internally 
displaced persons 
etc. 
 
 
 
N/A 
 
N/A 
 
N/A 
 
 
N/A 
 
N/A 
 
 
 
 
 
N/A 
 
N/A 
 
N/A 
 
 
N/A 
 
N/A 
 
 
  
 
 
100% 
 
100% 
 
100% 
 
 
100% 
 
100% 
 
 
 
 
 
Vulnerable funds 
 
Vulnerable funds 
 
Vulnerable funds 
 
 
Vulnerable funds 
 
Vulnerable funds 
 
 
 
 
 
Vulnerable 
 
Vulnerable  
 
Vulnerable 
 
 
Vulnerable 
 
Vulnerable 
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5.3 Revenue Collection 
Revenue collection is one of the three related health financing functions. Under revenue collection, 
two health financing performance indicators namely level of population coverage and level of 
funding served as themes. Questions related to population coverage and method of financing were 
posed to the interviewees in order to elicit information on this subject.  
 
5.3.1 Level of Population Coverage 
 
Nigerian former president Chief Olusegun Obasanjo formally launched the formal sector 
programme of the NHIS in 2005, and thus, the population covered by the formal sector programme 
represents insignificant proportion of the Nigerian population (Odeyemi and Nixon, 2013). 
However, in order to increase population coverage and ensure universal access, the community 
based financing scheme was introduced in 2008 to increase coverage to the informal sector workers 
and the rural population that makes up 70% of the Nigerian population (Uzochukwu et al. 2016; 
Bamidele and Adebimpe, 2013). Despite the introduction of community based programme to 
increase population coverage, literature has shown that coverage is stuck to less than 3% of 
Nigerian population (Uzochukwu et al. 2016; Odeyemi and Nixon, 2013, Odeyemi, 2013; Obikeze 
et al. 2013). The Table 5.2 below shows that 2.3 Million people including their dependants were 
covered in the NHIS by 2015. 
 
Table 5.2 Enrolees registered with Health Maintenance Organisations 
No Health Maintenance Organisation Total 
Principal 
Counts 
Total 
Dependant 
Count 
Total Extra 
Dependant 
Count 
Total 
Beneficiary 
Count 
1 Hygeia 48,988 79,197 - 130,185 
2 Total Health Trust 58,751 106,388 - 165,139 
3 Clear Line Integrated Limited 50,884 97,221 - 148,105 
4 Health Care International Ltd 61,780 105,762 - 167,542 
5 Medi Plan Health Care Ltd 34,400 64,111 - 98,511 
6 Multishade Nig. Ltd 40,211 74,990 - 115,201 
7 United Health Care International 86,727 151,408 - 238,135 
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8 Premium Health Ltd 68,523 129,666 - 198,189 
9 Ronsberger Nig. Ltd 18,521 41,297 - 59,818 
10 International Health Management 24,891 58,555 - 83,446 
11 Expat Care Health International 28,727 57,578 - 86,305 
12 Songhai Health Trust 20,014 42,033 - 62,047 
13 Integrated Health Care 19,179 20,229 - 39,408 
14 Premium Medic Aid 36,201 70,709 - 106,910 
15 Manage Health Care Services 17,220 35,811 - 53,031 
16 Pristine Health 18,836 46,349 - 65,185 
17 Maayoit Health Care Ltd 18,381 39,480 - 57,861 
18 Wise Health  25,707 51,431 - 77,138 
19 Wetlands Health services 15,945 34,123 - 50,068 
20 Zenith Health Care Ltd 30,673 63,082 - 93,755 
21 Defence Health Maintenance Ltd 60,121 120,152 - 180,273 
22 United Comprehensive Health 17 6 - 23 
23 Health Care Security 1,379 3,839 - 5,218 
24 Royal Health Maintenance Services 2,762 5,452 - 8,214 
25 Arewa Health Maintenance Services 2,503 6,225 - 8,728 
26 Zuma Health Trust 1,763 2,592 - 4,355 
27 PrePaid Medicare Services 450 1,079 - 1,529 
28 Precious Health Care 4,405 7,899 - 12,307 
29 Oceanic Health Maintenance 211 312 - 523 
30 Complete Medicare Ltd 2,801 6,232 - 9,033 
31 Life Care HMO Ltd 88 219 - 307 
32 NonSuch Medicare Ltd 167 402 - 569 
33 Sahel Health Trust Ltd 283 687 - 970 
34 Prudent Health Care Management 1 3 - 4 
35 Ultimate Health Maintenance Services 1,226 2,108 - 3,334 
 Total  802,738 1,546,697  2,329,435 
Source: NHIS, 2015 
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5.3.2  Level of funding 
 According to NHIS operational guidelines as depicted in figure 5.1 above, enrolees, employers 
and government/donors are committed to different financial obligations. Each of the three 
categories is expected to make its financial contribution for effective operation of the scheme. The 
researchers engage the key informants on the level of financial commitment of government, 
employers and enrols to the scheme. In the case of government, many opinions exist among the 
interviewees on its financial commitment as both employer and governing authority. It was 
revealed that government as an employer subsidises up to 90% of employee’s health care costs. 
An interviewee explained that: 
 
“I think the federal government is more committed to enrolees who are its 
employees than others. Government as an employer of labour is required to pay 
3.25% for each of its employee; however, as I speak, that plan has not happened. I 
learnt that, the Nigerian Labour Congress is not in agreement with the government 
on pay roll deduction. The labour congress disagreed on the ground that there are 
several deductions being made on the salaries of its members already and what is 
left cannot take care of their basic needs therefore the union resisted the plan to 
make deduction for NHIS. Consequently, the federal government decided to 
subsidise the medical bill for each of her employee who has enrolled in the NHIS 
up to 90% while the enrol pays 10% as co-payment. On the other hand, there is no 
such extent of robust subsidies to other programmes” (KII, an NHIS official, 6 
June 2015). 
 
Another interviewee corroborated the above view:  
 
“Government as an employer of labour ensures its employees who joined the 
scheme are protected from a huge financial cost of health care services. They are 
highly subsidised from the incurred health care cost” (KII, an NHIS official, 6 
July 2015). 
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For Government role as a governing authority of the scheme, a number of views were expressed 
in the interview such as inadequate and inequitable financial commitment, and delay in 
government financial commitment to the programme. An interviewee noted that: 
 
“Government financial commitment to the scheme is inadequate. It is only meant 
for those who have enrolled. Once you register, you are qualified for certain 
subsidy; however, someone who is not an enrolee does not benefit from the subsidy. 
For example, majority of Nigerians who are not members of the scheme because 
they cannot afford premiums are denied the benefits” (KII, an NHIS official, 6 
June 2015). 
 
Another interviewee substantiated the above view:   
 
“Only the enrolees benefit from the programme and their numbers represent an 
insignificant proportion of Nigerian population. Although Government has made 
financial commitment to ensure all Nigerians are covered with basic health care as 
stated in the NHIS Act, there is delay in the implementation. For example, Article 
11 of the National Health Act (2014) made provision for Basic Healthcare 
Provision Fund whereby 1% of Consolidated Revenue Fund will be disbursed 
among others for Basic Minimum Health Package for all Nigerians through the 
NHIS, but we are still waiting for the implementation of this Provision”(KII, an 
NHIS official, 7 June 2015). 
 
In the case of financial commitment from others such as enrolees and employers (private 
Organisations), the interviewees noted that financial contribution could be through either payroll 
deduction or individual contribution. The private organisations that have insured their employees 
in the NHIS pay their contributions on regular basis. The employer contributes 10% whereas the 
employee contributes 5% making 15% of the employee basic salary. For the voluntary individual 
enrolee; however, the interviewees noted that the 15,000 thousand naira per individual still stands 
and it could be paid in instalment on monthly basis or once per annum. It was further noted in the 
interview that the contribution from CBHIP is not fixed; it varies from one to the other and as 
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determined by the BOT. However, it was noted that contributions to the scheme is progressive on 
one hand for the formal sector programme because contribution is proportional to their income, 
and on the other hand, it is regressive for the voluntary individual sector because it is based on 
fixed premium method. An interviewee explained that: 
 
“Contribution is very important to the sustenance of NHIS because it is the primary 
source of funding of SHI. In the case of employees, they are usually in the form of 
a wage-related contribution, often paid in part by the employers. On the other hand, 
In the case of the self-employed, they can be flat-rated or income-rated. Income-
rated contributions are preferable to flat-rate contributions on equity grounds, as 
those with a higher income will accordingly pay higher contributions and 
contributions are based more on ability to pay than in a flat-rate design”(KII, an 
NHIS official, 7 June 2015). 
 
Further investigation shows that financing NHIS through contributions from the enrolees alone is 
not generating sufficient resources for the scheme. Indeed, the poor, student, unemployed and 
retired persons among others also need coverage. These contributions from the enrolees are 
complemented in a number of ways. “As noted earlier, the main supplementary source of funds 
usually comes from government funding like the Consolidated Revenue Fund. These can secure 
affordability of health care to a greater number of people who otherwise cannot afford 
contributions. It also contribute to improved equity in the setting of contributions” (KII, an NHIS 
official, 7 June 2015). 
 
From the above statements, it can be deduced that contributions are the primary source of NHIS. 
However, it is not generating sufficient resources for the sustenance of the scheme. Like in most 
countries operating SHI model, supplementary funding usually from government comes from 
general taxation earmarked tax etc. in order to ensure fair distribution of health care services among 
the people and to ensure sustenance of the scheme. 
5.4  Risk pooling 
Risk pooling is the second health financing functions. It refers to “spreading of risk among 
members of a pool and offer greater protection against high cost health expenditures which then 
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leads to financial accessibility of health services” (Carrin and James, 2004: 29). Under risk 
pooling, discussions were focused on level of fragmentation and composition of risk pools in the 
scheme. Risk pooling is crucial to a health financing system because it allows redistribution of 
funds among pools: from low risk pools to high-risk pools which in turn pave the way for financial 
protection of members of different pools. Risk pooling remains the hallmark of social health 
insurance. It increases people access to health care with less consideration of their financial 
capacity.  
 
5.4.1  Level of Fragmentation 
On the level of fragmentation within the NHIS, the interviewees revealed that the scheme is 
fragmented into different programmes such as formal sector programme, voluntary individual 
programme, students programme, community-based programme and vulnerable group programme 
etc. However, they stressed that there is no risk pool within the existing programmes. An 
interviewee noted that: 
 
“The scheme has many programmes especially in the CBHIP with each covering 
specific group of people who are related by both or either socioeconomic or 
geographical factors. In fact, each of these programmes are made up of small 
population as members are characterised by low-income earners and thus lack 
capacity to pool funds” (KII, an NHIS official, 7 June 2015) 
 
5.4.2 Composition of Risk Pool 
The basic principle of SHI is that contributions are not risk-related but rather based on ability to 
pay and result in equitable access to health care services among people of the same pool 
irrespective of individual financial contributions. The interviewees were engaged on the reason(s) 
why there is no risk pool in the scheme. It was revealed that membership to the scheme is 
voluntary; therefore, nobody is compelled by law to join and thus this affects the scheme in terms 
of capacity to make up a pool. Government encourages people through subsidy to join the 
programme. An interviewee explained that:  
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“…even membership for the civil servants is voluntary, subsidy is only used 
as incentive and to encourage people to join the scheme. In fact, the scheme 
was established on a voluntary basis. There is no provision of the Act where 
people are compelled to join. This is the main reason for lack of composition 
of risk pool in the scheme, though the common principle in social health 
insurance is that the size of a risk pool determines the financial flow and 
protection of its members” (KII, an NHIS official, 7 June 2015). 
 
The non-compulsory nature of membership affects the composition of risk pools of the scheme. It 
was explained in the interview that because NHIS Act did not make it compulsory for anyone to 
join the scheme, the number of people in the scheme remains stuck to less than 3% of the Nigerian 
population, and thus affects the composition of risk pool. In addition, the problem of attrition is a 
recurrent issue of the scheme. People withdraw from the scheme at any time due to one problem 
or the other including inability to continue payment of contribution. An interviewee explained that: 
 
“The sustainability of the scheme remains unclear because there is no 
substantial risk pool available, even within the formal sector programme 
government has been heavily involved in the financing of the scheme both 
as employer and governing authority. The labour unions did not support 
deduction from their members’ salary towards the scheme. In fact, it 
remains unclear the sustainability of the programme without the support of 
the labour force” (KII, an NHIS official, 7 June 2015). 
 
From the above statements, it can be deduced that NHIS is fragmented with several programmes 
such as Civil servants, private sector employees, urban self-employed etc. with no risk pool 
existing within the scheme. Voluntary membership was identified as the main reason for lack of 
capacity to have a risk pool in the scheme. Countries with successful SHI programmes, build on 
redistribution of risk among pools. However, lack of risk pool in NHIS contradicts the principle 
SHI that entails redistribution of funds among pools: from low risk pools to high-risk pools which 
in turn pave the way for financial protection of members of different pools. 
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5.5  Purchasing/Provision 
Purchasing/ Provision is the third health financing functions that is instrumental not only to the 
principle of health financing but also to the achievement of the objective of universal coverage. 
Purchasing entails benefit package, providers’ payment mechanisms and administrative efficiency, 
which results in optimal use of resources. 
 
5.5.1  Benefit Package  
 
The pooled contributions in a SHI scheme is usually used to purchase health care package for all 
insured members as stipulated in the agreement between an insurance system and the providers at 
all levels of the health care system. The researcher therefore engaged the interviewees on the 
benefit packages available to various programmes in the scheme and the extent to which funding 
helps members to access health care services. It was revealed in the interview that different benefit 
packages exist for different programmes, though there is similarity in terms of basic or essential 
health care services across programmes that reflects prophylactic and therapeutic components of 
health care services but to a limited range in some programmes. An interviewee explained that: 
 
“The benefit packages have similarities for the basic essential services in 
the case of the formal sector and individual contributors’ programmes but 
with difference when compared to other types of programmes such as 
community-based insurance and the tertiary insurance programmes. The 
enrolees for the formal sector programme have access to primary, secondary 
and tertiary health care while community programme is restricted to 
primary and secondary health care services. The programme in which one 
belongs determines access to health services” (KII, an NHIS official, 7 
June 2015). 
 
An HCP explained that:  
 
“I think the basic services cut across board but when it comes to specialist 
care, some programmes are excluded because of their financial strength. 
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The financial strength of some programmes cannot afford them beyond 
basic and priority package” (KII, an HCP, 11 July 2015). 
 
When asked the reasons for the variation in the benefit packages, it was revealed that it is likely 
based on the composition of various programmes in terms of the socioeconomic status of members 
and their ability to pay. It was also explained in the discussion that the whole health package for 
the scheme is not comprehensive because some essential health care services are not included such 
as treatment for people with chronic disease, occupational related injury, infertility related problem 
etc. Members can only access health care services available in the health care package available 
for their plans. For example, access to benefit package by primary health care providers cut across 
all programmes. These include access to curative services and common ailments such as minor 
wounds, treatment of malaria, diarrhoeal disease, and education for control and prevention of 
health problem etc. However, the secondary and tertiary health care providers offer specialised 
services to patient based on referral from the primary health care through the HMOs. The services 
include complex cases that cannot be treated at the primary level such as surgical procedures; 
specialist consultation, pharmacy services, diagnostic laboratory services etc. 
 
The extent to which funding from government helps members to access health care were raised in 
the discussions. Interviewees explained that the sustainability of the scheme greatly rests on the 
shoulder of the government. An interviewee noted that: 
 
“The cost of health care expenditures to many households is huge and 
without subsidy from the governments many would not be able to access 
health care. Even with subsidy, we still have some cases where people 
dropped out because they could not continue with the contribution. 
Therefore, subsidy plays an important role not only by reducing the 
financial health expenditures of enrolees but also by sustaining the scheme” 
(KII, an HCP, 11 July 2015). 
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Furthermore, in the discussion, the interviewees explained that many enrolees remained in the 
scheme because of the financial assistance from the government. It is important to note that the 
financial assistance from the government is only available to the enrolees. 
 
5.5.2 Payment Mechanism for Providers 
The NHIS accredited providers are required to deliver specified health care services to NHIS 
enrolees. Providers’ payments mechanism for services provided for the enrolees is crucial to 
ensure financial protection of the issued members. The researcher engaged the interviewees on the 
nature of contract between the providers and the HMOs, the methods of payment for their services 
and the extent to which this influence equity and efficiency of services. The interviewees explained 
that HMOs sign contract with the accredited providers in order to render stipulated health services 
to the enrolees. The contract is subject to renewal based on the terms and conditions of the contract. 
Moreover, the mode of reimbursement for providers’ services is a blended payment of capitation 
and co-payment for services rendered to the enrolees. An HMO pays capitation a form of salary 
on a monthly basis to individual providers or health care facilities for the services they rendered 
to the enrolees within that HMO. In addition, co-payment is also used as part of reimbursement of 
providers’ services. An interviewee explained that: 
 
“Capitation is the principal mode of paying providers under the NHIS for 
basic health care services. In addition, co-payment of 5% to 10% is often 
required from the enrolees as consultation fee” (KII, an HCP, 11 July 
2015). 
 
It was noted that the intent of co-payments at the point of service delivery was to discourage patient 
from excessive request for services because people with insurance coverage are more likely to use 
services excessively than when they are not covered under insurance. However, co-payment in the 
form of cost sharing is not the main source of reimbursement to providers but rather a part of the 
reimbursement plans. On whether capitation as a mode of payment positively influence providers’ 
behaviour and reflects efficiency and equity of services to the beneficiaries. The interviewees 
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explained that capitation is one of the methods widely used for paying providers for their services. 
Like other methods of payment, it has its own strengths and weaknesses. One of the strengths of 
capitation is to contain costs by encouraging health providers to provide efficiently a set of services 
for the assigned enrolees. On the other hand, the weaknesses include among others 
underproduction of services because health care providers are short-changed for the quantity of 
health services rendered to the enrolees; they are likely to reduce the services to the enrolees, and 
thus attracted by financial incentive to care more for fee-for-service patients. Health care providers 
however explained in the interview that often times there is unnecessary delay in the payment of 
capitation and reimbursement for their services. They complained that at times they go through a 
rigorous claim process before they are reimbursed by the HMOs. A health care provider explained 
that: 
 
“Capitation is internationally recognised as a method of provider payments 
under health insurance system and it is a good method. Nevertheless, low 
capitation and delay in payment by the HMOs remains a serious challenge 
to the scheme. Many at times we have to wait for so long before we are paid 
for services rendered to the enrolees. In addition, the capitation is very small 
given the inflation rate and the cost of medical equipment in the country. Of 
course, this affects providers’ behaviour towards NHIS patients because 
there is that notion that even after rendering services to the enrolees and 
being reimbursed might be delayed” (KII, an HCP, 11 July 2015). 
 
However, on the discussion with the HMOs about the complaints of providers on the delay in 
payments or claims after rendering services to the enrolees, they argued that there is no 
unnecessary delay in ensuring that the providers are duly paid as at when due, but there is 
bureaucratic process that must be followed before payment. The administrative processes include 
among others verification of the claimant documents, routine check on the accredited providers 
and monitoring of patients, that is, the enrolees to confirm that they received the said treatment 
before payments are made. However, it is worth noting that process for provider payment remains 
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contentious between providers and HMOs. Both providers and HMOs stand on different point of 
views regarding the payment processes.  
 
On the discussion on whether provider payment affect efficiency and equity, an interviewee 
explained that the mode of provider payment in NHIS determines provider efficiency and equity. 
“It is possible for a provider to maintain less efficiency in exchange for a greater degree of equity, 
depending on the incentive available to the provider. However, in the case of NHIS enrolees, 
personally,  I make sure that I strike a balance between efficiency and equity, and thus, the enrolees 
are given the necessary services as specified in the contract agreement” (KII, an HCP, 13 July 
2015).Similar trend applies to other providers in the interview. They explained that they are 
committed to providing health care services to the enrolees as stipulated in the contract agreement. 
 
5.6 Administration and Management Efficiency 
Administrative efficiency of the NHIS is important because it determines the overall performance 
of the scheme based on its day-to-day activities. The interviewees were engaged in the discussion 
on administrative costs of planning and management of the scheme in terms of revenue collection, 
handling of claims and referral system. It was revealed in the interview that administrative costs 
of the scheme is huge but the aggregate percentage of expenditure on administrative costs could 
not be ascertained. However, conflicting opinions exit among the interviewees on administrative 
efficiency. On one hand, an HMO employee explained that:  
 
“The administrative costs is not something that can be easily determined 
because of different stakeholders involved in the day-to-day activities of the 
scheme. For example, the administrative cost of an HMO differs from 
another HMO which include overhead cost such as payment of staff salary, 
maintenance of utility vehicles, payment of rent, buying of stationery etc., 
However, in terms of efficiency, I think the HMOs are trying their best. We 
need to follow the normal protocol to ensure providers are paid their claims 
as at when due and ensure our clients get the best health services and if 
referral is needed they are referred immediately. There are procedures we 
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must follow in all these things to ensure things are done properly” (KII, 
Ronsberger, 8 July 2015). 
 
On the other hand, health care providers in the interview argued that there is administrative 
inefficiency in reference to delay in reimbursement of providers and referral of patients. A provider 
explained that: 
 
“In term of administration, I think there is still more to be done given the 
unnecessary delay in the processing of claims by the HMOs. Many issues 
have come up on these bureaucratic bottleneck involved in the processing 
of claims. I think the HMOs need to improve on their administrative 
procedure in terms of payment on referral cases and capitation. Once their 
clients are given the necessary health services and the required documents 
are forwarded payment should not be a problem” (KII, an HCP, 13 July 
2015). 
 
The overall administrative costs of the scheme could not be determined in the interview. However, 
the administrative procedure involved in the reimbursement of providers remain contentious. On 
the management efficiency, a number of factors were considered as management inadequacy, 
which in turn affect the achievement of the scheme objectives. 
 
5.6.1  Policy Content 
A well-designed policy framework is critical to the implementation and achievement of the set 
target of a social health insurance, which is universal coverage. However, deficiency in the policy 
framework could affect the achievement of the set target. The researcher therefore engaged the 
interviewees in the discussion on issues related to the policy content and process in reference to 
the set objectives and overall goal of universal coverage. The policy content of the NHIS Act was 
criticised in the interview. The interviewees noted that NHIS law remain as the main hindrance to 
the scaling up of population coverage in Nigeria. It was further explained that some provisions of 
the Act contributed to the current slow rate of population coverage in the country. An NHIS official 
explained that:  
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“The wording of the Act is the main problem affecting the scheme from achieving 
its set target. For example, section 16(1) of Act says, “An employer who has a 
minimum often employees may, together with every person in his employment, 
pay contributions under the scheme, at such rate and in such manner as may be 
determined, from time to time, by the Council”. The word ‘may’ means ‘wish’. 
Those who desire to join the scheme should join. In other words, joining is not by 
force, it is voluntary. I think there is need for amendment of the Act… before 
positive change in the population coverage will begin to take place” (KII, an NHIS 
official, 6 June 2015). 
 
In an interview with a HMOs employee, she explained that: 
  
“In my own opinion, although, the scheme has the potential to provide health care 
services to all Nigerians and remain a major driving tool for achieving universal 
health coverage; however, the factor mitigating against the wider coverage of the 
scheme has to do with the Act that instituted the scheme. When the government 
introduced pension scheme in this country…it made it mandatory for every 
employee to participate. However, NHIS was made optional. Many public and 
private enterprises have no health insurance for their employees because the law 
did not mandate them to do so. In that regards, government cannot achieve anything 
tangible the way the scheme is going except there is amendment of the law” (KII, 
an employee of HMO, 8 June 2015). 
 
Furthermore, a health care provider also had similar stance on the point raised by other interviewee 
he explained that, “how can the government say it is committed to securing universal coverage for 
all Nigerians when other tiers of government are not involved? That is the problem with NHIS. 
The states and local governments are not part of the scheme; even those that showed interest among 
them sometimes ago are yet to take part in the programme. In addition, government said 
membership is mandatory for the federal civil servants, but this is not backed by law, as I speak 
not all have enrolled in the scheme. So how can we achieve universal coverage in such manner?” 
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(KII, HCP, 11 July 2015). Referring to the NHIS Act, the interviewees explained that the contents 
of the Act is not properly phrased and this has affected the implementation of the scheme. 
However, they call for amendment of the Act in order to rectify the points raised in the discussion 
and to accommodate every Nigerians. In the discussion, another important point raised was 
government commitment. The interviewees explained that government financial commitment to 
the scheme is inadequate. It was noted that government subsidy was only meant for the enrolees 
while those who are not enrolled because they could not afford the minimum contribution were 
excluded from the scheme. A health care provider noted, “The scheme at the moment is restrictive 
to those who can afford contribution while ignoring most deserving least-privileged people who 
cannot pay the required subscription. This act shows misconception of the nature and principle of 
social health insurance whereby everyone is involved irrespective of ability to pay. In addition, it 
also contravened the NHIS Act because it was stated in the Act that the scheme is committed to 
ensure every Nigerian have access to good health care services” (KII, HCP, 11 July 2015).  
 
In addition to lack of government commitment to the programme, inadequate mobilisation 
campaign was also raised in the interview. The extent of any government sponsored programme 
that dependent on direct financial contribution from the population hinges on rigorous campaign 
in order to gather support from the population. However, the scheme is lacking in this regard. A 
health care provider explained, “Many Nigerians may have heard of the scheme but lack 
knowledge of its operation and also many still do not understand how the scheme works in 
reference to risk pooling and cost sharing even among the insured. Therefore, I think government 
is not doing enough to enlighten people about the scheme” (KII, HCP, 13 July 2015). 
Furthermore, the interviewee explained that although the incremental approach adopted by the 
government is not a bad idea, the modus operandi adopted is defective given the fact that the 
scheme started with the formal sector programme with few-targeted population instead of the 
informal sector programme that has the larger population of the country. It was further noted that 
progressive universalism that initially targeted the poor by exempting them from contribution 
tends to fast track the achievement of universal coverage than the one that at the outset targets the 
non-poor as this tends to slow down the achievement of universal coverage and of course, this is 
the case of Nigeria.  
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5.7  Conclusion 
 This chapter explored the three-health-financing functions namely revenue collection, risk 
pooling and purchasing among NHIS stakeholders including NHIS officials, HMOs employees 
and health care providers. The three health financing functions were examined under eight themes 
namely population coverage, method of financing, level of fragmentation, composition of risk, 
benefit package, provider payment mechanism, administrative and management efficiency. The 
findings indicate NHIS is heavily subsidised by the government because of the insufficient revenue 
generated through enrolees’ contributions and co-payments to the total costs of health care 
benefits. The contributions represent a fraction of what enrolees spent on health care. Therefore, 
every enrolee receives a subsidy from the government to limit the direct financing burden of health 
care costs, though the percentage of the subsidy varies from one programme to the other. 
Furthermore, NHIS is fragmented with a number of programmes exist in the scheme such as formal 
sector programme, voluntary individual programme, students programme, community-based 
programme, vulnerable group programme etc. with no risk pool in existence. Enrolees are entitled 
to a benefit package as specified in their programmes, though the basic health package – under the 
primary health care providers cut across all packages, referral system from the secondary and 
tertiary levels of care hinges on HMOs approval or pre-authorisation. 
 
Furthermore, the scheme is confronted with administrative and management challenges.  These 
include poor referral of patients and providers reimbursement system. In addition, the phrasing of 
the Act coupled with non-compulsory nature of the scheme, inadequate and delay government 
financial commitment, and inadequate mobilisation campaign among others were identified as 
challenges hindering scaling up of population coverage and the achievement of universal coverage 
in Nigeria.  It is worth noting that for NHIS to achieve it set objectives there must be adequate 
financial resources for the sustainability of the programme, adequate risk pooling and purchasing 
and strong institutional capacity.  
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CHAPTER SIX 
 
FINANCIAL CONTRIBUTION AND HEALTH BENEFITS AMONG ENROLEES OF 
THE NATIONAL HEALTH INSURANCE SCHEME 
 
 
6.1  Introduction 
 
Chapter 6 discusses the socio-demographic characteristics of the respondents in Oyo state Nigeria. 
It assesses the extent to which financial contribution of the respondents determines their health 
benefits. Questions regarding financial contribution and health care services were assessed in this 
chapter in order to establish the extent of equity in terms of contribution and benefits among the 
respondents. However, the chapter begins with the assessment of the socio-demographic 
characteristics of the respondents and then move to issues related to financial contribution and 
health benefits, which in turn determines the equity level among the enrolees.  
 
6.2. Socio-Demographic Characteristics of the Respondents 
The socio-demographic characteristic of the respondents namely enrolees and non-enrolees were 
discussed in this section. The section discusses percentage distributions of the enrolees first, and 
then followed by the non-enrolees. 
 
Table 6.1: Percentage Distribution of Respondents by Socio-demographic Characteristics 
Variables 
Enrolees 
(no =1342) 
Non-enrolees 
(no =376) 
Gender   
Male 719 (53.6%) 207 (55.1%) 
Female 623 (46.4%) 169 (45.1%) 
Age   
18 – 20 0 (0%) 37 (9.8%) 
21 – 25 52 (3.9%) 42 (11.2%) 
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26 – 30 149 (11.1%) 101 (26.9%) 
31 – 35 231 (17.2%) 88 (23.3%) 
36 – 40 376(28.0%) 50 (13.3%) 
41 – 45 163 (12.1%) 30 (8.0%) 
46 – 50 210 (15.6%) 22 (5.9%) 
>51 161 (12.0%) 6 (1.6%) 
Marital Status   
Married 898 (66.9%) 224(64.9%) 
Single 256 (19.1) 64 (17.0%) 
Divorced 74 (5.5%) 49 (13.0%) 
Separated 86 (6.4%) 18 (4.8%) 
Widowed 28 (2.1%) 1 (0.3%) 
Education   
No formal education 0 (0%) 10 (2.7%) 
Primary Cert 15 (1.1%) 19 (5.1%) 
Secondary Cert 90 (6.7%) 121 (32.2%) 
OND/NCE 167 (12.4%) 104 (27.7%) 
HND/First degree 732 (54.5%) 75 (19.9%) 
Post Graduate 338 (25.2%) 47 (12.5%) 
Religion   
Tradition 34 (2.5%) 52 (13.8%) 
Islam 512 (38.2%) 161 (42.8%) 
Christianity 743 (55.4%) 151 (40.2%) 
Others 53 (3.9%) 12 (3.2%) 
Income Per Month   
<10,000 Naira 64 (10.8%) 41 (10.9%) 
10,100 - 30,000 179 (13.3%) 203 (54.0%) 
30,100 - 50,000 250 (18.6%) 101 (26.9%) 
50,100 - 70,000 266 (19.8%) 15 (4.0%) 
70,100 - 90,000 221 (16.5%) 7 (1.9%) 
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90,100 - 110,000 192 (14.3%) 5 (1.3%) 
>110,000 170 (12.7%) 4 (1.1%) 
Occupation   
Civil Servant 962 (71.7%) 68 (18.1%) 
Self-employed 139 (10.4%) 283 (75.3%) 
Private Sec Employee 241 (18.0%) 25 (6.6%) 
Ethnicity   
Yoruba 961 (71.6%) 263 (69.9%) 
Hausa 89 (6.6%) 15 (4.0%) 
Igbo 231(17.2%) 89 (23.7%) 
Others 61 (4.5%) 9 (2.4%) 
Source: Fieldwork, 2015 
 
From table 6.1 above, male respondents among the enrolees were 719 (53.6%) while female were 
623 (46.4%). This indicates that there were more males in the study than females. Age distribution 
of the respondents indicates that none was below the age of 20 years. However, 52 (3.9%) were 
between the age of 21 – 25. In addition, 149 (11.1%) were within the age range of 26 – 30. 231 
(17.2%) were within the age range of 31 – 35. 376 (28.0%) were within the age range of 36 – 40. 
163 (12.1%) were within the age range of 41 – 45. 210 (15.6%) were within the age range of 46 – 
50. 161 (12.0%) were 51years and above.  
 
The marital status of the respondents indicates that those who were married were 898 (66.9%). 
Single were 256 (19.1%). Seventy-four (5.5%) were divorced, 86 (6.4%) were separated while 28 
(2.1%) were widowed. The implication of this is that majority of the respondents were married in 
the study. Furthermore, from the assessment of the educational status of the respondents, none had 
no formal education. Fifteen (1.1%) had primary education, 90 (6.7%) had secondary education 
while 167 (12.4%) had either OND or NCE. In addition, 732 (54.5%) had either HND or First 
degree, 338 (25.2%) had post-graduate degree. This shows that all the respondents had formal 
education, though with different levels of education.  
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The respondents distribution also indicates that 743 (55.4%) of the respondents practiced 
Christianity, 512 (38.2%) practiced Islam. In addition, 53 (3.9%) practiced other religions while 
34 (2.5%) practiced Traditional religion. Moreover, the income of the respondents varies 
markedly. Sixty-four respondents (10.8%) earned less than 10,000 naira ($50.2) monthly, 179 
(13.3%) earned between 10,100 - 30,000 naira ($50.7 and $150.7). In addition, 250 (18.6%) 
respondents earned within the range of 30,100 - 50,000 naira ($151.2 and $251.2), 266 (19.8%) 
respondents earned between 50,100 - 70,000 naira ($251.7 and $351.7), 221 (16.5%) respondents 
income ranged between 70,100 - 90,000 naira ($352.2 and $452.2). Moreover, 192 (14.3%) 
respondents earned 90,100 - 110,000 naira ($452.7 and $552.7). Only 170 (12.7%) respondents 
earned above 110,000 naira (above $552.7). It is important to note that exchange rate was 199 
naira to one US dollar as at April 2015 during data collection. 
 
From the assessment of the occupational status of the respondents, 962 (71.7%) were civil servants, 
241 (18.0%) were private sector employee while 139 (10.4%) were self-employed. Furthermore, 
the ethnicity of the respondents indicates that 961 (71.6%) were Yoruba, 231(17.2%) were Igbo, 
89 (6.6%) were Hausa while 61 (4.5%) were others.  
 
However, the percentage distribution of the respondents (non-enrolees) indicate that 207 (55.1%) 
were male while 169 (45.1%) were female. This indicates male are more in the study than the 
female. The age distribution shows that 37 (9.8%) were within the age range of 18 – 20, 42 (11.2%) 
were within the age range of 21 – 25, 101 (26.9%) were within the age range of 26 – 30, 88 (23.3%) 
were within the age range of 31 – 35, 50 (13.3%) were within the age range of 36 – 40. In addition, 
30 (8.0%) were within the age range of 41 – 45, 22 (5.9%) were within the age range of 46 – 50 
and 6 (1.6%) were 51 years and above. 
 
 The marital status of the respondents shows that 224 (64.9%) were married, 64 (17.0%) were 
single, 49 (13.0%) were divorced, 18 (4.8%) were separated; one (0.3%) was widowed. This shows 
that majority of the respondents were married. Moreover, the educational distribution of the 
respondents indicates that 10 (2.7%) had no formal education, 19 (5.1%) had primary education, 
121 (32.2%) had secondary education, 104 (27.7%) had either OND or NCE, 75 (19.9%) had either 
Higher National Diploma or First degree, 47 (12.5%) had post-graduate qualification. The religion 
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distribution of the respondents shows that 52 (13.8%) practiced Traditional religion, 161 (42.8%) 
practiced Islam, 151 (40.2%) practiced Christianity, 12 (3.2%) practiced other religions.  
 
The income distribution of the respondents shows that 41 (10.9%) earned less than 10,000 naira; 
203 (54.0%) earned between 10,100 - 30,000 naira; 101 (26.9%) earned between 30,100 - 50,000 
naira; 15 (4.0%) earned between 50,100 - 70,000 naira; seven (1.9%) earned 70,100 - 90,000 naira; 
five (1.3%) earned between 90,100 - 110,000 naira and four (1.1%) earned 110,000 naira and 
above. The occupational distribution of the respondents shows that 68 (18.1%) were civil servants, 
283 (75.3%) were self-employed and 25 (6.6%) were private sector employees. Moreover, the 
ethnic distribution shows that 263 (69.9%) were Yoruba, 15 (4.0%) were Hausa, 89 (23.7%) were 
Igbo, and nine (2.4%) were others.  
 
The result on the socio-demographic characteristics of the respondents shows that majority of the 
enrolees 719 (53.6%) and non-enrolees 207 (55.1%) were male. In terms of age, greater number 
of the enrolees 376(28.0%) were between the age of 36 – 40 while majority of the non-enrolees 
101 (26.9%) were between the age of 26 – 30. The implication of this is that young people are 
more dispose to this study and issues related to NHIS. On marital status, majority of the 
respondents both enrolees 898 (66.9%) and non-enrolees 224(64.9%) were married. On education, 
greater number of the enrolees 732 (54.5%) were either HND or First-degree holder while for the 
non-enrolees, majority 121 (32.2%) had secondary school certificate, only 10 (2.7%) had no formal 
education. This shows that most of the respondents were educated.  On religion, greater number 
of the enrolees 743 (55.4%) were Christians. On the other hand, greater number of the non-enrolees 
161 (42.8%) were Muslims. This indicates that Christianity and Islam were the two main religions 
in the area. Only few respondents practiced traditional religion and other types of religions.   
 
On income, most of the enrolees 161 (42.8%) earned between 50,100 - 70,000 naira monthly 
compare to the non-enrolees with majority 203 (54.0%) earned between 10,100 - 30,000 naira 
monthly. This indicates that enrolees were in favourable conditions in terms of socio-economic 
status than the non-enrolees were. This agrees with the findings of Gu and Tang (1995) that higher 
quintile are disposed to accessing health care than the lower quintile in China. In terms of 
respondents’ occupation, while majority of the enrolees 962 (71.7%) were civil servants (federal 
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employees), for the non-enrolees, majority 283 (75.3%) were self-employed. This shows that civil 
servants are the most beneficiary of the scheme. This could also be attributed to the fact that the 
scheme started with the federal employees (NHIS, 2009) and therefore, the federal civil servants 
are the major enrolees in the Oyo state while the state government is yet to be part of the 
programme. On ethnicity, most respondents for both enrolees 961 (71.6%) and non-enrolees 263 
(69.9%) were Yoruba. This is because the study was carried out in Oyo state where Yoruba is the 
dominant ethnic group.  
 
6.3  Enrolees Method of Financial Contribution  
 
Health care financing in Nigeria is a mixed method of user charges, government funding, insurance 
and donor assistance with user charges accounting for more than two-thirds of the total spending . 
However, NHIS was established to replace user charges and give people more financial protection 
from health care expenditures. NHIS is financed by revenue generation from members, employers, 
government and donor assistance. Revenue generation could be by prepayment or co-payment. 
Prepayment is always preferred because it is a precondition of risk pooling among members and 
offers better protection against health care costs while co-payments serve as additional revenue 
generation. In addition, the level of prepayment shows how accessible the health package of a SHI 
scheme will be.  In other words, the extent of a benefits package of a SHI scheme is contingent on 
the financial contribution. Table 6.2 shows respondents distribution by method of financial 
contribution to the scheme. 
 
Table 6.2 Percentage Distributions of Respondents by Method of Financial Contribution 
 
Method of Contribution Frequency Percentage 
Prepayment 479 35.7% 
Co-payment 863 64.3% 
Total 1342 100% 
Source: Fieldwork, 2015   
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Table 6.2 above indicates that majority of the respondents 863 (64.3%) made their contribution to 
the scheme through co-payment while 479 (35.7%) contributed by prepayment. This shows that 
co-payment instead of prepayment is largely used among respondents as a means of financial 
contribution to the scheme. The federal civil servants constituted the highest percentage of the 
respondents in the study in that they expressed in the interview that they are yet to commence 
prepayment because of lack of agreement between the labour union congress and NHIS on payroll 
deduction. Consequently, this action has stalled prepayment by this group to the scheme. An 
enrolled civil servant in the NHIS pays 10% as co-payments of the costs of the services per visit 
to health care providers. On the other hand, prepayment is predominantly used by other employees 
including private organisations employees and self-employed.  
 
Revenue generation through prepayment is recognised as a strategy to ensure financial protection 
of members of a SHI scheme because it gives room for redistribution of risks among members 
(Carrin and James, 2004). However, this study found that the federal civil servants that make up 
of the highest percentage of the enrolees are yet to commence prepayment to the scheme. “Co-
payments are not regarded as a ‘generator’ of resources for the scheme. Instead, the health care 
providers receive revenues generated from co-payments primarily to check moral hazard” (Carrin 
and James, 2004: 34). It is not a good method of financing health care in SHI. However, the 
primary source of financing a SHI system is contribution in the form of a wage-based contribution 
and tax funding; these are a relatively sustainable source of revenue for the scheme (Carrin, 2002; 
Carrin and James, 2004). 
 
 Furthermore, NHIS is required to protect members against huge financial expenditure that may 
arise from health care costs. Figure 6.2 shows the extent to which respondents agreed or disagreed 
with NHIS as a financial protection against catastrophic spending. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
132 
 
Figure 6.1 Percentage Distributions of Respondents by Financial Protection against Catastrophic 
Spending 
 
 
Source: Fieldwork, 2015 
 
Assessing respondents’ financial protection against catastrophic spending, figure 6.1 shows 789 
(58.8%) agreed that they were protected, 241 (18.0%) strongly agreed while 175 (13.0%) disagreed 
and 107 (8.0%) strongly disagreed. Only 30 (2.2%) were undecided. On the aggregate, majority 
of the respondents 1030 (76.8%) agreed, 282 (21.0%) disagreed while 30 (2.2%) remained 
undecided. Responses from the qualitative data supported these findings. Out of 30 respondents 
interviewed, five disagreed that they had financial protection against catastrophic spending while 
a good number (23) of them agreed in the discussion that they were protected from huge medical 
bills. Below are excerpts from the interview: 
 
“NHIS has really helped me and my family members. Though no one pray 
to be sick but once sickness comes, the first thing to think about is money. 
However, with NHIS I do not bother much on the financial aspect because 
NHIS will take care of most of the expenses. Sometime ago, I was sick and 
went to the hospital. Being an NHIS enrolee, I was not scared of my medical 
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bill because I was rest assured that NHIS will foot the bill” (IDI, male 
enrolees, 52 years Old, 8 June 2015). 
 
Other respondents explained that:  
 
“Last week my daughter was down with malaria and I took her to the 
hospital for treatment. When we got there, I only paid 10% of the medical 
bill and that is about 500 naira. Therefore, NHIS saved me 90% of the 
medical bill. I think NHIS is good because it saves people from uncertainty 
of health care expenditure. There is no way you can compare NHIS with 
out-of-pocket spending. With NHIS, you are certain of the amount to pay 
for health care but not so with out-of-pocket spending” (IDI, female 
enrolees, 48 years Old, 8 June 2015). 
 
NHIS has many benefits. In fact, I have really benefited a lot from the 
scheme. In terms of cost of medical bills, my family expenditure has 
reduced drastically since I joined the scheme two years ago. We do not 
always consider the cost of health care as a major issue in the family 
anymore. The money my family would have spent on medical expenses is 
now redistributed among other household needs such as children’ 
education, asset etc.” (IDI, female enrolee, 40 years Old, 9 June 2015). 
 
However, those with opposite view noted that the scheme did not do enough to protect them against 
catastrophic health expenditure. Reason being that they still pay out of pocket for essential care 
outside NHIS health package. In addition, their contributions outweigh the benefits because of the 
status of their health. Below are some of the responses from the respondents with conflicting 
notions about the scheme.   
 
“I have not derived any benefit from the scheme. Since I registered last year, 
my husband and I have not used the services because we hardly fall sick. 
We only pay our contributions to the scheme but do not get sick to use our 
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money. I wish the scheme we pay or give us rebate at the end of the year 
since we are not using the health services, but I do not think the scheme will 
agree on this”(IDI, female enrolee, 45 years Old,  9 June 2015). 
 
Another respondent explained that: 
 
“As an enrolee, one has to pay for most of the major things in the hospital 
such as laboratory tests, x-ray and drugs among others. I do not see any 
difference between NHIS and out-of-pocket payments. Many times, fee-for-
service patients have better care than NHIS enrolees do. For example, I went 
to the hospital for treatment, after the medical tests, the drugs prescribed for 
me were not available in the hospital. I bought the drugs in a pharmacy. 
However, if I am a fee-paying patient, the hospital will sell the drugs for me 
because I believe the drugs are available in the hospital pharmacy” (IDI, a 
male, 54 years Old, June 9 2015). 
 
In the interview, majority of the participants (23) agreed that they were financially protected 
against huge costs of medical bills only small number (7) disagreed. This finding confirm 
Barnighausen and Sauerborn (2002) assertion that cost containment is best achieved by a social 
health insurance scheme while other method such as co-payments is used for mobilization of 
additional funds, containment of costs and prevention of moral hazard among the insured. 
Similarly, Nguyen, et al., (2011) study on the effect of NHIS financial protection in Ghana reveal 
that NHIS significantly reduced catastrophic OOP payments on health services. In addition, it 
serves as a safety net for households thereby reducing their health care costs and increases their 
budgets for other essential needs.   
 
6.4  National Health Insurance Scheme Health Package 
Another important feature of a SHI scheme is its benefits package. Health benefits package varies 
from one health plan to the other with some have a wide range of coverage while others have 
limited coverage depending on the financial contribution of the enrolee (Bodenheimer and 
Grumbach, 2005). Hsiao and Shaw (2007) posit that SHI is not only to ensure members’ protection 
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against catastrophic health medical expenses but also to provide health care services including 
prophylactic and therapeutic care as specified in the benefit package. They however note that 
mobilizing more funds by SHI may not necessarily produce adequate health care for members. 
This perhaps happens where multiple funds exist and risks fragmented which in turn results in 
different benefit packages. Nevertheless, contributions from insured members are used to purchase 
a specified benefits package. However, it was gathered in the interview that the NHIS benefit 
packages include preventive and curative care provided by the three levels of care including 
primary, secondary and tertiary care, but there is no well-defined demarcation among the existing 
benefit packages within the scheme. An interview noted: 
 
“Everyone subscribed to primary health care package. That is the first port 
of call to health care services in the NHIS. The primary health care services 
include out-patient care, in-patient care, maternity care, routine check-up 
and all uncomplicated cases of care. However, the secondary health care 
services offer specialized care services on referral from the primary health 
care levels through the HMOs. Such services include Specialist care for 
Medical, Surgical, Paediatric and Obstetrics and Gynaecology cases 
Pharmacy, radiological and laboratory services etc. The tertiary health care 
services is the third and final stage of care. It consists of all services 
provided at the secondary level of care, and other highly specialized 
services referred from the secondary level” (IDI, female enrolee, 46 years 
Old, 10 June 2015). 
 
Another respondent substantiated the above view: 
 
“I enrolled for the primary health care package because it is the ‘gateway’ 
to other types of care. Secondary and tertiary care are available only by 
referral. Anyone who want to join NHIS must enrolee for primary health 
care. No one can jump queue the way the system is arranged. One moves 
from the primary type of care for common diseases to secondary facilities 
for serious illnesses and to tertiary (teaching hospital) care for complex 
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illnesses. That is how the scheme operates” (IDI, male enrolee, 38 years 
Old, 16 June 2015). 
 
From the above findings, respondents subscribed to primary health care package (the first port of 
call) while secondary and tertiary health care services are dependent on referral from the primary 
care. Furthermore, it was noted in the interview that the federal civil servants, self-employed and 
employees of private organisations who are interested in joining the scheme, register with the 
contracted HMOs and pay their contributions where applicable. HMOs with long history of 
insurance, wider scope and record of accomplishment tend to have more contracts and more 
enrolees than those who are limited in scope. For example, most of the HMOs with national status 
such as Hygeia Limited, Total Health Trust Limited, Ronsberger Nigeria Limited among others 
have about 200 hospitals and clinics across the country and this also influenced the number of 
enrolees in these organisations. Most of the participants in the interview enrolled with the 
aforementioned three HMOs and have access to prophylactic and therapeutic health care services 
within the network of the HMOs. No enrolee is allowed to use health care services outside the 
network of the HMOs. Below are excerpts from the interview. 
 
“All of us here in this institution are under Ronsberger Nigeria Limited as 
our HMO. I think one cannot just go outside the contracted HMOs for 
his/her organisation. Every organisation has its own assigned HMO and 
interested employees approach the HMO for registration in the NHIS” (IDI, 
male enrolee, 31 years Old, 16 June 2015). 
 
Another interviewee explained that: 
 
“Employers of organisations sign agreement with the HMOs to cover their 
employees, except for Voluntary Individual Programme whereby interested 
members in NHIS approach HMOs of their choice for registration. For us 
in this organisation, we are under the Hygeia Limited. Hygeia Limited is 
the assigned HMO for us. It has office here to attend to clients. We approach 
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the HMO for registration and supply all the require documents” (IDI, 
female enrolee, 37 years Old, 16 June 2015). 
 
The interview indicates that HMOs sign contracts with organisations except for the individual 
contribution programme where interested members of the public approach HMOs of their choice 
for registration. The enrolees are entitled to preventive and curative care including consultation 
with specialists, pharmacy services etc. Figure 6.2 below shows respondents rating of health care 
services under the NHIS.  
 
Figure 6.2 Percentage Distributions of Respondents Rating of NHIS Health Care Services. 
 
 
Source: Fieldwork, 2015 
 
From figure 6.2 above, 127 (9.6%) of the respondents indicate that the health services is much 
adequate. 332 (25.2%) shows that it is fairly adequate. 394 (29.9%) shows that it is moderate. 412 
(31.3%) indicates that it is fairly inadequate while 53 (4.0%) indicates that it is much inadequate. 
In sum, greater number of the respondents 465 (35.3%) indicate that the health services is adequate, 
459 (34.8%) indicate that it is inadequate while 394 (29.9%) reveal that it is moderate. These 
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findings is further explained in the interview, though with conflicting views from respondents 
about the health services. Out of the 30 participants interviewed 24 explained that the services is 
not comprehensive because there are essential services excluded from the package while 6 noted 
that there should be exclusion of some services that may not be needed by everyone. Below are 
excerpts from the interview: 
 
 “I am not too comfortable with the NHIS health care services. The scheme 
says it offers both primary, secondary and tertiary care but in practice, there 
is limitation to the services it offers. You pay out-of-pocket for many things 
as an enrolee these include drugs, medical tests, x-ray among others, these 
are essential things that need to be covered by the scheme” (IDI, female 
enrolee, 35 years Old, 10 June 2015). 
 
Another interviewee explained that: 
 
“The scheme is not offering a comprehensive health package because 
several services are excluded. In theory, the scheme covers almost all health 
conditions but in practice, essential services are left out. Health services for 
people with chronic diseases and eye care and many more are being paid 
for out-of-pocket. These are services one should have access to because for 
example, as one grows older, the possibility to see an optometrist may arise 
but since such services is excluded from the package paying out-of-pocket 
may be overwhelming” (IDI, male enrolee, 30 years Old, 16 June 2015). 
 
On the other hand, those with contrasting views explained that: 
 
“I do not think the scheme has adequate resources to offer a comprehensive 
health care package. A comprehensive health service is capital intensive and 
I do not think the scheme can afford such. In fact, a comprehensive service 
comprises of many services that may not be a priority to the population. For 
example, luxurious services such as cosmetic surgery is not a priority for 
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everyone. Those interested in such services should pay directly. However, 
services including family planning, treatment for people with chronic 
disease, eye care etc., should be included” (IDI, male enrolee, 48years 
Old, 16 June 2015). 
 
“I think the issue is not the comprehensive package but rather priority and 
relevant services that are needed by the people is the most important thing. 
Presently, the schemes offers a wide range of health services that are 
relevant to the population. However, there is need to expand the services 
gradually to include other essential services including pharmaceutical 
because when the doctor prescribes drugs for you that are not available in 
the hospital. You pay extra money to buy these drugs in private pharmacies” 
(IDI, male enrolee, 51 years Old, 16 June 2015). 
 
The above findings indicate that participants differ on their views regarding what makes a 
comprehensive health care package but they advocated for a comprehensive package that includes 
priority and relevant needs of the population without paying out-of-pocket for most of the services. 
Furthermore, it was noted in the interview that the services offer by the scheme affect perceptions 
and attitudes of people to enrolee in the scheme and remain after enrolment. Barnighausen and 
Sauerborn (2002) has argued that countries with established SHI and modelled Bismarckian 
incremental approach should aim for priority package and then gradually extend the benefits 
package to comprehensiveness though with the exclusion of luxurious services. Further analysis 
shows a chi-square test between occupation of respondents and the rating of health care package 
in order to get a clearer picture of how respondents differ based on their occupation and rating of 
health care package as indicated in table 6.3 and figure 6.3 
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Table 6.3 Chi square test of association between health services and occupation of respondents  
Rating of NHIS Health Care 
Package 
Occupation of Respondents  
Total Civil Servant Self-employed Private Sector 
Employee 
Much Adequate 102 (10.7%) 15 (10.9%) 10 (4.3 %) 127 (9.6%) 
Fairly Adequate 262 (27.6%) 17 (12.3%) 53 (23.0%) 332 (25.2%) 
Moderate 305 (32.1%) 21 (15.2%) 68 (29.6%) 394 (29.9%) 
Fairly Inadequate 244 (25.7%) 77 (55.8%) 91 (39.6%) 412 (31.3%) 
Much Inadequate 37 (3.9%) 8 (5.8%) 8 (3.5%) 53 (4.0%) 
Total 590 (100%) 138 (100%) 230 (100%) 1318 (100%) 
Calculated chi square: 73.634; df: 8; Probability value: 0.000 
Source: Fieldwork, 2015 
 
Table 6.3 above indicates an association between the rating of NHIS health care services and 
occupation of respondents. Occupation and health care services are mutually dependent, that is, 
the rating of health care services is dependent on the occupation of the enrolees. The relationship 
was significant at χ2 (8, N=1318) = 73.6, P<0.05). Further analysis is depicted in Figure 6.3 below. 
Highest percentage 32.1% of the civil servant rated the health package to be moderate. For the 
self-employed, the highest percentage 55.8% rated it to be inadequate while highest percentage of 
the private sector employees 39.6% rated it to be inadequate. Reasons for variation in the rating 
were noted in the interview. These include poor referral system, limited pharmaceuticals, and out-
of-pocket payments for most of the services. An interviewee explained that: “when I went to the 
hospital for treatment because I was down with malaria, I was only given generic paracetamol and 
malaria drugs; these are drugs that do not have branded names. They were put in the plastic sachets 
for me instead of giving me branded drugs. In addition, many times proper investigation are not 
done before treatment such as taking blood sample for analysis before treatment. The doctor just 
asked, “What is wrong with you” and after my explanations, he prescribed drugs for me 
immediately without medical tests. The disheartening part of the issue is that most of these drugs 
are not available at the hospital pharmacy. One need to get it elsewhere at your own cost” (IDI, 
male enrolee, 35 years Old, 16 June 2015). 
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Figure 6.3 Percentage Distributions of Respondents Rating of Health Package by Occupation.  
 
Source: Fieldwork 2015 
 
The findings show that respondents differ in their rating of NHIS health package based on their 
occupations. Those with formal employment, higher social economic status tend to have a benefit 
package with more services than those with informal employment and lower social economic 
status. Literature has also shown an association between health care package, occupation and social 
economic status of the beneficiaries. Liu et al. (2002) assessing equity in the urban health insurance 
reform in China, observe that after the reform there was horizontal equity in accessing basic care 
among different income groups. The low-income earners had significant increase in outpatient 
care. However, vertical equity existed in accessing health care among the people; low-income 
earners did not have access to advanced diagnostic technology. In the same way, Polonsky et al 
(2008) observe an equitable distribution of health benefits among community health insurance 
scheme in Armenia. However, participation was low because of inability to pay contributions and 
lack of a comprehensive health package that includes coverage for chronic diseases like 
hypertension, diabetes and AIDS etc. Thus, financial contribution of a health insurance scheme 
determines the benefit package available to the scheme. Carrin and James (2004: 25) note, “Better 
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performance of insurance schemes is associated with evidence that the benefit package is 
comprehensive and in accordance with society’s preferences so that resources are best utilised”. 
 
6.5  Conclusion 
This chapter explored socio-demographic characteristics of the respondents. It also examined 
financial contribution and health care benefits among enrolees. The findings indicates that federal 
civil servants are yet to commence monthly contribution to the scheme through pay-roll deduction 
but pay 10% co-payments per visit to health facilities while other groups including self-employed 
and employees of private organisations pay monthly contributions to the scheme. All the 
respondents were enrolled in the same benefit package comprises of primary health care, the 
‘gateway’ to secondary and tertiary health care through accredited HMOs contracted either by 
their employers in the case of formal sector programme or by interested individual for the 
voluntary contributors programme. Primary health care service is the entry point to the scheme, 
secondary and tertiary health services are based on referral from the primary care with approval 
by the HMOs. The contracted HMOs ensured that the enrolees have access to health care services 
within the network of providers. The respondents rated NHIS health care services to be adequate. 
However, conflicting views existed in the interview in reference to the composition of health 
package. Some noted that the benefit package excluded most essential and priority services needed 
mostly by the people; others advocated for a comprehensive package that includes priority and 
relevant needs of the population without paying out-of-pocket for most of the services. 
 
Furthermore, the study reveals a significant relationship between health care package and 
occupation of respondents, that is, health care package is mutually dependent on the occupation of 
the respondents. Occupation and socio-economic status tend to determine the benefits package 
available to the enrolees. This is observed in the chi-square analysis and rating of the benefits 
package by occupation of respondents.    
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
 
QUALITY OF SERVICES OF HEALTH MAINTENANCE ORGANISATIONS AND 
HEALTH CARE PROVIDERS 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
Chapter 7 examines the quality of services of HMOs and HCPs in the study area. Exploring the 
services of the two actors is important because it gives a better understanding of their roles and 
contributions to the implementation of NHIS. HMOs and HCPs are central to the implementation 
of NHIS in Nigeria in that the assessment of the two actors would help to improve their services 
and scale up NHIS coverage. The chapter covers discussions on the quality of services of HMOs 
and HCPs but analyses and discusses data for the HMOs first then HCPs. 
 
7.2.  Health Maintenance Organisations 
As mentioned earlier, HMOs occupy an important position in the implementation of NHIS in 
Nigeria. They are private or public organisations registered with the NHIS whose responsibility 
includes among others enrolment of prospective enrolees, collection of contributions from 
enrolees, contracting with providers to render a set of health services to the enrolees under the 
HMO and ensure payment of providers. The NHIS operational guidelines specifies the functions, 
obligations, etc., of the HMOs. HMOs play a significant role in the management and operation of 
the NHIS. Nevertheless, there is a concern about the quality of services expected by the HMOs. 
For that reason, a composite of questions on availability and accessibility were posed to the 
respondents. On whether HMOs are accessible to the enrolees, figure 7.1 shows that281 (20.9%) 
strongly agreed, 484 (36.1%) agreed, 392 (29.2%) disagreed, 53 (3.3%) strongly disagreed while 
132 (9.8%) undecided. On the aggregate, majority 764 (57%) agreed that HMOs services were 
accessible while 445 (33.1%) disagreed. 132 (9.8%) did not give any response.  
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Figure 7.1 Percentage Distributions of Respondents Rating of Access to Health Maintenance 
Organisations 
 
 
Source: Fieldwork, 2015 
 
Furthermore, the qualitative data substantiated this finding. Most of the participants (20 out of 30 
participants) in the interview noted that HMOs are easily accessible especially where their clients 
are located. A participant in the interview explained that: “to locate a HMO for registration is not 
a problem. They are easily located especially across the cities where they have offices. For 
example, I registered with Ronsberger Nigeria Limited here in University of Ibadan because there 
is one of their offices here” (IDI, male enrolee, 35 years Old, 23 June 2015).Thus, participants 
noted that HMOs are quite easy to locate for registration and other related matters. 
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Table 7.1 Chi square test of association between accessibility to HMOs and occupation of 
respondents  
 
Accessibility to HMOs Occupation of Respondents  
Total Civil Servant Self-employed Private Sector 
Employee 
Strongly agree 210 (21.8%) 25 (18.0%) 46 (19.1 %) 281 (20.9%) 
Agree 367 (38.1%) 20 (14.4%) 97 (40.2%) 484 (36.1%) 
Undecided 119 (12.4%) 13 (9.4%) 0(0.0%) 132(9.8%) 
Disagree 231 (24.0%) 72 (51.8%) 89 (36.9%) 392 (29.2%) 
Strongly disagree 35 (3.6%) 9 (6.5%) 9 (3.7%) 53 (3.9%) 
Total 962 (100%) 139 (100%) 241 (100%) 1342 (100%) 
Calculated chi square: 92.397; df: 8; Probability value: 0.000 
Source: Fieldwork, 2015 
 
The above table indicates an association between the rating of accessibility to HMOs and 
occupation of respondents. The table shows that access to HMOs and occupation of respondents 
are mutually dependent, that is, the occupation of respondents tend to influence their perceptions 
about accessibility to HMOs. There is relationship between the two variables and the relationship 
was significant at χ2 (8, N=1342) = 92.397, P<0.05). 
 
Table 7.2 Chi square test of association between accessibility to HMOs and gender of respondents  
 
Accessibility to HMOs Gender of Respondents Total 
Male Female 
Strongly agree 123 (17.1%) 158 (25.4%) 281 (20.9%) 
Agree 293 (40.8%) 191 (30.7%) 484 (36.1%) 
Undecided 87 (12.1%) 45 (7.2%) 132(9.8%) 
Disagree 182 (25.3%) 210 (33.7%) 392 (29.2%) 
Strongly disagree 34 (4.7%) 19 (3.0%) 53 (3.9%) 
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Total 962 (100%) 139 (100%) 1342 (100%) 
Calculated chi square: 38.795; df: 4; Probability value: 0.000 
Source: Fieldwork, 2015 
 
The above Table 7.2 indicates an association between accessibility to HMOs and gender of 
respondents. The table shows that access to HMOs and gender of respondents are mutually 
dependent, that is, the gender of respondents tend to influence their perceptions about access to 
HMOs. The relationship was significant at χ2 (4, N=1342) = 38.795, P<0.05). 
 
Figure 7.2 Percentage Distributions of Respondents Rating of Health Maintenance Organisations 
Enlightenment Programmes. 
 
 
Source: Fieldwork, 2015 
 
Figure 7.2 above indicates 122 (9.1%) of the respondents strongly disagreed on regular 
enlightenment programme from the HMOs, 693 (51.6%) disagreed, 218 (16.2%) strongly agreed, 
231 (17.2%) agreed while 78 (5.8%) undecided. On the aggregate, majority of the respondents 815 
(60.7%) disagreed that they received regular enlightenment programmes from the  HMOs, while 
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449 (33.4%) agreed. The finding clearly shows that 78 (5.8%) did not decide make any decision. 
The findings clearly shows that enrolees are not receiving regular educational or enlightenment 
programmes from the HMOs about the NHIS. The qualitative data corroborate the above findings. 
Out of the 30 participants in the interview, 28 noted that they were not adequately enlightened 
about the operation and the activities of the NHIS. A participant explained in the interview that:  
 
“I got the information about the NHIS including how to enrol for the scheme 
from colleagues. The HMOs are not doing enough in educating people 
about the programme and I think that is a problem because many people do 
not really understand how the scheme operates. As I said earlier, a friend 
gave me the information and linked me up with a HMO for the registration. 
However, it is the responsibility of the HMOs to educate people on regular 
basis about the programme as well as their right as enrolees. Because having 
better knowledge about the scheme would help us to know what we are 
entitled to as enrolees” (IDI, male enrolee, 46 years Old, 22 June 2015). 
 
Another respondent substantiated the above view: 
 
“I have never heard that any HMO has organised an educational programme 
to educate and enlighten people about the NHIS especially for the non-
enrolees. I think it is part of their responsibility to get people informed about 
the scheme including the registration process, privileges and benefits of the 
scheme” (IDI, female enrolee, 50 years Old, 23 June 2015). 
 
The above statements indicate that HMOs are lacking in the area of educational and enlightenment 
programmes not only for the enrolees but also for the non-enrolees. The interviewees reiterated 
that HMOs are one of the major players in the implementation and achievement of NHIS objectives 
because they are involved in the day-to-day activities of the scheme. These include enrolment of 
interested individuals, collection of contributions on regular basis from the enrolees where 
applicable, ensure enrolees receive proper treatment in the case of illness and pay providers for 
their services. In addition, because of their significant functions in the implementation of the 
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scheme, they are located across the major cities in order to ensure interested individuals, employers 
and employees are enrolled. However, they are not doing enough to educate the public about the 
scheme as well as their functions since it is their responsibility to sensitize the public. Figure 7.3 
shows respondents rating of satisfaction with the services of HMOs.  
 
Figure 7.3 Percentage Distributions of Respondents Rating of Satisfaction with HMOs’ Services  
 
 
Source: Fieldwork, 2015 
 
Figure 7.3 above indicates 114 (8.5%) of the respondents strongly agreed that they were satisfied 
with HMOs services, 478 (35.6%) agreed, 588 (43.8%) disagreed, 51 (3.8%) strongly disagreed 
while 111 (8.3%) undecided. The findings shows that highest proportion of the respondents 639 
(47.6) were not satisfied with HMOs’ services while 592 (44.1%) were satisfied, 111 (8.3%) did 
not make any decision. The qualitative data substantiate these findings. Out of the 30 participants 
in the interview, 19 noted that they were not satisfied with the HMOs’ services while 11 were 
satisfied. Conflicting views exist among the participants on the services of the HMOs. Those who 
were satisfied gave reasons for their satisfaction; these include accessibility, attitude of the 
employees, prompt response to clients’ queries etc. Some of the participants explained that: 
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“HMOs are accessible. They are very easy to locate because they have 
contacts with their enrolees on regular basis. In fact, I have my HMO’ phone 
number. I contact them on regular basis on issues relating to enrolment and 
benefit package. For example, sometime ago I wanted to register my son, I 
called my HMO and their response was fantastic. They make sure their 
enrolees are well treated, even in the case of health care” (IDI, female 
enrolee, 43 years Old, 23 June 2015). 
 
Another participant explained that: 
 
“I think the HMOs are trying to give the best to their client, that is, the 
enrolees. Whenever I went to their office or called them, they respond 
quickly to my query. There was a time I was in Lagos and I needed to know 
the health care providers in their network because I wanted to do my regular 
check-ups. I called them and they told me the nearest health care facilities 
to my location. They also check their enrolees on regular basis in the 
hospital in the case of hospitalisation” (IDI, female enrolee, 52 years Old, 
24 June 2015). 
 
On the contrary, those who were not satisfied noted poor attitude of HMOs to enrolees most 
especially in the case of referral. Some of the respondents explained that:  
 
“Most of these HMOs do not know their responsibility. In fact, they are very 
slow in responding to cases especially when it comes to referral of patients. 
They always want patients to remain in a particular hospital even when 
doctors make referral. There was a time my friend was sick and he went to 
the hospital for treatment. The doctor wanted to refer him to a specialist but 
he could not get approval from the HMOs on time. My friend had to wait 
for some days before the referral was approved. This is just one of the 
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instances where the HMOs were very reluctant to carry out their duty 
appropriately” (IDI, male enrolee, 46 years Old, 23 June 2015). 
 
Another participant noted that: 
“I am not satisfied with their services for many reasons. I will give you two. 
One is the unnecessary waiting period the HMOs subject enrolees to go 
through. I waited for many months before my registration as an enrolee was 
finalised. I do not understand the unnecessary delay. Two, poor 
communication between the enrolees and the HMOs. For example, it is the 
role of the HMOs to give their clients proper and regular information about 
their rights but HMOs do not feel concern about this because of the fear that 
when the enrolees know their rights they may challenge them on irregular 
activities they perpetrate on regular basis (IDI, female enrolee, 40 years 
Old, 23 June 2015). 
 
Although divergent opinions existed among the participants on the services of the HMOs, majority 
note that HMOs need to improve in their services to their clients especially in the area of referral. 
In addition, HMOs need to organise forums and educational and enlightenment programmes on 
regular basis so that enrolees can express their feelings and grievances and suggest ways to 
improve HMOs’ services which in turn will increase population coverage in NHIS. Figure 6.4 
below shows the overall rating of HMOs’ services by gender of respondents. Most of the 
respondents male 333 (24.8%) and female 244 (18.2%) rated HMOs’ services to be fair while male 
206 (15.4%) and female 216 (16.1%) rated it to be good. The findings indicate that the HMOs 
need to intensify efforts to improve in their services. Since they occupy a significant position in 
the implementation process of the NHIS, as the intermediary between the health providers and 
enrolees, they need to improve in their services regular basis to their clients. 
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Figure 7.4 Overall rating of HMOs services by gender of respondents. 
 
 
 
7.3  Health Care Providers 
 
Health care providers or facilities is another important actor in the implementation of NHIS in 
Nigeria. Health care providers include Doctors, Nurses, Pharmacists, Laboratory Scientists, 
Physiotherapists, and Radiographers etc. The NHIS operational guidelines specifies the functions 
and obligations of the HCPs to include provision of primary health care, secondary and tertiary 
services to the enrolees within the range of specific health package for the target groups. HCPs 
sign contract with the HMOs in order to offer a set of health care services to enrolees under the 
HMO (see chapter 2). However, a considerable debate dwelled on the perceived quality of services 
provided by the HCPs to the enrolees. To assess services of the HCPs, a range of questions were 
posed to the respondents. Percentage distributions of respondents based on their responses to 
various questions were presented in different charts. On excessive waiting for appointment, figure 
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7.4 shows that 79 (7.0%) respondents strongly agreed, 339 (25.3%) agreed, 747 (55.7%) disagreed, 
83 (6.2%) strongly disagreed while 79 (5.9%) undecided. On the total, majority of the respondents 
830 (61.9%) disagreed on excessive waiting for appointment with HCPs while418 (32.2%) 
respondents agreed, 79 (7.0%) respondents were undecided. Most of the participants in the 
interview noted that the scheme has improved in the area of consultation in the hospital. “One 
don’t need to queue up or sit down in the hospital unnecessarily because he/she wants to see a 
doctor for treatment or check-up. Doctors are very timely in attending to patients and I think this 
is an area in which the scheme is getting it right” (IDI, female enrolee, 46 years Old, 23 June 
2015).The findings corroborates existing literature that NHIS has reduced excessive waiting time 
for medical consultations (Hurst, 2010; Mohammed et al. 2011; Owumi, 2013). 
 
Figure 7.5 Percentage Distributions of Respondents Rating of Excessive Waiting for Appointment. 
 
 
Source: Fieldwork, 2015 
 
On availability of prescribed drugs, Figure 7.5 below indicates that 157 (11.7%) respondents 
strongly agreed, 414 (30.8%) agreed, 625 (46.6%) disagreed, 99 (7.4%) strongly disagreed, 47 
(3.5%) undecided. In total, majority 724 (54%) disagreed on the availability of prescribed drugs 
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in health care facilities, on the other hand, 571 (42.5%) agreed and 47 (3.5%) did not make any 
decision. 
 
Figure 7.6 Percentage Distributions of Respondents Rating of Availability of Prescribed Drugs 
 
 
Source: Fieldwork, 2015 
 
Corroborating the above findings are results of the various in-depth interview sessions, though 
conflicting ideas were presented in the interview, majority of the participants (25) severely 
complained that most of the prescribed drugs are usually not available in the health facilities. Some 
of the participants responded as thus: 
 
“I think availability of prescribed drugs in the NHIS health facilities is a 
serious problem facing the programme. Though I have witnesses on this 
issue, I have also witnessed this problem of non-availability of drugs at the 
hospitals. There was a time I went to the hospital went I had malaria. After 
the examination, the doctor prescribed drugs for me to buy in the pharmacy 
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instead of collecting the drugs at the pharmacy since my insurance covers 
it” (IDI, female enrolee, 46 years Old, 23 June 2015). 
 
“Most of the prescribed drugs are not available at the health facilities. The 
available ones are just the common drugs like paracetamols, vitamins etc. I 
can tell you that about 80% or more of the prescribed drugs are not available 
at the health services for the enrolees. Most enrolees are given prescription 
to buy at the pharmacy” (IDI, male enrolee, 56 years Old, 23 June 2015). 
 
On the other hand, those with contrary views noted that though not all prescriptions are available 
at the health facilities for the enrolees, some of the prescribed drugs are usually available and 
dispense to the patients whether you are NHIS enrolees or not. A participant explained that:  
 
“There are drugs at the health facilities for the enrolees but at times when 
the prescribed drugs are out of stock, one may be asked to buy at the nearest 
or available pharmacy. Though most of the prescribed drugs are generic, I 
think it is just a way to reduce costs of health expenditures for the enrolees” 
(IDI, female enrolee, 52 years Old, 24 June 2015). 
 
Another participant explained that: 
 
“I will not say there are no drugs at the health facilities. The problem is not 
that there are no drugs but generic drugs is what people are worried about. 
People do not believe in the efficacy of generic drugs, they often considered 
generic drugs as substandard to branded drugs. I have seen my colleagues 
complained of the generic types of drugs usually dispensed at the health 
facilities for the enrolees. Because they are cheaper and affordable, patients 
usually complain of its efficacy. I think there is different between 
availability of drugs and prescription of generic drugs. Generic drugs is the 
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main issue that affects people’ satisfaction with NHIS services” (IDI, male 
enrolee, 56 years Old, 24 June 2015). 
 
Based on the above findings, although conflicting ideas existed in the interview, majority 25 out 
of 30 participants were of the view that non-availability of prescribed drugs at the health facilities 
for the enrolees is a usual occurrence while others disagreed. This finding however contradicts 
Osungbade, et al., (2014) who observed high satisfaction in drug prescription among respondents 
in Ibadan.   
A cross tabulation and χ2analysis was carried out to investigate the relationship between 
occupation of respondents and their perceptions about availability of prescribed drugs (Table 7.3) 
 
Table 7.3 Chi square test of association between occupation and availability of prescribed drugs. 
Availability of Prescribed 
drugs 
Occupation of Respondents  
Total Civil Servant Self-employed Private Sector 
Employee 
Strongly agree 123 (12.8%) 0 (0.0%) 34 (14.1 %) 157 (11.7%) 
Agree 273 (28.4%) 42 (30.2%) 99 (41.1%) 414 (30.8%) 
Undecided 47 (4.9%) 0 (0.0%) 0(0.0%) 0(0.0%) 
Disagree 450 (46.8%) 89 (64.0%) 86 (35.7%) 625 (46.6%) 
Strongly disagree 69 (7.2%) 8 (5.8%) 22 (9.1%) 99 (7.4%) 
Total 962 (100%) 139 (100%) 241 (100%) 1342 (100%) 
Calculated chi square: 63.881; df: 8; Probability value: 0.000 
Source: Fieldwork, 2015 
 
The above findings show that the respondents differ in their perceptions about availability of 
prescribed drugs. The highest percentage by occupations indicates that 89 (64.0%) of the self-
employed disagreed with the availability of prescribed drugs, 450 (46.8%) of the civil servant 
disagreed while 99 (41.1%) of the private sector employee agreed. However, the χ2analysis shows 
that occupation of respondents tends to influence their views about the availability of drugs 
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(occupation and availability of drugs are dependent). The relationship between two variables was 
significant at χ2 (8, N=1342) = 63.881, P<0.05). 
On interpersonal relationship between enrolees and HCPs, Figure 7.7 below shows that 59 (7.4%) 
respondents rated it to be poor; 420 (31.3%) rated it to fair, 475 (35.4%) rated it to be good, 320 
(23.8%) rated it to be very good and 68 (5.1%) rated it to be excellent. On the aggregate, greater 
number of the respondents 863 (64.3%) rated their interpersonal relationship with health care 
providers to be good, 420 (31.3%) rated it to be moderate while 59 (7.4%) rated it to be poor. This 
indicates that majority of the enrolees have good interactions with the providers whenever they 
visit providers for health care services. This finding confirms Mohammed, et al., (2011) who posit 
that client’s satisfaction with health facilities is a composite of many factors including receipt of 
courteous attention at the hospital. In addition, Bodenheimer and Grumbach, (2005) note that some 
patient interactions with health providers influence their decisions to use health care services. 
Figure 7.7 Percentage Distributions of Respondents Rating of Interpersonal Relationship with 
Health Care Providers. 
 
Source: Fieldwork, 2015 
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On the overall rating of health services as indicated in the Figure 7.8 below, the highest number of 
the respondents 712 (53.1%) rated it to be fair, 345 (25.7%) rated it to be good, 151 (11.3%) rated 
it to be very good, 99 (7.4%) rated it to be poor and 35 (2.6%) rated it to be excellent. The 
qualitative data substantiate these findings. Out of the 30 participants in the interview, 19 noted 
that the health services is moderate reason being that NHIS enrolees tend to receive less services 
compared to those who pay out of pocket. A participant noted, “health care providers including 
doctors and nurses treat patients who pay out-of-pocket better than NHIS enrolees. This action is 
notable in many areas including drugs prescription, and diagnostic test” (IDI, male enrolee, 59 
years Old, 24 June 2015).Another participant substantiate this view as thus: 
 
“I think the health care services received by the enrolees is unsatisfactory 
because we are not only restricted to services, we are also not treated equally 
with those who pay directly for their services. In my own view, I think they 
are treated better than we are and this undermines peoples’ interest in the 
scheme” (IDI, female enrolee, 42 years Old, 24 June 2015). 
Figure 7.8 Percentage Distributions of Respondents Rating of Health Services. 
 
 
 
Source: Fieldwork, 2015 
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Table 7.4 Cross tabulation of Respondents Occupation by Health Care Services 
HEALTH CARE 
SERVICES 
OCCUPATION TOTAL 
Civil Servant Self employed Private Sector 
Employee 
Poor 85 (8.8%) 5 (3.6%) 9 (3.7%) 99 (7.4%) 
Fair 519 (54.0%) 68 (48.9%) 125 (51.9%) 712 (53.1%) 
Good 217 (22.6%) 35 (25.2%) 93 (38.6%) 345 (25.7%) 
Very good 109 (11.3%) 29 (20.9%) 13 (5.4%) 151 (11.3%) 
Excellent 32 (3.3%) 2 (1.4%) 1 (0.4%) 35 (2.6%) 
Total 962 (100%) 139 (100%) 241 (100%) 1342 (100%) 
Source: Fieldwork, 2015 
The above table shows more than half 519 (54.0%) of civil servant, 68 (48.9%) of self-employed 
and more than half 125 (51.9%) of private sector employee rated the NHIS health care services to 
be fair. The implication of this is that NHIS needs to improve its health care services to the 
enrolees. When people have confidence on health care services, it increases their interest and 
enrolment rate (Mohammed, et al., 2011). 
 
7.4  Conclusion 
This chapter explored the quality of services of HMOs and HCPs. The findings indicates that 
HMOs are quite accessible for registration of potential enrolees and other related matters especially 
in the urban areas because they have offices across the main cities. However, the findings reveals 
that HMOs are lacking in the area of educational and enlightenment programmes not only for the 
enrolees but also for the non-enrolees. Because the HMOs occupy a very important position in the 
implementation of NHIS, for example, enrolment of prospective enrolees, collection of 
contributions from insured members, signing contract with providers to provide a set of services 
to the specified enrolees and payment of providers, they need to organise on regular basis 
informative, educative and sensitization programmes. It was revealed in the study that the HMOs 
are not doing enough in this respect and thus, undermines peoples’ knowledge and interest in the 
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scheme. The findings shows that majority of the respondents were not satisfied with the services 
of the HMOs. Areas in which they expressed dissatisfaction include (1) lack of prompt responses 
to referral because providers need to take approval from the HMOs before a referral can be made 
and (2) inadequate informative programmes about the scheme to the public. People are not well 
informed about the scheme though it is part of the responsibilities of the HMOs. 
For the HCPs, the findings reveals that HCPs have improved in the area of excessive waiting for 
consultation in the hospital, as timely intervention by providers was revealed in the study. 
However, the findings reveals that most of the respondents were disagreed with the availability of 
prescribed drugs though there were conflicting views on this subject. Some noted that there is usual 
occurrence of unavailability of prescribed drugs; others expressed prescription of generic drugs as 
the main challenge. Furthermore, majority of the respondents rated their interpersonal relationship 
with the enrolees to be good. On the overall rating of the health services, the findings indicates 
that majority of the respondents rated the services to be fair and needs improvement. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
 
 
KNOWLEDGE, ATTITUDES AND PERCEPTIONS OF NON-ENROLEES ABOUT 
NATIONAL HEALTH INSURANCE SCHEME 
 
8.1 Introduction 
 
Chapter 8 examines knowledge, attitudes and perceptions of non-enrolees. Research on non-
enrolees is imperative because it provides better understanding of their knowledge, attitudes and 
perceptions about the NHIS, which in turn will enhance their confidence and interest on the 
scheme. It will also help the scheme to strategize in reaching out to the public. A range of questions 
regarding knowledge, attitudes and perceptions of non-enrolees were examined in this chapter.  
 
8.2  Knowledge about National Health Insurance Scheme 
Knowledge is an important factor in the decision to enrol in NHIS. It is when people are 
knowledgeable about the scheme that their interest will be inspired. In other word, knowledge is a 
condition in which public interest in the scheme is based. Therefore, a well-informed people tends 
to make informed decision. The respondents in the study were asked a number of questions 
regarding their knowledge. On whether the respondents have knowledge about the availability of 
NHIS as indicated in the Figure 8.1 below, 275 (73.1%) stated ‘yes’ they have knowledge about 
its availability while 101 (26.1%) stated ‘no’ they have no knowledge about the scheme. This find 
shows that majority of the respondents have knowledge about the availability of the scheme. The 
qualitative data confirmed this finding as majority (13) out of (15) participants noted that they have 
heard about the scheme. A participant explained, “I have heard about the NHIS about four years 
ago” (IDI, Female, non-enrolee, 29 June 2015). In the same manner, most of the participants 
expressed their views regarding their knowledge of the scheme. Only few did not have knowledge 
of the scheme’ existence. Adequate awareness of NHIS has also been reported in the literature 
(Ogben, 2014; and Jehu-Appiah et al., 2011). Both studies conclude that adequate awareness of 
NHIS tends to influence people’s decision to enrol.  
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Figure 8.1 Respondents’ Percentage Distributions of Knowledge about NHIS 
 
Source: Fieldwork, 2015 
 
Table 8.1 Chi square test of association between occupation and knowledge of NHIS. 
 
         Occupation             Knowledge Total 
Yes No 
Civil servant 63 (22.9%) 5 (5.0%) 68 (18.1%) 
Self employed 192 (69.8%) 91 (90.1%) 283 (75.3%) 
Private sector employee 20 (7.3%) 5 (5.0%) 25 (6.6%) 
Total 275 (100.0%) 101 (100.0%) 376 (100.0%) 
Calculated chi square: 17.809; df: 2; Probability value: 0.000 
Source: Fieldwork, 2015 
 
The above χ2analysis indicates that occupation and knowledge of respondents are dependent. The 
occupation of respondents tends to influence their knowledge of the scheme. The relationship was 
significant at χ2 (2, N=376) = 17,809, P<0.05). 
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On the sources of knowledge about NHIS, Figure 8.2 below indicates that 113 (30.1%) respondents 
indicated radio as their source of knowledge of the NHIS. Eighty-one (21.5%) indicated television, 
57 (15.2%) indicate newspapers. Thirty-eight (10.1%) indicated publications such as magazines 
and flyers of the scheme, 34 (9.0%) indicated others such as family members, colleagues and 
friends as their source of knowledge while 23 (6.1%) indicated health workers such as nurses etc., 
as source of their knowledge. Thus, different sources of information were available to the 
respondents though most of them got information about the scheme from the mass media such as 
radio, television and newspapers. Mass media occupies an important position in dissemination of 
information about NHIS to the public. 
 
Figure 8.2 Sources of Knowledge about National Health Insurance Scheme 
 
 
Source: Fieldwork 2015 
 
On the description of the NHIS, Figure 8.3 shows that 203 (54.0%) respondents described NHIS 
as a prepayment scheme for health care, 86 (22.9%) described it as out-of-pocket payment, 62 
(16.5%) described it as free health care while 25 (6.6%) could not give any description of the 
NHIS.  Thus, this indicates that majority 203 (54.0%) of the respondents had knowledge about the 
basic assumption of NHIS as a prepayment mechanism for health care. 
 
163 
 
 
 
Figure 8.3 Percentage Distributions of Respondents on the Description of NHIS 
 
Source: Fieldwork, 2015 
 
Table 8.2 Cross tabulation of Education and the Definition of NHIS  
Education                                     Definition of NHIS TOTAL 
Prepayment OOP 
Payment 
Free health 
care 
I don’t know 
No edu. 4 (2.0%) 2 (2.3%) 1 (1.6%) 3 (12.0%) 10 (2.7%) 
Primary sch 9 (4.4%) 5 (5.8%) 2 (3.2%) 3 (12.0%)  19 (5.1%) 
Sec. school 50 (24.6%) 27 (31.4%) 19 (30.6%) 4 (16.0%) 100 (26.6%) 
NCE/HND 64 (31.5%) 28 (32.6%) 23 (37.1%) 10 (40.0%) 125 (33.2%) 
HND/B.Sc 50 (24.6%) 15 (17.4%) 6 (9.7%) 4 (16.0%) 75 (19.9%) 
P/graduate 26 (12.8%) 9 (10.5%) 17 (17.7%) 1 (4.0%) 47 (12.5%) 
Total 203(100.0%) 86 (100.0%) 62 (100.0%) 25 (100.0%) 376(100.0%) 
Source: Fieldwork, 2015 
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The Table 8.2 above indicates a relationship between education of respondents and definition of 
NHIS. More than half of the respondents 199 (52.9%) who had a form of education defined NHIS 
as a prepayment scheme. Qualitative data substantiate the above findings, though some of the 
participants in the interview have had about the scheme but they did not understand the basic 
assumption of the scheme. Out of 15 interviewees, 11 had understanding of the principle of NHIS. 
Below are extracts that clearly describe most definitions of the participants: 
 
“I think NHIS is about paying small amount on a regular basis for health 
care, in case one falls sick, he/she then will be able to use health care without 
having to pay directly at the hospital for medical costs” (IDI, Female, non-
enrolee, 42 years Old, 29 June 2015). 
 
Another participant explained that: 
 
“In my own understanding, NHIS is about planning ahead for uncertainty 
about one’ health by paying small amount on monthly, quarterly or annually 
to an insurance company. The money will then be used to pay for health 
care should the person or family members fall sick. Anyone can be sick at 
any time and the money one has contributed will be used to pay for the 
person’s medical bills” (IDI, male, non-enrolee, 56 years Old, 29 June 
2015). 
 
On the other hand, those with less knowledge of the NHIS explained the scheme in a different 
way. Below are extracts: 
 
“I think NHIS is a government programme to provide health care for people 
at no cost. It is about providing free health care for people and I think it is a 
good gesture if government can make it a reality because we all want free 
health care for our households”(IDI, Female, non-enrolee, 61 years Old, 
30 June 2015). 
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Another participant depicted: 
 
“NHIS is paying for health care at the point of service. There is no free 
health care provision anywhere because one has to pay whenever he/she 
needs health care services” (IDI, Female, non-enrolee, 59 years Old, 4 
July 2015). 
 
Although there were some participants in the interview who were not adequately informed about 
the basic assumption of NHIS in reference to prepayment mechanism, most (11 out of 15) 
participants were better informed about NHIS as a prepayment model for health care provision 
whereby one pays small amount on a regular basis prior to falling ill. Knowledge of the scheme 
basic assumption constitutes an appropriate tool, relevant in the implementation the insurance 
programme (De Allegri, et al., 2006). 
 
8.3  Attitudes and Perceptions about National Health Insurance Scheme 
 
Attitude and perception are individual traits that influence people decision to enrol and remain in 
the NHIS. NHIS is a voluntary scheme and therefore people views, opinions and emotional 
responses are important factors that determine their willingness to enrol in the scheme. A number 
of questions on attitudes and perceptions were posed to the respondents. On whether respondents 
are willing to enrol for NHIS, Figure 8.4 below shows that 274 (72.9%) respondents indicated 
‘yes’ while 74 (19.7%) indicated ‘no’. Moreover, most (11) out of 15 participants in the interview 
indicated their willingness to enrol in the scheme if they have the opportunity such as financial 
capability. Below are extracts from the participants on their willingness to enrol in the NHIS. 
 
“I am interested in the NHIS because it is a very good programme that helps 
to pay for health care. It saves people from huge financial costs of medical 
bills. Paying directly out-of-pocket for health care can be very 
overwhelming most especially when one does not have cash to pay. In fact, 
I have sold some of my property some time ago to pay for medical bills, so 
this programme will save one from taking different and perhaps 
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inconvenient steps such as the one I have mentioned earlier which could 
negatively affect the whole family” (IDI, Female, non-enrolee, 58 years 
Old, 30 June 2015). 
 
Another participant noted: 
 
“It is good to save money for health care and that is what exactly NHIS 
stands for because illness does not give notice. It can just happen at any 
time. Gone are those days when our elders used to say that it is not good to 
plan for something unpleasant such as illness. Therefore, to avoid such 
unpredictable health issues, it is better for a person to enrol in the NHIS. 
Once I am financially buoyant, I will enrol my wife, children and myself 
for the programme” (IDI, male, non-enrolee, 64 years Old, 30 June 2015). 
 
Figure 8.4 Percentage Distributions of Respondents Willingness to Enrol for NHIS 
 
 
Source: Fieldwork, 2015 
 
The above findings shows that most of the respondents are willing to enrol in the NHIS. This was 
evidenced as majority 274 (72.9%) indicated ‘yes’ and most of the participants in the interview 
indicated willingness to enrol. However, respondents differ in their socioeconomic characteristics 
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and willingness to enrol. Figure 8.5 shows that education of respondents tends to influence their 
willingness to enrol. Ninety (83.3%) of respondents with NCE/OND indicated ‘yes’ while 18 
(16.7%) indicated ‘no’. For respondents with secondary school education, 80 (80.8%) indicated 
‘yes’ while 19 (19.2%) indicated ‘no’. Fifty-three (74.6%) of those with HND/BSc indicated ‘yes’ 
while 18 (25.4%) indicated ‘no’. For those with postgraduate education, 35 (74.5%) indicated ‘yes’ 
while 12 (25.5%) indicated ‘no’. For respondents with primary education, 12 (75.0%) indicated 
‘yes’ while four (25.0%) indicated ‘no’ On the other hand, those with no formal education varied 
slightly. Four (57.1%) indicated ‘yes’ while three (42.9%) indicated ‘no’.   
 
Figure 8.5 Percentage Distributions of Respondents Level of Education and Willingness to Enrol 
 
Source: Fieldwork, 2015 
 
Table 8.3 Chi square test of association between education and willingness to enrol 
 
         Education                 Willingness Total 
Yes No 
No formal education 4 (1.5%) 3 (1.4%) 7 (2.0%) 
Primary school 12 (4.4%) 4 (5.4%) 16 (4.6%) 
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Secondary. School 80 (29.2%) 19 (25.7%) 99 (28.4%) 
NCE/HND 90 (32.8%) 18 (24.3%) 108 (31.0%) 
HND/B.Sc 53 (19.3%) 18 (24.3%) 71 (20.4%) 
Post graduate 35 (12.8%) 12 (16.2%) 47 (13.5%) 
Total 274 (100.0%) 74 (100.0%) 348 (100.0%) 
Calculated chi square: 4.920; df: 5; Probability value: >.05 
Source: Fieldwork, 2015 
 
The above χ2analysis indicates that education and willingness to enrol in NHIS are independent of 
each other, that is, formal education does not necessarily influence willingness to enrol in the 
scheme. The relationship was not significant at χ2 (5, N=348) = 4.920 P>0.05). 
 
Figure 8.6 below indicates respondents’ level of income and willingness to enrol. For those that 
earned above 10000 naira ($50.2) monthly, 255 (73.3%) indicated ‘yes’ while 19 (18.7%) 
indicated ‘no’. In contrast, those that earned less than 10000 naira monthly, 65 (5.5%) indicated 
‘yes’ while nine (2.6%) indicated ‘no’. 
 
Figure 8.6 Percentage Distributions of Respondents Level of Income and Willingness to Enrol 
 
 
Source: Fieldwork, 2015 
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Table 8.4 Chi square test of association between income and willingness to enrol 
 
         Income                 Willingness Total 
Yes No 
<10000 naira 19 (6.9%) 9 (12.2%) 28 (8.0%) 
10000 naira and above 255 (93.1%) 65 (87.8%) 320 (92.0%) 
Total 274 (100.0%) 74 (100.0%) 348 (100.0%) 
Calculated chi square: 2,152; df: 1; Probability value: >.05 
Source: Fieldwork, 2015 
 
The above χ2analysis indicates that income and willingness to enrol in NHIS are independent of 
each other, that is, income does not necessarily influence willingness to enrol in the scheme. The 
relationship was not significant at χ2 (1, N=348) = 2.152 P>0.05). The above findings confirm 
existing literature (e.g., Allegri, et al., 2006) that a number of factors influence peoples’ 
willingness and decision to enrol; however, these may not necessarily result in actual enrolment. 
 
Figure 8.7 Percentage Distributions of Respondents Impediment to Enrolment 
 
 
Source: Fieldwork, 2015 
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Figure 8.7 above shows that 163 (47.5%) respondents indicated financial barrier as the impediment 
to enrolment, 87 (25.45) indicated sociocultural belief as the impediment, 52 (15.2%) indicated 
that they are always healthy, and thus, need not to enrol while 41 (12.0%) indicated other reasons 
as hindrance to enrolment. The findings show that most 163 (47.5%) of the respondents attributed 
their financial constraints to enrolment. These findings are further corroborated in the interview, 
though with a range of views from the participants about the impediment to enrolment. Although 
most of the participants, 8 out of 15 explained that financial constraints remained as the main 
challenge to enrolment, 2 noted that their religious belief simply does not encourage them to enrol 
because it is a perceived plan ahead for illness. Others indicated other reasons such as 
unavailability of NHIS programme in their community. Below are extracts from the participants: 
 
“My problem is money. If I have money, nothing will stop me from joining 
the NHIS because I have seen some of the beneficiaries, even my 
neighbours are among them. They testified about the programme and 
encouraged me to join. One of them even told me that he does no longer 
feel threatened or intimidated because of money whenever any of his family 
members is sick since he joined the NHIS. This word really motivated me 
to join but money is my problem” (IDI, male, non-enrolee, 60 years Old, 
30 June 2015). 
 
Another participant noted: 
 
“Since I was informed about NHIS, I have been longing to enrol but my fear 
is the monthly contribution. You know that I have to pay my contribution 
but I do not have a good job. I am just managing somewhere as a 
journeyman. The little pay I get from my job barely sustain my family and 
me, so getting money to enrol and pay subsequent contributions is a 
challenge” (IDI, male, non-enrolee, 57 years Old, 4 July 2015). 
 
On the other hand, participants with sociocultural viewpoints noted: 
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“I do not belief in paying upfront for illness. In fact, it is against my 
conviction. As a Christian, I pray for good health and my healing is in Jesus 
Christ because He has promised good health for his followers. Therefore, 
having announced Christ as my healer, it will be odd for me to start paying 
money should in case I fall sick” (IDI, female, non-enrolee, 48 years Old, 
4 July 2015). 
 
“Look! I do not believe in this western medicine because they only lessen 
illnesses but not totally cure them. Whenever, I feel unhealthy, I used ‘agbo’ 
traditional herb and within 2 two days I feel better and get back to work. 
Therefore, I am not interested in the NHIS stuff because I do not need it” 
(IDI, male, non-enrolee, 65 Years Old 30 June 2015). 
 
However, some of the interviewees explained that though money is a factor in enrolment and 
continued with the scheme after enrolment, unavailability of NHIS programmes in many towns 
and villages is also a challenge. Below are excerpts from the interviewees: 
 
“There is no NHIS programme in this village even if I want to enrol where 
will I enrol? NHIS is only for people in the city. People in the rural areas do 
not feel the impact of the NHIS and that is the problem. We only heard of 
the programme but we are not opportune to be part of the beneficiaries. I 
wish the programme is available here many people including me would 
have tried to enrol though money to pay is an issue too” (IDI, male, non-
enrolee, 60 years Old, 30 June 2015). 
 
 Financial constraint toped the discussion on impediment to enrolment. This has also been reported 
in the literature (Amo, 2014), as impediment to enrolment in Ghana. However, another significant 
factor noted is the non-availability of NHIS programmes in the rural areas. The non-enrolled 
individuals in the rural areas explained that they are aware of the scheme but had no opportunity 
to take part in the programme. They explained that NHIS programme is biased towards the urban 
areas. In addition to financial constraint and unavailability to NHIS programme in the rural areas, 
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belief system, and perceived good health status, also stand out as impediment to enrolment. This 
is in line with Jehu-Appiah et al. (2011) who observed that household’s decision to enrol in Ghana 
was influenced by health beliefs and attitudes among others. However, on what could be done to 
increase the number of enrolment, the participants unanimously called for ‘free’ enrolment of the 
poor. Below are excerpts. 
 
“I think if government can make NHIS free for the poor people who cannot 
afford to pay the contribution; the problem of low enrolment will be fixed. 
Many people especially the low-income earners or rural population find it 
difficult to pay. Let me tell you, to eat is very difficult for many people. 
Therefore, where will such people get money to pay for NHIS” (IDI, male, 
non-enrolee, 54 years Old, 30 June 2015). 
 
Another participant corroborate this view. 
 
“I think NHIS should be free for all if government is determined to cover 
everybody. I told you earlier that the problem to enrolment is money. People 
want to be protected from the burden of official cost because if you go for 
treatment in the hospital, you cannot say exactly what the cost of the 
treatment will be but with NHIS, one would not bother about the expenses. 
The scheme will pay for the medical bill. If NHIS makes announcement 
today that enrolment is free, half of Nigerian population will enrol within a 
month” (IDI, Female, non-enrolee, 50 years Old, 30 June 2015). 
 
8.4  Conclusion 
 
This Chapter examined knowledge, attitudes and perceptions of non-enrolees about the NHIS. The 
findings indicate adequate awareness of NHIS among the respondents from different sources 
including radio, television, newspaper, publication etc. Moreover, the respondents’ awareness of 
the scheme was reflected in their description of NHIS as majority described NHIS as a prepayment 
scheme. The study also indicates respondents’ willingness to enrol. The χ2analysis shows 
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significant relationship between occupation and knowledge about the scheme.  Although education 
and income of respondents are among other factors that influenced their willingness to enrol, the 
relationship is not significant. Furthermore, the findings reveals that financial constraint topped 
the impediment to enrolment. However, others issues were also revealed in the interview as 
hindrance to enrolment. These include perceived good health status, religious belief and belief in 
traditional medicines and unavailability of NHIS programme. The study also shows that for NHIS 
to increase population coverage, enrolment should either be free for the poor and low-income 
earners, or free for all.  
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CHAPTER NINE 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
9.1  Introduction 
 
Chapter 9 concludes with synthesis of the research findings. This thesis was predicated on the 
lacuna between NHIS objectives and actual implementation of programmes, which in turn 
negatively affects scaling up population coverage in Nigeria. It is from this proposition, specific 
research questions were formulated, these include (1) what is the structure and functions of NHIS? 
(2) What are the mechanisms adopted by NHIS to meet universal coverage objectives? (3) What 
are the challenges that inhibit the achievement of the set objectives? (4) What is the extent of 
equity in terms of financial contributions and health benefits among enrolees? (5) What is the 
extent of availability and accessibility of services of HMOs and providers? (6) Finally, what is the 
knowledge, attitudes and perceptions of non-enrolees about the scheme? The rest of this chapter 
presents evidence on the outline of the thesis, the contribution of the thesis to knowledge, policy 
recommendations and areas for further research. 
 
9.2  Overview of the thesis   
 To have a better understanding of this study, it is necessary to have a summary of the whole thesis. 
The thesis commenced with background information on health care financing policy in general 
and this was narrowed down to health care financing in Nigeria, and thus, research problem for 
the study was identified. Chapter 2 provided historical development of the evolution of the NHIS. 
It traced the historical context for the establishment of NHIS to 1962 when the bill was first 
introduced to the national parliament. However, because health care provision and other social 
services was being provided by government, financed through taxation and meting heath care 
needs of every Nigerian at no direct costs on individual and households, the bill was jettisoned.  
The bill was reintroduced to the parliament in the 1980s because of government inability to 
continue to finance health care due to slow economic growth rate and structural adjustment policies 
of the international financial institutions as a condition to access bailout loan. The chapter also 
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discussed institutionalisation of NHIS and analysed the provisions of the Act and the operational 
guidelines that guides implementation of NHIS policy. 
 
Chapter 3 presented bodies of literature on health sector reform. Subjects reviewed in the literature 
include health sector reform, structural adjustment programmes and health sector reform; risk 
sharing scheme, national health insurance, financing health care in Nigeria, and NHIS in Nigeria. 
The chapter also presented the conceptual framework used in this thesis, that is, key conceptual 
issues in health care financing functions developed by Carrin and James (2004). The framework 
hinged on the theory that for SHI financing model to achieve its set objectives including “sufficient 
and sustainable resource generation, optimal resource use and financial accessibility of health 
services for all” (Carrin and James, 2004: 20), the three interrelated financing functions namely 
revenue collection, risk pooling and purchasing must work together because they are 
interdependent.  
 
Chapter 4 discussed the research methodology used in this thesis. Firstly, the chapter presented 
theoretical underpinning for the cross sectional research design used. Secondly, it argued for the 
adoption of a mixed method of qualitative and quantitative techniques. Thirdly, it presented the 
study area, study population, sampling techniques, research instrument etc. Fourthly, it presented 
data collection and data analysis. Fifthly and finally, it discussed challenges experienced in the 
fieldwork and ethical issues namely informed consent, confidentiality, beneficence and non-
maleficence, and dissemination of research in line with the ethical considerations. Feedback from 
research questions gathered in the course of this research work using this methodological 
procedure were presented in chapter 5, 6, 7 and 8 as presented below. 
 
Chapter 5 presented key informant interview with the NHIS officials, HMOs’ employees and 
HCPs using the three interrelated health financing functions namely revenue collection, risk 
pooling and purchasing. On revenue collection, questions on population coverage and method of 
financing were posed to the interviewees. Empirical findings indicated that there is no accurate 
number of the total enrolled population in NHIS and this was due to lack of comprehensive 
database of the enrolees, which in turn resulted in conflicting numbers of total population coverage 
by the scheme. Moreover, on the method of financing, the study revealed that the federal 
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government as an employer of labour subsidises the health care cost of each of its employees who 
has enrolled in the NHIS by 90% because payroll deduction has not commenced for this group due 
to the impasse between the government and the labour union. Other beneficiaries including private 
organisations and voluntary individuals pay their financial contributions on regular basis. 
However, government subsidises the cost of health care of all enrolees.  
 
The study revealed that the revenue generated through contributions from members of the scheme 
was not sufficient to fund health care services of members given the small proportion of the 
Nigerian population covered. On risk pooling, the study indicated that the scheme is fragmented 
with so many programmes in place without risk pooling among the existing programmes. 
Membership to various programmes is voluntary and thus affects the size in terms of population 
coverage. Overall, the study revealed that NHIS is fragmented and there are no transfer or 
redistribution of funds among the existing programmes.  
 
On purchasing/provision, research evidence showed that there were similarities among benefit 
packages in the scheme in terms of provision of preventive and curative services. Primary Health 
Care is the first point of health care provision in the scheme. All members enrolled in the Primary 
Health care, access to Secondary and Tertiary care is by referral from the primary care. Moreover, 
the study showed that there is disagreement between the HMOs and the HCPs in terms of payment 
of capitation and other reimbursements, which often influenced providers’ behaviour towards 
NHIS patients. In addition, a number of issues were revealed that hindered the achievement of 
NHIS objectives. These include policy content, government commitment, inadequate mobilisation 
etc.  
 
Chapter 6 presented socio-demographic characteristics of the respondents, financial contribution 
and health benefits of the enrolled individuals in NHIS. Research evidence showed that financial 
contribution to the scheme is progressive in the formal sector programme and regressive in the 
informal sector programme because of the fixed contribution rate. Findings also revealed that 
employees of the federal civil service pay 10% as co-pay for consultations while other enrolees 
pay their statutory monthly contributions. Furthermore, the study showed that majority of the 
respondents agreed that they were financially protected from catastrophic spending. However, the 
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overall benefit package was rated moderate because of the exclusion of some priority and essential 
needs. Further analysis showed a significant relationship between occupation of respondents and 
health package, that is, the level of health care package is dependent on the occupation of the 
enrolees. 
 
Chapter 7 examined quality of services of the HMOs and HCPs. For the HMOs, evidence showed 
that most of the respondents agreed that HMOs are accessible. However, the study revealed that 
most of the respondents were disagreed that HMOs organise educative and informative 
programmes on regular basis. On the overall satisfaction with the HMOs’ services, most of the 
respondents were not satisfied. For the HCPs, majority of the respondents indicated improved 
waiting time good interpersonal relationship between enrolees and providers. However, they 
disagreed with the availability of prescribed drugs. On the overall rating of the services, most of 
the respondents rated the services to be fair. Further analysis showed access to HMOs and 
occupation of respondents are mutually dependent, that is, the occupation of respondents tends to 
influence their perceptions about accessibility to HMOs. There is relationship between the two 
variables and the relationship was significant at χ2 (8, N=1342) = 92.397, P<0.05). In addition, 
study also shows that access to HMOs and gender of respondents are mutually dependent, that is, 
the gender of respondents tends to influence their perceptions about access to HMOs. The 
relationship was significant at χ2 (4, N=1342) = 38.795, P<0.05). 
 
Chapter 8 examined knowledge, attitudes and perceptions of the enrolees about NHIS. Evidence 
indicated adequate knowledge among the respondents through different sources including radio, 
television, newspaper etc. In the same way, most of the respondents described NHIS as a 
prepayment mechanism. The study also revealed that most of the respondents were willing to enrol 
in the NHIS. The χ2analysis indicates that occupation and knowledge of respondents are 
dependent. The occupation of respondents tends to influence their knowledge of the scheme. The 
relationship was significant at χ2 (2, N=376) = 17,809, P<0.05). Willingness to enrol is influenced 
by socioeconomic factors. However, the χ2analysis indicates that education and willingness to 
enrol in NHIS are independent of each other, that is, formal education does not necessarily 
influence willingness to enrol in the scheme. The relationship was not significant at χ2 (5, N=348) 
= 4.920 P>0.05). Similarly, χ2analysis indicates that income and willingness to enrol in NHIS are 
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independent of each other, that is, income does not necessarily influence willingness to enrol in 
the scheme. The relationship was not significant at χ2 (1, N=348) = 2.152 P>0.05). Further analysis 
showed hindrances to enrolment with financial barrier as the most hindrance. Others include 
sociocultural belief, perceived good health status and non-availability of NHIS programmes 
especially in the rural areas.  
 
9.3  Thesis’ Contribution to Knowledge  
The NHIS was instituted to protect individuals and households from financial hardship and ensure 
financial accessibility of health services for all. However, the percentage of Nigerians who are 
benefiting from the scheme remained stuck to less than 3% of the population. The thesis therefore 
investigated questions associated with the design and implementation of NHIS programmes. The 
design and implementation of NHIS programmes is crucial in the redistributive process in order 
to achieve democratic and egalitarian objective of universal coverage. In this respect, the thesis’ 
contribution to knowledge is group into methodological and empirical as explained below: 
 
9.3.1  Methodological Contributions 
The thesis used empirical methods to explore the design and implementation policy of NHIS. 
Cognizance of different stakeholders involved in the implementation of NHIS policy, both 
quantitative and qualitative approaches were used to allow in-depth exploration. Key informant 
interview was used to elicit open and in-depth information from the NHIS’ officials, employees of 
the HMOs and health care providers on broader issues regarding the design and implementation 
policy of NHIS. In addition, a combination of in-depth interview and semi structure questionnaire 
was used in order to elicit robust information from the enrolees and non-enrolees taking into 
consideration sample size. In accordance with recommended high standard of enquiry, the use of 
sampling techniques served the purpose of capturing differences in view, opinions, experiences, 
common preferences. As a result, the use of a mixed method provided better understanding of 
broader issues on the design and implementation policy of NHIS. 
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9.3.2  Empirical Contributions 
The design and implementation policy of NHIS in Nigeria is understudied. The fact remains that 
health-financing policy is a pertinent concern in the face of increasing deprivation of majority of 
Nigerians from accessing health care because of the huge medical cost of health services. Available 
studies on NHIS have focused on benefits, quality of services and challenges. There are research 
gaps. For example, where NHIS objectives contradicted implementation policy or fails to meet its 
statutory objectives of universal access. Thus, this thesis contributed to existing literature in health 
financing policy in the following ways: 
9.3.2.1  Fragmentation of Programmes 
 Research evidence indicated that although there are three main programmes designed by the 
scheme to cover the Nigerian population. These include the formal sector programme, informal 
sector programme and the vulnerable group programme. However, only two namely the formal 
and the informal programmes are operational. Furthermore, evidence indicated that within the two 
operational programmes, there are a number of sub-programmes. Thus, the scheme is fragmented 
in a number of ways including one, presence of several programmes covering different population 
groups related by socio-economic status, occupation etc. Two, lack of risk pools in the scheme, 
which negates the fundamental principle of social insurance scheme. Thus, the fragmentation of 
the programmes and lack of risk pools has affected the financial strength of not only individual 
programme but also the entire programmes to achieve a fair financial protection of members. In 
addition, evidence from the study indicated that the voluntary nature of NHIS hinders several 
people (those who can afford premiums) especially the middle or high-income earners from 
joining.  
 
9.3.2.2 Limitation to Health Care Services 
Primary Health Care package is the first port of call to health care provision in the scheme. All 
members enrolled in the Primary Health care, access to Secondary and Tertiary care is by referral 
from the primary care. The study showed limitation to some essential services including 
pharmaceutical services, laboratory test etc. which results in paying for these services through out 
of pocket payment. 
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9.3.2.3 Level of funding  
 
The thesis showed that the government subsidises the cost of enrolees in the NHIS. Because the 
revenue generated by contribution from the enrolees remained insignificant compared to the 
services offered, government is heavily involved in subsidization of the costs. Furthermore, lack 
of fairness based on the fixed contribution showed regressive nature of financial contribution 
among the enrolees of individual contributors programme, in that the low-income earners pay 
proportionately higher contributions than the high-income earners. Evidence also showed that 
federal government as an employer of labour subsidised the health care cost of its employees who 
has enrolled in the NHIS by 90% while the employee paid 10% co-pay for every consultation.  
 
Another area the thesis contributed to knowledge is that research evidence showed that respondents 
were not satisfied with the services of the HMOs. Areas of dissatisfaction include referral services 
and irregular organisation of informative and educative programmes for the public including the 
enrolees. Furthermore, the thesis showed improved waiting time good interpersonal relationship 
between enrolees and providers, albeit it showed disagreement with the availability of prescribed 
drugs. The thesis also contributed to scholarship in the area of public knowledge, attitudes and 
perceptions on social policy in that it showed public knowledge of NHIS as a health financing 
policy with the principle of prepayment mechanism. However, financial constraints, sociocultural 
and unavailability of NHIS programmes among others were revealed as hindrances to enrolment.  
 
9.4  Policy Recommendations 
In the light of the research evidence, the followings are recommendations: First, merging of the 
existing pools into manageable size. Although NHIS has three main programmes, several sub-
programmes that cover different population groups with smaller number of population coverage 
existed. Therefore, government should ensure integration of the existing smaller programmes into 
the major ones. This would enhance the organisation and better management of the existing 
programmes. Second, merging all funds together and establishing a single national fund. Since the 
goal of NHIS is to ensure universal coverage and financial accessibility of health services for all, 
government should ensure merging of existing funds into a single one and then ensure existence 
of risk pools. Merging of funds improve risk pooling; reduce adverse selection as well as increase 
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efficiency and equity in the SHI. Third, the best way to fund NHIS in order to achieve universal 
coverage is through tax revenue. Therefore, in order to break the fetter of slow population 
coverage, government should resort to funding of NHIS through taxation. However, based on the 
fiscal constraint, making membership compulsory for some programmes such as the formal sector 
programmes would increase funding to ensure low-income earners and the poor have access to 
health care through subsidization. It is acknowledged in the literature that several countries that 
have achieved high population coverage adopted compulsory membership for middle or high-
income group of their populations while government pays the contribution of low-income earners 
through general tax. 
 
Finally, NHIS should intensify effort to ensure there is a comprehensive database of the total 
number of enrolees, because having knowledge of the total number of the enrolled individuals 
would help the scheme to plan for extension to the population uncovered. Furthermore, the scheme 
should ensure the quality of services of the health care providers and HMOs are improved. It is 
when enrolees have quality services that they will be willing to encourage others to join the 
scheme.  
 
9.5  Area for further Research   
The study was conducted in Oyo state, Nigeria, further research in other states would shed light 
on the similarities and differences because of the socioeconomic diversities that exist in the 
country. Furthermore, since this study was conducted among the civil servants, self-employed and 
private sector employees, it would also be insightful to conduct similar research in the community-
based programme. 
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APPENDIX 3 
 
QUESTIONNAIRE FOR THE ENROLEES 
 
 
 
 
Department of Sociology 
         College of Human Sciences 
         University of South Africa 
. 
Serial No… 
Date … 
Dear Respondent,  
I am a postgraduate student of the department of Sociology University of South Africa, carrying out a study on the topic 
The Design and Implementation Policy of National Health Insurance Scheme in Oyo State Nigeria. I request your 
support to answer questions contained in this questionnaire. You have been selected randomly for this study and all the 
information you will supply will be strictly kept confidential.  
 
Thanks in anticipation of your cooperation. 
 
Yours Sincerely,     
Augustine Omoruan            
 
SECTION A: Socio-economic and Demographic Characteristics 
S/N QUESTION RESPONSES AND CODING CATEGORIES 
001 
 
What is your sex? 
 
Male [      ] 
Female [      ] 
1 
2 
002 What is your age range (in years)? 
 
18-20  [      ] 
21-25   [      ] 
26-30    [      ] 
1 
2 
3 
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31-35     [      ] 
36-40      [      ] 
41-45    [      ] 
46-50   [      ] 
51 and above [      ] 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
003 What is your marital status? Married    [      ] 
Single       [      ] 
Divorced [      ] 
Separated [      ] 
1 
2 
3 
4 
004 What is your highest educational qualification?  Primary school    [      ] 
WASCE/GCE/NECO[      ] 
OND/NCE    [      ] 
HND/First Degree [      ] 
Post graduate[      ] 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
 
005 
 
What is your religious affiliation? 
 
African traditional religion [      ] 
Islam [      ] 
Christianity[      ] 
1 
2 
3 
006 
 
What is your monthly income? Less than 10000[      ] 
10000-30000 [      ] 
30001-50000 [      ] 
50001-70000 [      ] 
70001-90000 [      ] 
90001-110000[      ] 
110001 and above [      ] 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
007 What is your occupational status? Civil servant     [      ] 
Public servant  [      ] 
Self-employed [      ] 
Private sector employee [      ]  
Teachers[      ] 
Lecturers [      ] 
Others (pls specify) 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
008 What is your ethnic origin? 
 
 
Yoruba [      ] 
Hausa [      ] 
Igbo  [      ] 
Others (pls specify) 
1 
2 
3 
4 
009 Where do you live? 
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Equity in financial contributions and health benefits 
S/N QUESTION RESPONSES AND CODING CATEGORIES 
010 Is there any deduction from your salary as your 
contribution to NHIS? 
Yes[      ] 
No [      ] 
1 
2 
011 What health plan did you subscribe?  
 
012 Is your financial contribution determines the volume of 
your health benefits? 
Yes[      ] 
No [      ] 
1 
2 
013 Do you pay for extra charges after being attended to by 
healthcare providers? 
Yes[      ] 
No [      ] 
1 
2 
014 Is your health plan covers other members of your 
household? 
Yes[      ] 
No [      ] 
(If  No) 
1 
2 
015 Why?  1 
 
016 How would you rate the health benefits in terms of your 
financial contribution? 
Adequate [    ] 
Fair [    ] 
Inadequate [    ] 
1 
2 
3 
017  Has NHIS reduced your health care cost?  Yes[   ] 
No[    ] 
 
 
 
 Availability and Accessibility of NHIS Services  
Please indicate the extent of your agreement with the following statement (kindly tick your 
answer) 
S/N 
 
STATEMENT  
 
Strongly 
agree 
Agree undecided Disagree  Strongly 
disagree 
018 Joining the scheme has benefited me      
019 NHIS is better than OOP payment      
020 No difficulty in accessing services      
021 The service I received worth my financial 
contribution. 
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022 NHIS has considerably increase my savings 
from paying hospital bills 
     
023 I do not need money to pay for hospital care any 
more 
     
024 I get immediate care if I need it 
 
     
025 Treatment through NHIS is effective for 
recovery and cure 
     
026 The quality of medication is good      
027 The provider do a good clinical examination      
028 There are adequate health personnel in NHIS 
accredited hospitals  
     
029 The medical equipments are adequate      
030 Attitude of health staff is good      
031 No delay in responding to NHIS enrolees      
032 NHIS health service providers are closer to my 
house 
     
033 I am satisfied with the services received from the 
providers 
     
034 HMOs are adequate in terms of service delivery      
035 Most often, it is difficult to get HMOs officials 
for registration and other processes. 
     
036 Most often HMOs officials failed to attend to 
their clients complaints. 
     
037 The relationship between HMOs and healthcare 
providers is cordial 
     
038 I am satisfied with the services of HMOs       
039 I will visit NHIS hospital again if it becomes 
 needful for me 
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040 Hospital meeting with my expectation about 
equipment 
     
041 I am not delayed unnecessarily in the hospital 
when I go for treatment 
     
042 Availability of medication in pharmacy      
Kindly Rate the following statements  Excellent Very 
good 
Moderate Fair  Poor 
043  Interpersonal relationship with the health 
personnel 
     
044 Overall rating of health services       
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APPENDIX 4 
 
QUESTIONNAIRE FOR THE NON-ENROLEES 
 
DEPARTMENT OF SOCIOLOGY 
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH AFRICA 
 
Section A: Demographic Characteristics 
No Questions Response Value Skip 
1  Sex of respondent Male 
Female 
1 
2 
 
2 What is your age range (in years)? 18-20  [      ] 
21-25   [      ] 
26-30    [      ] 
31-35     [      ] 
36-40      [      ] 
41-45    [      ] 
46-50   [      ] 
51 and above [      ] 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
 
3 Which ethnic group do you belong? Yoruba [      ] 
Hausa [      ] 
Igbo  [      ] 
Others (pls specify)… 
1 
2 
3 
4 
 
4 What is the highest level of school you 
have completed? 
No formal education 
Primary school 
Junior secondary 
Senior secondary 
NCE/OND 
HND/B.Sc 
Postgraduate 
0 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
 
5 What religion do you profess? Christianity 
Islam 
ATR 
Others (specify) 
1 
2 
3 
4 
 
6 What is your current marital status? Single 
Married 
Divorced 
Separated 
1 
2 
3 
4 
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Section B: Knowledge, Attitudes and Perceptions about National Health Insurance Scheme 
 
9 Have you heard about National 
Health Insurance Scheme? 
Yes 
No 
1 
2 
 
10 From which source did you get the 
information about NHIS? 
From the health workers 
Television 
 Radio 
Newspapers, Publication 
and Journals 
Others............................. 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
 
11 How would you describe NHIS? Prepayment for health 
care 
Out-of-pocket payment 
for health care 
Free health care 
I don’t know 
1 
 
          2 
 
          3 
          4 
 
12 Are you willing to enrol for NHIS? Yes 
No 
1 
2 
 
13 Why did you not enrol in NHIS? Financial barriers 
Culturally unacceptable 
Always healthy 
1 
2 
3 
 
Widowed 5 
 
 
7 What is your present occupation? Civil servant     [      ] 
Self-employed [      ] 
Private employee [      ] 
Others (pls specify)… 
1 
2 
3 
4 
 
 
 
 
8 What is your average monthly income? Less than 10000[      ] 
10000-30000 [      ] 
30000-50000 [      ] 
50000-70000 [      ] 
70000-90000 [      ] 
90000-110000[      ] 
110000 and above [      ] 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
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Others ……………. 4 
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APPENDIX 5 
 
DEPARTMENT OF SOCIOLOGY 
COLLEGE OF HUMAN SCIENCES 
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH AFRICA 
 
KEY INFORMANT INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR NHIS OFFICIAL 
 
1. What is the total number of the population coverage in the NHIS? 
 
2. Since financing of NHIS is important in order to ensure financial protection of enrolees 
against health care costs, what is the level of financial commitment of government, 
employers and enrolees to the scheme? Probe. 
 
3. What is the ratio of contribution from enrolees to the total costs of benefit package? Probe. 
 
4. How does NHIS ensure that households are protected against catastrophic expenditures? 
 
5. What is the composition of risk pools and is there cross subsidisation among the existing 
pools? 
6. What measures are in place to ensure effective risk pooling among pools? Probe. 
 
7. Is there variation among existing benefit packages? Probe 
 
8.  How are providers being paid? Probe 
 
9. What mechanism is in place to ensure universal health insurance coverage? Probe. 
 
10. What are the challenges militating against NHIS? Probe 
 
11. How do you think NHIS can improve its coverage? Probe.  
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APPENDIX 6 
 
DEPARTMENT OF SOCIOLOGY 
COLLEGE OF HUMAN SCIENCES 
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH AFRICA 
 
KEY INFORMANT INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR EMPLOYEES OF THE HMOs 
 
1. How would you describe NHIS contributions in reference to its financial protection of 
Nigerians? Probe. 
 
2. What is the total number of enrolees in your organisation? 
 
3. How would you describe your relationship among other stakeholders, especially the 
healthcare providers? Probe. 
 
4. How do you ensure that the enrolees are well informed on the processes for registration 
and related issues? Probe. 
 
5. What Challenges do you encounter in the course of discharging your services? Probe. 
 
6. What mechanism do you employ in the payment of providers for their services? 
 
7.  How do you think NHIS can improve its coverage? Probe. 
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APPENDIX 7 
 
 
DEPARTMENT OF SOCIOLOGY 
COLLEGE OF HUMAN SCIENCES 
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH AFRICA 
 
KEY INFORMANT INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR HEALTH CARE PROVIDERS 
 
1. What is your perception about NHIS as a viable financial option to OOP payment? 
 
2. What health care packages available to the enrolees? Probe.  
 
3. How would you describe the relationship exists between provider (you) and HMOs? 
Probe. 
 
4. How are you reimburse for your services to the enrolees and how will you describe the 
process for the reimbursement? Probe. 
 
5. What challenges do you encounter as NHIS healthcare provider? Probe. 
 
6. What general comment do you have on how NHIS can improve its coverage? Probe. 
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APPENDIX 8 
 
 
DEPARTMENT OF SOCIOLOGY 
COLLEGE OF HUMAN SCIENCES 
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH AFRICA 
 
IN-DEPTH INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR ENROLEES 
 
1. How would you describe OOP payment with NHIS? Probe. 
 
2. How would you describe your experience with HMOs and healthcare providers? 
 
3. What are the bureaucratic procedures involve in the registration as enrolees in NHIS? 
Probe. 
 
4. What type of NHIS plan did you subscribe for and are you satisfied with it? Probe. 
 
5. How would you describe equity in terms of your financial contribution and benefits? Probe. 
 
6. Are you satisfied with the services of health care providers and health maintenance 
organisations? Probe. 
 
7. Does socio-economic status of employees determine their access to healthcare services? 
Probe. 
 
8. What challenges do you think are hindering coverage of NHIS in the country? Probe. 
 
9. Would you encourage people to join the scheme? Probe. 
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APPENDIX 9 
 
 
DEPARTMENT OF SOCIOLOGY 
COLLEGE OF HUMAN SCIENCES 
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH AFRICA 
 
IN-DEPTH INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR NON-ENROLEES 
 
1. Have you heard about NHIS? If yes,  
 
2. From what source? 
 
3. How would you describe NHIS? Probe 
 
4. Are you willing to enrol? If  yes 
 
5. What stop you from enrolment? Probe 
 
6. What do you think government can do to increase the number of enrolment in the NHIS? 
Probe. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
